Is Europe going into crisis again?

Brussels ) only four months ago, Europhilia Emmanuel Macron was elected president of France, and it seemed that the European Union would finally experience a period of calm. But calm is the last thing anyone can see in the streets of Barcelona, where demonstrations in favour of Catalonia's independence a referendum that was brutally banned by government forces have faced protests against her.

As the internal conflict in Spain escalates, a return to the crisis in Europe seems totally inevitable. And what is happening on Spanish soil already affects the recovery of Europe's economy, which is strengthening by reaching the limits of what the EU can achieve.

The power of the EU's economic recovery is made clear by the lack of a serious sign on the financial market after the horrific scenes in Catalonia. If a similar situation occurred a few years earlier, then the stock market in Spain would drop sharply. Today, however, markets are not noticing political uncertainty in that country.

Reliance is built on its solid foundations. The entire eurozone economy is growing considerably. As the Spanish economy rose even faster than the eurozone average, it managed to keep foreign affairs very well.

This means that the establishment of the Spanish economy is based on production, more than on the rise of consumption, as it did during the pre-crisis economic boom. Add to this the existence of Eurozone institutions that can address temporary financial difficulties faced by banks or states, and it becomes even clearer why the deep political crisis in Spain did not associate with the dangerous flow of the financial market.

But the Catalonia crisis also highlights EU integration model restrictions, which are rooted in the fact that the recent European Union is based on nationals. This model cannot be described as intergovernmental. Rather, it is based on indirect implementation: tell everything you do and do The EU is conducted by national governments and their administrators.

This distinction can be seen more clearly in the field of monetary policies, where the decision-making mechanism is definitely not intergovernmental: The ruling Council of the European Central Bank operates on the basis of a simple majority.

But the implementation mechanisms are clear that they are indirect, not direct: when a decision is made, it is implemented by national central banks a function that can have huge consequences.

The European Court of Justice in Luxembourg another joint institution of enormous importance also relies on decision-making mechanisms that are not intergovernmental. Yet, judges are elected by national governments, national courts, and relevant administrations that empower decisions in question.

A comparison with the United States would enhance the weakness of this policy we are talking about. While the US Federal Reserve has a regional structure, district reserve banks cover various states and are not linked to any state government or any institution. And the judges of the U.S. Supreme Court are nominated by federal institutions (Sennati accepts or refuses nominals by sending them to the president), not by state governments.

For the EU, which relies on its member states which build common institutions, was arguably the only way to launch the integration process, simultaneously spreading a deep distrust among states that had waged brutal wars against each other. And yet, a union that relies on the nation-state, not just on the implementation issue, but also on legitimacy, can only function until each member of it functions. But, already, since most of them have internal conflicts, the EU model appears to be at its end.

In Greece, the weak administrative and judicial system has hampered economic recovery. In Poland and Hungary, non-liberal governments are undermining the independence of the judiciary. And in Spain, the political system seems unable to resolve the conflict between the Catalonian government, with its aspirations for greater self-rule, and the central government in Madrid, which argues that even simply considering this aspirations would undermine constitutional order.

Even Germany is facing domestic political challenges. Losing a fifth of the votes in the federal elections, Chancellor Angela Merkel must deal with undisciplined coalition partners during her fourth mandate, and possibly the latest. As for Italy, polls show a large majority already backing populist and/or Eurosceptic parties.

Although Eurosceptic parties do not seem likely to gain power anywhere, these recent political developments are not good news for European integration. The EU is facing little hostility for now. It's facing, as a replacement, with an obscurantistic cyndiference as long as its member states continue and more, are getting distracted with their internal problems, making Europe integration a second-hand issue in most of the continent.

These EU leaders, who still want to push forward the integration issue, cannot count on the argument they used during the financial crisis, that there is no alternative. But the consensus that allowed the integration of the first years has already been forgotten. If the united is to go further, the European leaders must find a new pattern to overcome the apathy and deep hatred that is changed in them. / Prepare in Albanian: Periscope