Kosovo no longer has U.S. lobbie contracts: experts show what that means

In itself, that is just a fact. But in practice, it opens a broader debate: how important is lobby for a small country that relies on the United States as its most important political and security ally?

The answer is not the same for all.

For some American policy connoisseurs, the lack of lobbiing contracts is a sign that Kosovo has reduced its presence in Washington at a time when it should strengthen it.

Others argue that the problem is not lobby firms, but the lack of a clear foreign policy strategy and a more active diplomacy.

The debate takes place at a time when relations between Kosovo and the US have passed several trials.

Strategic dialogue between the two countries, long warned, has not yet begun.

In recent years, American officials have repeatedly sought to reduce tensions in the north and progress in dialogue with Serbia, while repeating they expect a stable and functional partner in Pristina.

The lobbi, otherwise, is not a replacement for diplomacy, but in Washington it has become part of the way many governments build access to decision-makers, organise meetings and promote their political, economic or security interests.

Kosovo is not unknown to this practice.

Since the 1990s and after the declaration of independence, Kosovo institutions have engaged some of the most popular lobbie firms in the US.

For years, they have helped establish contacts with American administrations, Congress and other influential actors in Washington.

Since June 2024, this practice has ceased.

Neither Presidency nor Government nor other institutions provide active contracts to the Foreign Agents Record Act (FARA) - American law requiring the registration of individuals and companies representing foreign interests before American institutions.

Radio Free Europe addressed the Kosovo Presidency, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Diaspora, as well as incumbent Foreign Affairs Minister Glauk Konjufca, with questions whether Kosovo plans to engage lobbie companies in the United States again and how it aims to strengthen its diplomatic presence there, but, until the publication of this article, it received no response.

A tool that Kosovo left behind?

For Petrit Selimi, former Kosovo foreign minister, the lack of lobbie contracts is not an administrative detail.

According to him, it reflects a deeper change in the way Kosovo has dealt with its relationship with Washington.

He recalls that the lobby has been part of Kosovo's foreign policy since the 1990s, to continue even after the declaration of independence in 2008, when Kosovo institutions have co-operated with companies known to create access to decisionmakers, organise meetings and be in the American political agenda.

This has not been a luxury, but a vital need for small states like Kosovo”, Selimi tells Radio Free Europe.

According to him, this need has become even greater in recent years, as the way Washington functions, under President Donald Trump's administration, has changed.

Besides traditional institutions, the largest role has been to take on political networks, councilors and private lobby companies, which, according to him, often have more direct access to decisionmakers.

“In the last few years we've needed companies that help open doors”, Selimi says.

The “is nothing less than tragic and completely unintelligible that Kosovo has weakened both its own diplomatic presence at the Embassy, as well as its interaction with US private lobbyists”, he adds.

In his assessment, the problem is not just the absence of a lobbie contract.

He argues that Kosovo has simultaneously reduced two mechanisms that must complement each other: diplomacy and lobby.

If he were to advise the Government of Kosovo today, Selimi says the first step would be strengthening the Embassy in Washington with competent staff.

Kosovo diplomatic presence in Washington

In addition, it proposes the commitment of two specialised lobbyist companies - one for political, economic and security agendas, and another for strategic communication and digital diplomacy.

For him, these are not secondary expenses, but investments in Kosovo's ability to protect and promote its interests in the American capital.

Diplomacy before lobe

The idea that Kosovo lacks lobby companies does not convince everyone.

Robin Brooks, former official at the US National Security Council, argues that debate often overestimates the role of lobbyists and underestimates diplomacy.

She says diplomats, not lobbyists, should be the main channel for representation of Kosovo, because they act on mandate from their government, are transparent and bear responsibility for protecting state interest.

“I would rather work with a colleague, a diplomat who I know represents his country's foreign minister, president or prime minister”, Brooks tells Radio Free Europe.

It expresses skepticism to lobby, stressing that it carries danger to corruption, creates personal and business relations that are not always transparent and may not be in line with the broader interests of both the United States and the country represented.

“Lobsters often did things that seemed less legitimate to me as diplomats. They established relationships with American officials through dinners, trips, gifts and other forms of approach, along with providing”, she says.

According to Brooklyn, lobbies can be useful only in limited and very specific cases when a small state - with limited diplomatic capacity - has a specific objective that its diplomats cannot fully cover.

As examples, it cites the development of a civil nuclear energy programme or the opening of a particular export market.

For this reason, the lobbyists are -- on limited issues and very specific”, Brooks says.

So, instead of new lobbiing contracts, she says she would invest in a more powerful embassy, with more diplomats and capacities to build direct relations with Congress, American administration and policymaking centres.

Source not strategy

At one point between these two positions is Blerim Vela, former head of the Kosovo president's cabinet, Vjosa Osmani.

For him, the debate is not whether Kosovo should engage the lobby firm, but how it should build its presence in Washington.

The US lobby issue must be seen as a tool for realising goals in foreign policy”, he tells Radio Free Europe.

Vela, currently foreign research associate of the Centre for Security and Stability in Oslo, argues Kosovo's representation should be based on three pillars: The embassy in Washington, the Albanian-American community and, as a supplementary element, lobbie contracts.

But, according to him, none of them can produce results if there is no co-ordination between the presidency, Government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a co-ordinated <x0-political” that gives continuation to foreign policy objectives.

He estimates that even the way the American administration works has changed.

The decision-making, he says, has become more centralised at the White House, which requires yet another approach from Kosovo.

We need to understand how decisions are made in the American system and adapt to it”, Vela says.

He adds that, before new lobbying contracts are discussed, institutions must strengthen diplomacy itself. That means embassies with more clearly defined diplomats and targets.

Kosovo's “government and Kosovo institutions must do their job. Their primary job is to ensure that embassies are as numerous diplomats as possible. Then, to establish targets”, he says.

But for Vela, the challenge goes beyond relations with the United States.

He argues that domestic political crises have caused Kosovo's foreign policy to lose continuity and initiative, making the country less present on the international stage.

If you continue with this approach, you will lose your step and then it will be difficult to consolidate your location”, he concludes.

Lessons From Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina

Unlike Kosovo, Serbia - which continues to reject Kosovo's independence and lobbie against its membership in international organisations - invests in its presence in Washington.

According to the US FDA registry, Serbian institutions and related subjects currently have six active lobbiing contracts, covering various areas, from economic and energy co-operation to representation of Belgrade's political interests.

For Brooklyn, however, Serbia's influence is not limited to these contracts.

She notes that Serbia's Embassy in Washington is “probably five times the largest” than that of Kosovo, with more staff and resources, which enables them to build continued relations with various American institutions.

As an example, Brooks mentions former Serbian Ambassador to the US Marko Djuric, who during a period of the Biden administration, according to her, had “direct access to President” and was later appointed foreign minister.

Marko Djuric was every day in Congress, knocking on doors, building relationships, organizing business dinners, and doing the job she needed to do. He could do that because he was a close friend to the president of the country”, Brooks says.

In this case, she also mentions Bosnia and Herzegovina primarily as a warning example of how lobby can be used incorrectly.

It emphasises that, although 16 lobbiing contracts are registered in the US, “mostica, in fact, represent Republika Srpska”.

According to her, their main goal has been to lift sanctions on former Serbian entity Freedom Milorad Dodik - a goal that, Brooks says, did not serve the interests of Bosnia and Herzegovina and did not develop transparently.

For Brooklyn, this is a reminder that a state cannot only build foreign policy on lobo contracts.

I don't want diplomacy to work on the basis of the principle 'pay to get access'”, it concludes.