Italian Institute: Kosovo sanctioned, while no sanctions against Serbia

The Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI), one of Italy's most prestigious foreign policy studies institutes, has published an analysis about developments in the Western Balkans, including problems between Kosovo and Serbia.

This institute also writes about measures taken against Kosovo, which according to the institute, a thought shared by more than 50 European, British and American deputies who sent him a letter in early August. The EU, the US and Great Britain by inviting them to change their strategy for Kosovo.

The risks of such an approach are twofold. First of all, it leaves an eye on Serbia's position in the region, where Belgrade carries from a policy intervention aimed at building the so-called Serbian “ “ “: an intersection between a updated version of the nationalist “Great Serbia” and Moscow's policy in its neighbourhood called “mir “ <6>

As for the first danger, the Institute for International Political Studies estimates that the Ohrid Agreement had two long-term geopolitical objectives: avoiding tension centres between the two countries and turning Serbia away from Russian orbit, drawing it close to the western camp.

“While Belgrade's conviction to pass sanctions against Moscow is currently both utopic and non-consistent on their eventual economic impact, the hope is at least that Serbia will break its ten-year shift between Russia and the European Union. In particular, if Serbia stops from obstructing Kosovo's approach to the UN and other organisations, the political alliance with Russia will be meaningless. However, the current lack of diplomatic equality makes these objectives elusive”, writes I SPI.

The Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI) writes that Kosovo was banned from US-led Defender Europe 23 military exercise, then the EU froze the distribution of funds until it commits itself to de-progression.

“at the same time, no sanctions were directed towards Serbia, not even when two weeks after the unrest in the north, police arrested three Kosovo police officers in the border area between the two countries -- 11x1>, writes I SPI.

Full analysis of the Institute for International Political Studies(ISPI)

Balkans: if the West has wrong access to the Kosovo file.

It was another hot summer in the Balkans, especially between Kosovo and Serbia. Following violence at the end of May and subsequent border tensions, the situation has turned into a visible calm. Waiting for the next episode that will make the rest of Europe fear that a new war will erupt in the Balkans. A hypothesis, however, to be excluded, for several reasons: lack of military resources and budgets, but above all political irregularities. Belgrade and Pristina have a mutual political advantage in the ongoing threat of war: fear of the old enemy helps strengthen the two leaders more than any agreement or negotiation. Which is actually there, but you can't see it.

The Ohrid Agreement has never been taken seriously by either side. Without signing and diplomatic protocols, the text was first accepted in Brussels at the end of February, and on March 18th integrated into the application annex in the Macedonian town. Based on the agreement that normalised relations between the two Germanys in 1972, understanding consists of 11 articles and leads the parties to an actual mutual recognition, never to mention it openly. Moreover, while Pristina vows to create the self-government body for Kosovo Serbs what the 2013 Brussels accords call the Association/United Serbian Communists (ASM) Belgrade abandons boycotting Kosovo's candidacys in international bodies.

Angs that are not respected until today. If there is still no consensus in Pristina, nor real political commitment, for a statute that defines and regulates the ESM, in Belgrade seems to have no intention of halting the diplomatic campaign against Kosovo's membership in international organisations. Indeed, just a month after the Ohrid Agreement, Serbia voted against Pristina's accession to the Council of Europe (KiE). And a real commitment to implementation is also lacking by European Union member states, where a formal contradiction continues because of five non-recognising Kosovo, including Slovakia and Spain, which still have the special envoy for dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina, Miroslav Lajcak, and EU High Representative for Foreign Policy Josep Borrell, respectively. Along with Serbia, Spain and three other EU countries, Cyprus, Romania and Hungary also voted against Kosovo membership in the KiE.

What is surprising, however, is not so much that individual EU states do not change their policy of Kosovo's sovereignty, but the common approach of the European Commission and the United States.

After violence against KFOR military in late May, when the deployment of Albanian mayors in four northern municipalities Kosovo prompted the Serbian response, both Brussels and Washington sanctioned the Kosovo government, found it guilty of provocation that led to escalation, an independently determined move without informing international partners. Kosovo was initially banned from US-led Defender Europe 23 military exercises, then the EU froze the distribution of funds until it commits itself to de escalation. At the same time, no sanctions were directed at Serbia, even when two weeks after the unrest in the north, police arrested three Kosovo police officers in the border area between the two countries.

So a very balanced approach, which affects the executive led by Albin Kurti and, indirectly, favours the agenda of Serbian President Aleksandar Vuciq. An opinion shared by more than 50 European, British, and American deputies who sent him a letter in early August The EU, the US and Great Britain by inviting them to change their strategy for the Kosovo file.

The dangers of such an approach are twofold. First of all, it leaves an eye on Serbia's position in the region, where Belgrade carries from a move of political interference aimed at building the so-called Serbian “ ” -- a intersection between a updated version of the nationalist “Serbia-Great eventually and Moscow's policy in its neighbourhood called “75x>

As for the first danger, the Ohrid Agreement had two long-term geopolitical objectives: avoiding tension centres between the two countries and leaving Serbia from Russian orbits, drawing it close to the Western camp. While Belgrade's conviction to pass sanctions against Moscow is currently both utopic and uncontaining in terms of their eventual economic impact, the hope is at least that Serbia will break its ten-year shift between Russia and the European Union. In particular, if Serbia stops from obstructing Kosovo's approach to the UN and other organisations, the political alliance with Russia will be meaningless. However, the current lack of diplomatic equality makes these goals elusive.

As for the second danger, leaving the field free for Serbia's regional agenda of Vucinqit -- whose governments have always enjoyed the support of the mayors and major Western institutions, contributing to so-called “ocracy” -- means above all the minutes of the dialogue process and the very desired normalisation between Belgrade and Pristina. And, as a result, further jeopardise the political stability of the entire Balkan region. Even though Vuciq regularly uses a rhetoric with which he promotes himself as guarantor of regional peace and stability, the attitude towards those countries of the former Yugoslavia with a large Serb minority aims to destabilise local governments. A case in northern Kosovo takes the form of the Serbian List, the main Serb-Kosovon party, which however exclusively responds to Belgrade's wishes.

Similarly in recent weeks, the phenomenon can be seen in Montenegro. In Podgorica, the third government is being born without former President Milo Djukanovic's party, which was transferred to the opposition in 2020 after thirty years of almost irrefutable domination, and the executive who will be led by centrist Milojko Spajic should not include so-Serbian parties. A event that triggered Belgrade's political intimidation. Two weeks ago, Defence Minister Milos Vucevic threatened Montenegro (and Northern Macedonia) on national television for recognising Kosovo: “A mistake that would result back, just as happened in Ukraine,” Vucevic told pro-government broadcaster Pink. Even if Kosovo's recognition dates back to 2008, now comes the threat to NATO's country that the Montenegrin executive should exclude the political figures close to the Serbian president and who during the election campaign promised that, with them in the government, Montenegro would withdraw recognition of Pristina and would have left the Atlantic Alliance.

The Serbian “Bota” A phrase created by the former interior minister and now the head of the Secret Service Aleksandar Vulin ʹ is precisely this: a rhetorical device aimed at threatening neighbouring states, whose political course the Serbian government intends to influence for its use and consumption. Not a political programme supported by a war budget as it was in the 1990s, but a nationalist stock that weighs heavily on delicate regional relations, as well as on internal reconciliation processes. A stance that in recent years has facilitated the Sessionist movements of Bosnian Serbs to Milorad Dodik, who last June promoted a law to undermine the decisions of Bosnia and Herzegovina's constitutional court in what could be defined as the <x2-> legal division” of Republika Srpska (one of the two entities that make up the country).

Therefore, a diplomatic imbalance from the West in the Kosovo file would give further legitimacy to a Serbian policy that is authoritarian domestic and destabilizing in neighbouring countries.

Although the Russian influence in Serbia can hardly translate into active military support, this does not rule out the possibility of Belgrade not continuing to import its political model from Moscow, comprised of internal autocratia and regional aggression. A model which in the Balkans may not produce open wars but will keep a steady secret tension on the already uncertain ethno-political balance alive.