Power drops another law: Constitutional Court Rejects Public Officials Law

The Court judges' college has unanimously ruled that the Law for Public Officials is incompatible with two paragraph 1 of Article 3, Equality before the Law, of the Constitution of Kosovo.

However, the court has also ruled that the procedure for adoption of the Law has not been in conflict with the Constitution.

Full decision:

The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Kosovo has decided regarding united demands in case JULY 216/22, with a warning: Isaac Shaban and ten (10) other deputies i n July 220/22, with a warning: Arben Gashi and nine more MPs of the Republic of Kosovo Assembly, set forth at the Constitutional Court based on the definitions of paragraph 5 of Article 113 [Jurisdiation and Authorised Palaces] of the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo, in terms of assessing the constitutionality of nine (general criteria for official/public admission), 12 (the Government of the Republic of Kosovo), 46 (Electuring and mandate in low and medium-level leadership positions) and 99 (improportionate documents) of Law No.08/ L-197 for public officials.

The court (i) has unanimously decided to declare acceptable requirements; and (ii) by seven (7) votes for and one (1) against, to establish that the procedure followed for adopting the controversial Law is not contrary to articles 77 [Commissions] and 78 [the Commission for Rights and the Interests of the Communities] of the Republic of Kosovo. While concerning the content of the controversial Law, the Court has unanimously ruled that (i) the criterion of “appropriateity defined in paragraphs 2 and 5 of Article 9 (the general criteria for accepting office/public duty) of the controversial Law is not in accordance with Article 1 [Barazia before Law] and paragraph 1 [Vlerat] of Article 7; (ii) forming “and overseeing their implementation of Article1.1x> and paragraph 1 1 1st, 1st, 1st and 1st of Kosovo's 1st, 1st and 1st paragraphs 1,1st, 1st and 1st paragraphs 1, 1st, 1st, 1st, 4th, 4th paragraphs 1, 4th). (The Ministry of Public Administration) of the Conflicted Law is not compatible with Article 1 [The Government and Power Division] and Article 2 articles 101 [Syvil Service] of the Constitution; (ii) formulating “in the pre-trial cases under this law” of Article 3 verse 27 (right to inform about the working relationship and the right to complaint) of the verdict is not in line with us [32] the 32nd Law and the 54th Constitution of the December 3rd (E) and the 27th just information of the 16th article and the 14th article for the correct relationship. (The right to a complaint of the controversial Public Service Office) of the Law does not match Article 1 of Article 4 [The Foundation of Governance and Power Division], Article 32 [Justice Rights for Juridical Tools], and Article 54 [Reliefs of Rights] of the Constitution; (v) paragraph 6 of Article 67 (List of waiting) of the Convention, is not in accordance with paragraph 1 of Article 3 [Bara] before the 7th Law and 1th paragraph 1st of the 7th Constitution; (see paragraphs 1, 7th), 7th, and 7th 9th, and the 46th in the context of the Sabbath are not in line with the 1st correctability of the 1st century. (E. 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights; and (vi) paragraph 2 of Article 104 The controversial Law is not compatible with Article 1 [Barazeae before the Law], paragraph 1 of Article 4 [The Foundation of Governance and Power Separation] and Article 1 (Venth) 7 [Verences] of the Constitution; whereas (vii) vote by seven (7) and one (1) against Article 46 (Emperation and mandate in low and medium-level leadership positions) of the Law dispute is not at the 2nd paragraph 19th [Zi) of the International Law and the 101st of the Civil Condition.

Based on the above findings, the Court also decided: (i) to state that under Article 43 (Affair) of the Constitutional Court, the controversial Law is sent to the president of the Republic of Kosovo for the proclamation, without the provisions outlined in opposition to the Constitution, and according to specifications specified in the Court Act; (i) in accordance with Article 1 of Article 116 [The Constitutional Law], to order the Republic of Kosovo's Assembly within six months of entry into the power of Aktju, among the necessary actions to complete and change (the 6th paragraph 67th) of the paragraph 6th; we order the correctness of the Republic of Kosovo (E) and the 4th verdicts and the 4th verdicts. (The right to a complaint by the public service officer) and Article 6 (the civil servant with special status) of the Law contested, in accordance with the Constitution and this Act of Justice; and (ii) to determine that the Act comes into force with its publication in the Official Journal of the Republic of Kosovo.

The bias initially explains that pre-representors of requests, in essence, claim that (i) the procedure followed for adopting the conflicted Law is contrary to Article 77 and 78 of the Constitution; and (i) articles 9 (the general criteria for accepting office/public duty), 12 (the government of the Republic of Kosovo), 46 (Emment and mandates at low and medium-level positions) and 99 (transmitting amendments) of the Law are at odds, among other things, with us [amental] Barat [the Law, 4th of the Governments, 7th Powers, the 16th Serb Constitutions, and the 21st Civil Constitutions], the 46th. [Est] In essence, petitioners claim that the controversial (i) law violates constitutional principles that connect with the civil/administration public service, with emphasis on independence of independent constitutional institutions, through intervention and supervision of executive power; and (i) violates basic rights and freedoms of public officials, with emphasis, in the low and medium-sized category of management, among other things, through the transformation of the positions of this category of officials from the provisional mandate, including with the effect of having acquired rights, thus resulted, among other things, in the political and political instability of the opposition to Kosovo's office, and with the opposition to judicial reform in the judiciary. Proposal claims, in principle, are also supported by the ombudsman, while opposed by the prime minister of the Republic of Kosovo and the parliamentary group of Movement V I'm sorry. All arguments and counter-arrangements of the parties before the Court are detailed in the Court Act.

The prosecution further explains that the Court (i) has limited the assessment of the constitutionality of the Law contested in the scope of provisions opposed by the pre-tellers and related ones; and (i) along with this assessment, among other things, has expounded and applied the general principles set by the Court, with emphasis on the Act in the June2/03/19 case, regarding the assessment of the Law. 06/L-14 for public officials, the European Court of Human Rights' judicial practice (GJENDJ), opinion and relevant reports of the Venice Commission, including the contribution of constitutional courts and/or the relevant equivalents of the Venice Commission Forum, as well as the Organization for Co-operation and Economic Development (OECD/SIGMA) principles for public administration.

In the Court Act, higher principles have been applied in the examination of each valued article of the disputed Law. In this and for the purposes of this summary, the Court will explain the main findings and findings related to the controversial Law, respectively: (i) the procedure followed by the Parliament for adopting the Conflicted Law; (ii) the independence of independent constitutional institutions in relation to the Government's supervisory competence; (ii) the definition of limited mandates related to the lower and medium-level public administration positions; (iv) the effect of restrictions on public officials currently exercising low-level positions and public administration (i) and public officials' obligations that set forth <20> on high level of public administration (x1). The effective public administration rights and public administration (x2).

(i) The procedure followed by the Assembly for adopting the Law

The indictment initially explains that, pre-advisors of the motion claim that the procedure followed for adopting the conflicted Law is contrary to Article 77 and 78 of the Constitution, and to the Parliament's rule, putting emphasis, among other things, on the fact that the same one was adopted in the Assembly without being examined in permanent commissions, respectively, “has been adopted without being examined at all in the Standing Commission for the Boards, Work and Transfers and the Commission for Rights and Intercess of the Committees and Khm1)

In assessing this claim, the Act initially explains that the controversial Law was considered in the Assembly under the [N.08-V-449] decision of the December 15th 2022 Assembly, issued based on Article 123. (Designment from the procedure deadlines) of the Convention for avoidance of procedural deadlines, and through this decision, has been requested by permanent commissions that the relevant comments, to submit the operational Commission for Public Administration, Local Powers, Media and Regional Development, until the set term through the above decision. Also, based on subject paperwork, it turns out that the Commission for the Rights and Interests of Communities has delivered the corresponding contribution, while this is not the case even with the Commission for Boards, Work and Transfere. In the above context and in view of (i) the contents of Article 77 of the Constitution, as long as it is relevant to the circumstances of the case, which determines the competency's competence to appoint the permanent and functional commissions, while delegate the respect procedures at the level of the Parliament Rule; and (ii) the content of the Article 78 Constitution related to the Commission for Rights and Intercess of the Comments of the Committees ) as the only relevant procedure with which it is defined in terms, precisely that, following the request of the member of the Constitutional Commission's decision as long as it has made the verdicts in the week's decision of the two, though the commission is to argue in the case, the court is not to argue with the exacting of the verdicts, the verdicts, the verdicts in the verdicts, the verdicts of the verdicts, the verdicts of the verdicts of the verdicts, the verdicts of the verdicts of the verdicts of the verdicts are in the verdicts.

Put it this way, and in the context of using Article 123 of the Order, respectively avoiding the legislative deadlines of the Parliament along the lawmaking process, the Court highlights two cases: (i) its decision by means of the adoption of Article 85. (The accelerated procedure of reviewing the bills) and 86 (the urgent procedure for reviewing the draft law) of his work regulation, that accelerated and/or urgent procedure of reviewing bills is subject only to bills that are related to national security, public health, budget and financial issues, or to taking measures for the state of emergency under Article 131 [extraordinary affairs] of the constitution, while the controversial law does not coincide with these categories; and (i) the setting up of the country through its 123th order of the order of the working procedures, with the lower work requirements required by the two-thirds-thirds of the constitutions, according to the order of the two entitiess, according to the two-thirds states. The indictment, in the upper context, explains that before the Court, there is no conflict with the Constitution of Article 123 of the Labour Rule, however, remembering that the exercise of legislative power is the primary and most essential function of the Republic of Kosovo, as defined in Article 4 [The Government of Governance and the Division of Power], 63 [General Laws] and the 65 [Cubstation Comissionsettes] of the Constitution and that this function, according to the 74 [Unional Office], the representatives of the people are obliged to apply it to the constitutions and the rules of the constitution.

(i) regarding the independence of independent constitutional institutions in relation to government supervisory competence

In the context of pretentious claims on the violation of independence of independent constitutional institutions through Article 12 of the controversial Law, the Act first explains that this provision should be interpreted in relation to Article 13 (The Ministry responsible for its public administration) which details the way Article 12 is implemented and related to Article 104. Its remand, which abolishes any other law in opposition to the contrary Law. The bias in this respect explains that (i) according to Article 12 of the controversial Law, the Government of the Republic of Kosovo approves and co-ordinates the general state policies for the employment of official/public employment, as well as “adhered to implementation of their”; (ii) under Article 13 of the controversial Law, the Ministry responsible for public administration, respectively, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, among other things, is responsible for monitoring policy implementation and public institutions in the state administration, gets from the institutions of the Republic of Kosovo to any information needed in the field of the state working relationship, and is the single institution that has provided for the state's explanations of internal affairs, among them, while in opposition to the Law (for example) any other provisions to the constitution, against the constitution. In assessing the constitutionality and balance of powers and those defined through its consolidated judicial practice in the context of independent constitutional institutions, including those related to the Independent Council for Kosovo Civil Service, highlights the constitutional principles of two core issues: (i) the independence of independent constitutional institutions defined with the constitutions, including that of Independent Agencys founded by the Parliament under the definitions of November 142. [ Independent Agencies] of the Constitution; and (ii) the constitutional function of the Independent Council overseer for the Kosovo Civil Service, according to the provisions of Article 101 [Sivrate service] of the Constitution.

In terms of the first issue, the Act explains that based on the controversial Law, the same applies in terms of institution officials defined in chapters IV, V, V II, VIII and XII of the Constitution, in terms of the Parliament, the Presidency, the System of Justice, the Constitutional Court and Independent Institutions defined with the Constitution, as long as “does not violate their functional and organisational independence guaranteed under the Constitution”. Moreover, the controversial Law classifies officials of superior institutions as “civil servants with special status”, whose working relationship is regulated by law and specific acts, under the condition of the area allowed by the controversial Law itself, but also under the protection of the principle of guaranteed constitutional independence. According to The Act's clarifications, in principle, such an arrangement does not conflict with the constitutional principles of balance and separation of powers defined in Article 4 of the Constitution and the respective principles expounded through the Court's Act of Judgment. In that statement, according to the clarifications given in the Act, this is not the case with the category of Independent Ages defined in Article 142 of the Constitution, and which, the controversial Law, does not guarantee independence and necessary constitutional autonomy, especially considering that based on Article 104 of the controversial Law, all provisions of laws adopted by the Convention pertaining to Independent Age, which are contrary to the Law. The prosecution further explains that while according to the court's judicial practice, Independent Ages founded under Article 142 of the Constitution, not necessarily enjoy the same level of constitutional independence as the institutions listed specifically in chapter XII of the Constitution, however, based on this end, it is clear that the same are not subject to control and supervision of executive power, but to supervision by the Parliament, given the respect laws the same as adopted under the 142th Constitution. Moreover, the Act also stresses that the Law against the status of “civil servants with special status” also defines it for a part of its executive power, including its employees responsible for public administration, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, respectively, while exclusion from this status of Independent Agency officers defined in Article 142 of the Constitution, does not turn out to have pursued a legitimate and/or proportional purpose.

Moreover, and in terms of the second issue, the Act of Justice stresses that the competency of oversight regarding the rules and principles regulating civil service through Article 101 of the Constitution has been assigned to the Independent Council for Kosovo Civil Service. Constitutional independence and the function of this institution has been outlined by the Court through a number of provisions, which, among other things, has been clarified that precisely with the aim of providing an impartial, independent and professional public administration, the Constitution has established a separate constitutional institution and independent of executive power with the authority of monitoring rules and principles regulating the civil service of the Republic of Kosovo. The indictment further explains that (i) the supervision powers of the Independent Council of Overseers, defined by the Constitutions, cannot be violated or taken by executive power through lower-level standards acts, respectively; that (ii) the Government's (i) supervisory competencies, precise through Article 12 and 13 of the Law countered, are clearly the competencies of the Independent Council based on the Law No.06/04/04 for the Independent Council, and which are violated through paragraph 2 of the Law, under which any amendments to the verdicts of the Law are rejected by any amendments to its adoption of power in its adoption. The bias explains that the joint reading of the provisions 12, 13 and 104 of the controversial Law, through which the Independent Supervisor Council is essentially stripped of constitutional functions, which are adopted by the Government, results in opposition to Article 4 and 101 of the Constitution, respectively.

(i) regarding the definition of limited mandates for lower and medium-level management positions in public administration, the effect on right after the introduction of the disputed law

In the context of presumption claims on violating constitutional principles pertaining to civil service, among other things, as a result of determining limited mandates related to low and medium-level management positions, the Act first explains that under Article 46 of the controversial Law, the category of low and medium-level leadership in public administration would submit to limited mandates, respectively, four (4) years' mandate, with the continued option for a similar mandate, under the prescribed conditions. The court, as well as the contribution of constitutional courts and/or the respective equivalents of the Venice Commission Forum, its assessment, in the context of high-level entity constitutional security and hierarchy, focused on (i) the constitutional characteristics of the civil service based on Article 101 of the Constitution; and (ii) the obligations stemming from the Stabilisation and Association Agreement in the context of the state-run service, which were ratified by (i) the Constitution based on the 19th Constitutional Republic of Kosovo's preeminence to the judiciary, the judiciary of Kosovo.

In the upper context, the Act explains that Article 101 of the Constitution, beyond (i) the criteria that civil service should reflect the variety of the people of Kosovo and take into consideration the principle of gender equality; and (ii) the determination that the Independent Council for Civil Service must be formed, which ensures the implementation of civil service standards, does not further specify the issue of classification of public officials and/or the duration or restrictions related to relevant mandates. The prosecution also explains that through a Stabilisation and Association Agreement ratified by the Parliament in 2015, the Republic of Kosovo has taken on the obligation of reforming the state administration in co-operation with the European Union, under the definitions of the Supreme Agreement, which, among other things, refers to developing a career in public service, but does not specify obligations and/or specifics in the context of public officials' classification and/or the duration of the respective mandates. Furthermore, and in the context of fundamental rights and freedoms and the principle of judicial security, the Action stresses that all public officials who are elected/appointed to low-level and medium-level management positions in the future, respectively after the introduction of the controversial Law, will have the clarity and predictability needed in the context of the obligations they undertake and the rights they gain, including limited mandates in public administration.

In that statement, the Act also explains that based on the letters handed down to the Court by the applicant, the opinion of the European Union Legal Office and SIGMA, among other things, had warned of public administration reform shortcomings. Furthermore, based on contributions delivered to the Court through the Venice Commission Forum, it turns out that since public administrations of respective states, exclusively, determine positions with limited mandates, in principle, none of them have undertaken a reform under which the positions with permanent mandates have been transformed into temporary, affecting even the rights gained by respective state administration officials.

However, the Act of Justice stresses that based on the Constitution, the Parliament exercises legislative power, while the Constitutional Court is responsible for the final interpretation of the Constitution. Taking into account the relevant competencies defined with the Constitution and the principle of separation and balance of powers, based on the court's judicial practice, the latter is limited only to the assessment of the compliance of the act disputed with the Constitution, and as long as the same has not been violated, it does not assess the adaptation of public policies defined by executive and/or legislative powers and reflected in laws adopted by representatives of the people in the Assembly. As a result, and considering that (i) Article 101 of the Constitution and Article 120 of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement, there are no specific obligations in the context of classification and/or mandates of public officials in the state administration; and (i) through this article are infected by public officials who are appointed/elected to low and medium-level positions after the chairmanship of the contrary Law, the Court, states that the 46th non-combated Law is not at odds with the above terms of the constitution.

(iv) regarding the effect of limiting mandates for officials currently exercising low-level and medium-level management functions in public administration, the effect on rights acquired prior to the law's entry into force

In the context of pre-responsor claims on the backive effects of the Law countered regarding officials currently holding low and medium-level management positions with indefinitely mandates and acquired based on existing laws for the civil/public service, resulting in violating their constitutional rights, the Act initially explains that the Article 99 of the Conflicted Law, among other things, stipulates that later a year (1) from entering into force, all low and middle-level positions will be subject to open and public competition. The controversial law stipulates that public officials currently holding these positions, have the right to apply in these contests and, in case of non-election, (i) will be arranged in professional positions for which they meet the conditions, as well as for the next four (4) years period, will benefit from a transit salary under the definitions of the law; or (i) they will be arranged in “The Presret) list of the Prija” and can be released from civilian service if they cannot be regulated in professional positions. The indictment explains that this category of state administration officials have been appointed to low and/or middle-level management positions based on laws in power for civil service and/or public officials, on the basis of which they have undertaken obligations and/or acquired rights, including <x2 legitimate expectations that could result in property” based on corresponding contracts with indefinite terms, the way of change and/or interruption of which is clearly accurate in effective laws. Consequently, assessing the constitutionality of Article 99 of the controversial Law includes the obligation of assessing compliance with fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed with the Constitution, with an emphasis on Article 46 [the Protection of Property] of the Constitution regarding Article 1 (right on Property) protocol No. 1 KEDNJ.

In the context of the rights guaranteed through the superior provisions, following the clarification of general principles pertaining to the principle of judicial security and rights acquired, including based on the ECDNJ's judicial practice, the Act explains that these rights are not absolute and can submit to restrictions/intervention based on Article 55 [Confision of Found Rights and Freedoms] of the Constitution], just as much as the restriction in the corresponding right (x) <0) is defined with a law <2> (x>) follows a legitimate <2> and <x> and <x> is required by a valid <4>

The bias further explains that under the circumstances of the controversial 99th Law Article, it is not contradictory that has limits to the rights and freedoms of current state administration officials who exercise lower and medium-sized management tasks, among other things, because implementation of this article can result not only in the loss of the functions they exercise but also of the professional position of the working relationship, because based on the provisions of the countered Law (i) the category of high-level officials, if they are not re-elected to positions that are based on the law, they can be placed in the lowest position of professional or <20>, because they can expect to release any of any property from the civil service (x2) and then they can also expect to be able to adopt any effective command from a civil servants. In saying this and applying the principles that stem from the judicial practice of the Court and the ECHR, the Court makes clear that there is no contradiction that restriction to acquired rights (i) is “defined by law”, defined by non-conventional Law; and (i) follows the legitimate “object of reforming state administration based on principles of efficiency, meritocracy, inclusion and accountability, respectively, but it is controversial if this is a violation of the fundamental rights and the relevant “is meant to be applied to a report with a constitutional purpose.

The bias, following the application of principles that stem from the relevant practice of the GEDNJ, stresses that the solution defined through the non-competitived article 99 Law, does not represent the right “balance between the stated purpose of public interest and fundamental rights and freedoms, and therefore it is not proportional, among others, because (i) the same goal will be achieved through the least restrictive/interfictectious mechanisms in public rights and freedoms among the public rights and public rights and freedoms, and thus has not been introduced by the proficiency of the Public Law, among other profiling laws, with the same performance and specific measures, and specificing measures, including in the state-run's non-reference (rectory) and the protractoral rights, or the protradidictional laws, or the profiling of individualatement of individualatement, or criminal laws, or public or criminal, are not yet, or public or criminal, or criminal, or criminal, or criminal, or criminal, or criminal, or criminal, it's, or criminal, it's, or criminal, or criminal, or otherwise, or criminal, Consequently, the Act states that Article 99 of the controversial Law is incompatible with Article 46 of the Constitution regarding Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 KEDNJ.

(v) regarding the rights and obligations of public officials placed in “Waiting Lists” in state administration

The bias also explains that the controversial Article 46 and 99 of the Law refers to its 67 (wait list) -- in terms of its “Waiting List”. While the Act has clarified that Article 46 of the controversial Law, including the concept of the “List of Waiting”, is the solution of the Parliament which, except for the effect defined in Article 99 of the controversial Law, is not contrary to the Constitution, the Court notes that the definitions of Article 67 of the controversial Law, however, raised issues of fundamental rights and freedoms of relevant officials placed on the list. This, among other things, because the controversial Law, in the context of the “Waiting List”, determines only the obligations of the relevant officials by not determining also the rights, but by delegateing the same in determining through the Ministry's provisional act responsible for public administration. More precisely and according to the clarifications given in the Act, Article 67 of the Law disputed, among other things, stipulates that during the period of up to nine (9) waiting before the system in a professional position and/or release from the civil service, the relevant (i) officials have the obligation not to have any other working relations or otherwise, they lose the rights that may spring from the “List of Prisimo”; while (i) their rights, including pay and/or its level, are not guaranteed through the Law, but according to the same act, will be determined by the same case. The indictment explains that such a report between rights and obligations is not proportional, and furthermore, contrary to the criteria of “cretity” and “predictability” regarding the applicable law, distorted in the principle of judicial security, according to the interpretation of the ECHR's judicial practice, Court and relevant opinions of the Venice Commission.

(vi) regarding “dueability” as criteria for admission to the office of public official in public administration

In the context of presumption claims by pre-requisiters with the criterion of “adequateability, on the basis of which public officials in the state administration can be admitted, and which allegedly violates the principle of judicial security and, among other things, has the consequence of political interference in public administration policies, the Act originally explains that the 9 non-combated Law, among other things, defines the general criteria for public officials' admission, adding the criterion for <x> to the specific position of public officials, the exact position of the individual, according to the individual parliament's proposal, under the administration. In assessing the constitutionality of this provision, the Act provides (i) general principles stemming from the judicial practice of the ECHR, the practice of the Court and Control List of the Rule of the Venice Commission, concerning the principle of judicial security, embedded in the concept of rule of law, guaranteed by Article 3 and 7 of the Constitution, respectively; and (i) the contributions of constitutional courts and/or equivalents of the state member states of the Venice Commission Forum.

The indictment, among other things, explains that among the criteria set out in Article 1 of the contested Law, there are also “the ability to perform the corresponding task” and “ary, professional work experience and/or the required capacity for position, category, class or corresponding group”, leaving the public disrepute with the assessment in accepting the public official's office. In that sense, these criteria, including those objective correctly defined in the same paragraph, can be dominated in their entirety, through a criterion of “belonging to”, precise through an act of law, on the basis of which the disrepute of public authority is in disproportionate with the principle of “arbitrity “and <x> profiling <x> required by the context of the applied law, including with regard to the procedure and the application of law for the use of the judiciary, in a state administration, which is defined by other disputes, inter-definance of transparency, the party's jurisdiction, and the pro-deciency, the party's specificity. As a result, and taking into account the principles expounded regarding judicial security, including the obligation that relevant provisions of the law be “clear, accessible and predictable”, the Court has estimated that the criterion of “fit” is incompatible with constitutional guarantees according to the clarifications provided in the Action device.

(vii) regarding constitutional rights for legal means and judicial protection of public officials' rights in state administration

The bias highlights the fact that right to legal means and right to judicial protection of rights, defined at Article 32 and 54 of the Constitution in liaisons with Article 13 (KEDJ's effective legal instrument) constitutes the most fundamental rights of individuals, including in the context of the principle of access to justice, defined through Article 31 [Just for Justice and Unright] of the Constitution in connection with Article 6 (right in fair judgment) of KEDNJ. The bias, among other things, explains that these rights have been violated in their entirety in the context of the controversial Article 99 of the Law. In saying, the Act also highlights the fact that Article 27 (right to information about the labour relationship and the right to complaint) of the Law opposed to connection with Article 88. (The right to a public service official's complaint) also raised serious constitutional issues in the context of upper rights. This first because, since civil servants' rights to file complaints to the Independent Supervisor Council and then, at the competent court, have been determined, these rights are conditioned only “in cases previously under this law”. The bias, based on the ECHR judicial practice, explains that the right to effective legal means to any act of public authority that may have violated the fundamental rights and freedoms of the individual determined by law and/or Constitution, in principle, cannot be limited. Second, the Act of Justice also explains that based on provisions 27 and 88 of the controversial Law, public officials' right to complaint has been defined, respectively, in the Labour Inspectorate and later, at the competent court. The bias emphasizes that such a legal definition is in full opposition to the Labour Law and the Labour Inspectorate Law itself, which does not specify the same competence to resolve disputes from the working relationship and, furthermore, with the principle of separation and balance of powers defined in Article 4 of the Constitution, among other things because (i) the Labour Inspectorate, based on the law of establishment of its creation, is executive authority founded by the Ministry of Labour and Social Goodness, is a component of executive power; and (the) in the judicial order of the Republic of Kosovo, which is based on the principles of the balance and balance of power, the authority that has been established by the Justice and Authority, which has been linked to the relationship of office and authority. All these principles have already been clarified through the Act on trial in the Ko27/21 case, published on December 16, 2022, by the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Kosovo.