Rohan: We had good reason to believe Russia will recognise Kosovo

Former Austrian deputy mediator in Kosovo status talks, Albert Rohan, in an interview in Interactive has spoken of talks in Vienna between Kosovo and Serbia.

He has told about the Contact Group that had formed at that time, while Rohan was chief of the UN Secretariat's Staff.

I remember how very interesting. I knew all sides very well, since my first diplomatic job was Belgrade. I was the first foreign official to meet with Prime Minister Kostunica on his oath day. On the morning of that day, I spent two hours with him and then the ceremony took place in the evening. I have had many friends in Serbia, and many friends in Kosovo, and I have known the Kosovo issue for many years. The match as if it were mediating between friends, and Ahtisaari the same, because it had long been involved in Balkan issues. I worked with him in the '70s. When they named him, I was Chief of Staff of the UN Secretary, we named him the Commission for Namibia. It was a very interesting time. One thing others don't know, is the very close contact we've had with the Contact Group. Initially we accepted the Contact Group's leading principles, which said there will be no partition, which will have no union with another state and others. Every month we had a meeting of different levels with the Contact Group. Then, Ahtisaari had a brilliant idea, urging the EU, Russia and the US to send liaison officials to our mission. This created many bureaucratic problems with the administration in New York, because they felt they were outside and couldn't work in our offices, but Ahtisaari said that if they came, they should work like the others, Rohan said.

Rohan, however, has indicated that Russia has not used this option. He said they had reason to believe in early 2006 that Russia would accept Kosovo's independence. According to Rohan, there were statements that were quite clear, especially from Lavrov.

The “Russians did not use this option. The EU did it sending Stephan Lehne. The US sent us two people, one was a constitutional expert and we had a senior Russian official on our mission, a UN diplomat. Everyone knew everything and was very transparent. The talks themselves were very concrete -- in detail for municipal borders -- for decentralisation, for minorities. They were very detailed. We shared matters with Ahtisaari. I led most regular meetings, while he led the Elephanes ' round when the presidents and prime ministers arrived. The next division of the work was, although not everyone else knew, that Martin focused on great powers. He went to Beijing, Moscow, Washington and I used to go with him. But I focused on regional powers, neighboring countries, because I knew them better than Ahtisaari and he had greater influence on powers than I did. It was a good job break. If you ask me if I've had disappointments, I tell you I've had two ways. When it was realized that an agreement on status was impossible, which soon became clear, we wanted to find a way for both sides to gain something. And, Ahtisaari's plan is compromise. On the one hand, there is independence for Kosovo, with some minor restrictions, and on the other side, there are major measures to preserve the Serb community in Kosovo. Kosovo's minority rights legislation is more advanced than anywhere in the world, and that is why Kosovo has received so much recognition. It was in some form the price for independence and recognition. My disappointment was that Belgrade thought only about territory. Very little was given to all positive sides that this Ahtisaari plan offered for its Serb minority in Kosovo. It took many years until Serbs in Kosovo realized how many possibilities they had in taking part in decision-making, directing their own affairs, with the process of decentralisation and similar. I think they've realized now, that was a disappointment. The next disappointment was Russian behavior. We had reason to believe in early 2006 that Russia would accept Kosovo's independence. There were statements that were very clear, especially from Mr. Lavrov. The fact that Lavrov signed a statement that the foreign ministers of the Contact Group made in January 2006 in London, which said the solution should be acceptable to the people of Kosovo, and since 90% of Kosovars wanted independence, it was clear what this meant, and Lavrov had signed this statement. Then, in the spring of 2006, there was a change of attitude for the Russians, and they refused everything related to independence. Why that happened, we don't know. I don't know whether Putin got involved or not, but there was a clear change of position. That was to regret, because in that way the Ahtisaari Plan would be backed by the Security Council”, Rohan has said.

Rohan has indicated that 2-3 months have been taken to write this proposal.