Washington dilemmas for recognition of Enver Hoxha's regime

Scripulous employees of the US delegation to the UN with headquarters in New York have drawn up several commemorations (memo) for the State Department about negotiations with the head of Tirana's personal emissar, who was also prime minister, foreign minister and defence, of course the chief of the communist party.

P SE THIS cry IN THIS TIME?

The author of the document notes on May 16, 1949, “that the Albanian government wants to discuss establishing diplomatic relations with the United States and may be willing to meet the condition (accepting pre-war treaty obligations)”. The director of the European Affairs Office tells UN Assistant Secretary of State about the uncertainty “why this approach is being done at this time”.

But, apparently, from the beginning and from the fact that about three months ago, on March 22nd and 23rd, Tirana's all-powerful leader Enver Hoxha, had met with Soviet Foreign Minister Visinski and Prime Minister Stalin, the US diplomat Hikerson, says the U.S. “could allegedly have been done with consent and possibly with a suggestion of Soviet”.

CRIICES

For its part, Hikerson lists two of the possible disadvantages that could bring about the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1949: it would not be accepted by anti-Hoja elements in Albania, as well as by Greeks.

There may be some criticism in this country, as recognition would be seen as a sign in favour of a particularly distasteful government”. On the other hand, Hikerson says that “establishing diplomatic relations would enable us to protect American citizens better than we can actually do. There would also be advantages, from the point of view of information and the possibilities of action that we do not now have.

In the current situation in the Balkans, and especially in Albania, which is a weak spot in the Soviet sphere, the presence of a US mission in Albania could be very useful”.

ENGLEVE GREATMENT

The editor of the Corps of original American diplomatic documents points to the press and the fact that “on May 23rd 1949, a British Embassy official in Washington informed the State Department that the Albanian regime had made no effort near the British government over the possible establishment of diplomatic relations”.

“Eater British lion” with Tirana went so far that Britain does not consider it desirable to establish normal diplomatic relations with Albania because of: 1. Albania's help for Greek guerrillas; 2. Albania's action against British ships on Corfu Canal in 1946 and its refusal to pay the required compensation; 3. Possible negative public opinion response in Great Britain and Greece to any movement for normalising relations with Albania; 4. The fact that Hoxha's regime was in a very weak position and should not be empowered in any way, materially or psychologically”.

U n A ZINGTONIA DO NOT THE PRY OF LONWRA

Washington was not a fan of London (“as it is hard to consider establishing diplomatic relations cut off from relaxed problems, such as Albania's role in the civil war in Greece, its failure to co-operate with the UN, etc”, but Tirana did not cut it with large axes. On 16 May, it was recommended to inform the “pillar that we will consider any view that might want to present later “and that “in preparation for further exchanges and the formation of the Department's position on this issue, we should maintain ... flexible, given the advantages, in principle, of establishing diplomatic relations with Albania”. Therefore, “t '%i is said unofficially today that he cannot expect immediate answers for his request, and that there is no reason for him to delay his return to Paris because of this”.