VV does not accept the Constitutional Decision, of “sulet” bad: You're giving Serbian List a veto right

According to the VV, the Court has maintained opposing positions within four months on the same constitutional issue, without any legal changes or actual new circumstances.

A constitutional court that changes its stance on identical constitutional issues, without any normative, actual or systemic change, violates not only the principle of the foreseeable of law, but also the trust of citizens in the timeline of constitutional order”, said in response.

In the communiqué, the ruling party goes even further, naming this action as “the classic abus de droit” form and claiming the Court is coming out of its constitutional role.
The Constitutional Court has no control role over the legislature, no political arbitrator role... This authority does not give him the mandate to create new rates”, the VV points out, adding that, through such decisions, a parallel and invisible power pole is being created by sovereign”.

Vetevendosje also accuses the Court of distorting Ahtisaari's proposal principles and of creating, according to them, a “right veto for a concrete political subject -- Serbian List”.
“Every additional criterion is rating creation, not interpretation”, is further said in response, stressing that the Constitution envisions the election of the Serb community's deputy chairman with the majority of MPs, without additional political or party conditions.

Full Posting:

Deep care and abus de fear of Constitutional Court

The prosecution in the Serbian List's KO325/25 case against the election of Deputy Chairman Nenad Rassic testifies to a serious lack of co-ordination of the Constitutional Court.

In the verdict, KO265/25, paragraph 129, the Court specifically found that failure to issue the same candidate proposal more than three times was valid in the case of the vice president.

Now the Court has ascertained just the opposite, completely changing its position.

Within four months, on the same constitutional issue, the Court has changed the jurisdiction without any normative or actual change.

The principle of judicial security is the structural element of the democratic state and the sine qua non for its legitimacy of judicial authority. A constitutional court that changes the stance on identical constitutional issues, without any nor any normative, actual or systemic change, violates not only the principle of right prognosis but also the trust of citizens in the era of constitutional order.

Such a change cannot be justified as a development of jurisdiction, since it lacks the essential element of its evolution of norm or social circumstances. Under these conditions, the change of attitude takes the character of a formal use of judicial competence to produce a new normative result, which constitutes the classic form of abus de fear.

Crossing Constitutional Role and Establishing parallel Power

The Constitutional Court has no controlling role over the legislature, nor does the political arbitrator play. It has only one role: the ultimate authority in interpreting constitutional issues. This authority does not mandate him to create new standards, invent representation criteria or set conditions that the Constitution does not recognise.

The current Constitutional Court is making hermeneutics of its texts. When the Constitutional Court becomes authorial, it goes beyond constitutional limits. The constitution is not interpreted through the Court's self - determination but through its text, structure, and purpose.

Enlarging the role of the Constitutional Court with this composition is no coincidence or isolated case. The following, even in most past colleges, with certain exceptions, has been followed by the same trend: gradual expansion of competence beyond the constitutional mandate. Thus, a parallel and invisible power pole is deliberately being shaped by the sovereign, who appears every time democracy begins to take off momentum and realpolitical life produces contradictions.

Dozens of reforming and interest laws for the country have been blocked by the Constitutional Court, then partially abolishing most of them. Their fight against the Government is doing so much harm: from the fall of the Law for ceiling prices for basic products to the 770-day deadlock of the Law for the Sovereign Fund of Kosovo.

The constitution of the Republic of Kosovo is clear: the deputy head of the Parliament by the Serb community is elected by the ranks of the Serb community deputies and the majority of the Parliament's votes. It does not speak of the majority of Serbian deputies, neither of domestic communitarian legitimacy nor of party exclusiveity. Any additional criterion is rating creation, not interpretation.

Self for a Political Subject

The provisions of Ahtisaari's comprehensive proposal recognise community representation, not the dominance of a political subject over institutions. It's about communities, not parties.

The Constitutional Court today is doing the opposite, narrowing Ahtisaari's proposal beyond text and purpose, creating in practice a veto right to a concrete political subject to the Serbian List. The Constitutional Court is willing to overcome the 2006 negotiating team and Ahtisaari in 2007.

As the Constitution on this issue has already turned into matter of discussion and contraction, not implementation.

Any interpretation that sacrifices this functionality for the sake of a political subject, which unfortunately accepts the independent state of Kosovo, does not defend the constitutional order and harm it. According to the Constitution, we are multiethnic societies, not multiethnic states, because we are democratic and parliamentary Republic, not federation or confederation. No courts can change this, nor this constitutional one.