The truth about Vetevendosje and the project "Bilfger," in 22 facts

The last few days of detection in the country has become the solution to the power energy problem, where the introduction of the Kosovo rehabilitation project A from the German company “Bilfger” is thought to be in. As the reason for the energy crisis, it has sometimes been mentioned by government officials, and by Kurti himself the escape of this opportunity by accusing the LDK of refusing to accept the German project for Kosovo A.

However, Isa Mustafa insists that this company was uninterested to rebuild Kosovo A in 2015. According to the Mustafa all that he had offered “Bilfger” were 15-20 pages of PowrPoint.

Below, we bring you the complete article with 22 facts:

The Kosovo rehabilitation project A from Bilfinger has been discussed much recently as a solution to energy sector problems. By the time this concept was proposed I was working for the Government of Kosovo and I participated in some technical meetings with Bilfinger where their concept-project was discussed.

I write this article anonymously because I don't want to be part of the political debate, but I feel obliged to give the necessary clarifications that will hopefully help move away with the development of the country's energy sector.

1. Bilfinger wasn't an investor. They're just workers. For those who doubt it, here's the Bilfinger Website (www.bilfinger.com) and please find a single elexir in which Bilfinger has invested!

2. Bilfinger has demanded that the investment be state budget. So, like any other employee, Bilfinger just asked for all the tools for the jobs performed to be provided by the Government.

3. Bilfinger promised to help the Government secure a loan to pay Bilfinger, but he has never managed to provide any letters of interest from any developmental or commercial bank.

4. There is no case in the world where a similar project is undertaken. Bilfinger's concept has been to remove all existing equipment from Kosovo A and only use existing walls. So everything new, except the walls. From our research and international experts who were supporting Government we have no case in the world when such an investment has been undertaken to rehabilitate any such old thermal power plants because it is an irrational investment. It's very simple for Blfinger to share information about any same case (“S study”) but no such information was provided. Why, because they don't exist! Anyone with interest can investigate and see for himself.

5. Bilfinger has called for negotiating contracts as a businessman and has stated that they do not participate in any competition process. Even so, competition for this project would not have been, because it was a very speculous project and no serious employer would participate.

6. Bilfinger has no access to project and budget. Always the officer gives the detailed project to the client. Bilfinger's approach has been that they don't know exactly how much work needs to be done and so it takes a framework contract where Bilfinger will be paid for time and materials spent and they're the only ones who have the exclusive work done. A joint Government-Billfiner commission would be created to decide along the implementation of the project what to do for specific equipment. That means government official sat on the table and said “but we're buying this new device from Bilfinger for 50 million Euros and this one we're buying from Bulfinger for 12 million Euro.” No comment.

7. Bilfinger refused to propose a maximum budget that would not be passed. While on the proposal some bandages said the project would cost around 900m euros, they refused to provide guarantees that that budget would not be passed. What the final expenses would depend on this Government-Billfinger Commission, which would in reality depend on how much Bilfinger would offer for any device while the Government had exclusiveity with them (unable to get an offer from someone else).

8. The real budget for the project would be around 2 billion to 3 billion euros. The concept was to completely remove all existing equipment, but only use the existing thermal walls. This means that equipment producers would have to design and produce specific equipment for use only on this thermal power plant. The main limit is the fact that Kosovo entities are too small (less than 200 MW for unit) and they have a design of the '60s-70s, while industry has evolved into units larger than 500MW. So equipment producers (Sieemens, Mitsubishi-Hitachi, General Electric Alstom, Doosan, etc.) have not produced these types of equipment for 40-50 years and have to design everything from the beginning by adhering to the new technical and environmental standards and limits of existing space (such as area 9). The process of design and production of a single-use device in this case would cost 2-3 times higher than the production of standardized equipment produced en masse and sold to hundreds of customers.

9. Civil works (so existing walls) are the simplest and most valuable part of these projects (about 100m euros) compared to the project as a whole. Using existing walls would only cause problems. Bilfinger engineers during the meeting have confirmation that it will be very difficult to manage the installation of equipment because it should be maneuvered in existing spaces. At the same time, device design would have to stick to space limits. When a new project is built, civil work is always adapted to technology, since in this case it would be quite the opposite!

10. Bilfinger has not guaranteed the length of the work done and the deadline for when the rehabilitated thermal power term would enter the operation. That's because they don't have to understand how much interference it takes, how long it will take to design and manufacture equipment, which equipment needs to be rehabilitated, and how difficult their installation will be.

11. During rehabilitation Kosovo would have to import belts, and that would mean an additional cost of import of 400m to 1.2 billion euros. So we're talking about at least four years when the T. C Kosova A would be out of office and should import currents in Kosovo to replace lost production. This, in the best case, at electricity prices as if pre-pandemia would mean about 100 million Euro-year extra costs for import (1600). GWh Kos A production at the price of around 60 Euro/MWh. In energy prices as they are now, the additional cost of import would be 300m euros per year, or 1.2 billion euros for 4 years. So these are additional costs on existing import.

Twelve. As a result, the project's main lobbyists have been traders/addicts. The main beneficiary is Serbia. Unfortunately, long-time importers have had great influence in Kosovo, often through people who have stolen what interests they represent.

13. Bilfinger has not guaranteed how much the final capacity of the units (as MW) would be and how eventually many units would enter the operation. Again, this is about not being designed.

14. Bilfinger did not guarantee that the thermal power plant would adhere to European standards in terms of broadcasting or efficiency. The standard that was applied at the time was Disregarding Plants Direct for Balkan States, but a higher standard called Industrial Plants Direct was advanced in Europe. Bilfinger would not guarantee contracting that none of these standards would be met, and Kosovo could be forced even after this investment shuts down the thermal power plant because it does not meet the standards. Bilfinger didn't guarantee these standards because technology didn't exist, not because they didn't want to.

15. The efficiency of the restored thermal power plant, however, would remain very low, which would mean very high energy costs as well as the higher CO2 costs (and future costs). That's just because the smaller than the 200-Flights of Kos A have low efficiency. The larger the unit, the more efficient it can be. That's why industry has evolved into much bigger electrities. This evolution is seen with gas and coal electrocutes, but also eolics, PV, CSP, etc.

16. Bilfinger didn't guarantee performance. So even if it entered the thermal operation, it could still crash immediately and there was no guarantee that they would cover costs to regulate waste and purchase electricity in the market to replace these products. Again, lack of reference technology does not allow them to guarantee performance.

17. Bilfinger wanted to be compensated for any dangerous waste that could be encountered during the work. Resiliency for Kosovo has been very high because in T There's a lot of dangerous waste. PCB, etc) and cleaning it would cost at least hundreds of millions. In the energy industry, there are numerous cases where dangerous materials have increased the costs of projects for billions of euros.

18. To sum up: Imagine you're the poorest family and you're living in the oldest and most damaged house in the city (so the oldest and most harmful electrina in Europe and Kosovo the poorest country). You're definitely planning on building a new house and then ruining the old house. To approach an officer and to say that the whole city is our stupid town that is building new houses (Germany, Slovenia, Poland, Greece, and all of it built new ones, did not rehabilitate the 60-year-old thermal power plants). Your employer proposes that you'd better pay them no matter what he says, but without talking to someone else, to fix my old house. The officer says he doesn't guarantee how much it's going to cost you, how long he's going to take, what quality of materials he has to use, will stick to the technical rules and as a result the state owes you the drop, and how much you're going to have operating costs due to low efficiency. In the meantime, while it's working, you have to go live somewhere for rent. Ask yourself what you'd do.

Nineteen. During the government experience, I had the opportunity to see several times come fully speculative proposals from companies that have tried to exploit Kosovo's weaknesses and to lobby through their states (which are legally bound to support) for then absurd gains. Bilfinger's project was the most speculative project I've seen and if it wasn't for the interest lobes of the current traders and the people representing Bilfinger who thought to take the direct advantage of the project, this concept would just be forgotten like all those other speculative projects. Unfortunately, the interests were too big.

20. Why did Vetvendosje at that time even now support this concept-project without analyzing and thanking the details, and without talking to a serious employer remains a mystery. This project would judge Kosovo's energy sector and budget, and I am convinced that even though it is talked about the rehabilitation of Kosovo A, the current government does not necessarily have any idea how complex and conditional such an adventure will be. At the same time, I am very hopeful that the Government will give up this project when I realize how irrational such an investment is. Better than losing billions of Euros. Also, some key people who have vV lobes for this project are party members and have personal interest in developing this project. It would be nice to audit those people and see if they ever made statements of conflict of interest.

21. Anyone who mentions rehabilitation of T C Kosova A would have better go visit the plant myself. At least I'll fix the day for those poor T workers. C# source files Kos A that every day decades the highest levels of cancerous emissions of any thermal power plant in Europe are exposed. Those Albanian workers have simply sacrificed their health for Kosovo to have electricity, and to a minimum they deserve to retire with honor in advance.

22. Producing powerline some of Bilfinger's bandages is in the ministry. Ask for the release of that proposal and I challenge you to find any contradictions between that and that proposal.