How did dezinforms from Kosovo spread for Australian elections?

Jacob Wallis of the Australian Institute for Strategic Policy has said in an interview for Radio Free Europe that there are data that states are exploiting groups of cash in social networks that mainly spread dezinforms with the goal of expanding influence. Wallis, leader of the Information and Dezinform Operations program, has [...]
Wallis, the leader of the programme for information and dezinformation operations, has mentioned that Kosovo -- along with Albania and Northern Macedonia -- has been involved in spreading dezinforms in the federal elections held in 2019 in Australia.
He says one of the reasons such activities are held in countries like Kosovo is financial motivation and little opportunity for people involved in these activities to deal with something greater.
For this reason, he believes governments should work with these groups to encourage them to lead their capacities into something more creative.
According to him, governments should co-operate, not be hostile to social networking platforms, because as he points out, societies benefit from such an environment of co-operation.
Radio Free Europe: In the latest report by the Australian Institute for Strategic Policy, called the shadow economy online in the Asia-Peace region, you say there's increasing data that states are exploiting paid networks for impact purposes. How does this work?
Jacob Wallis: This has become clear to us when we have started to analyse major dezinformation campaigns linked to the People's Party of China. There were data that was provided by social networking companies, which were connected to the Chinese government. Within these databases, we have identified social media account networks, which were from countries like Indonesia, Bangladesh, or even Russia. We've seen that in this huge database, some accounts have been connected to other countries. What we've discovered by analyzing these networks is that there were networks within them that were paid deliberately for influence and a shadow economy, where people who acted on that market have sold their jobs to the highest bidder. In that case, the consumer was the Chinese government.
Radio Free Europe: We've learned from your report that the production of disinfectant often serves as a big business. Can you tell us which countries benefit most from such actions?
Jacob Wallis: There are different ways to answer that question. One approach would be that these markets create opportunities for countries that are willing to create deinformation campaigns, so countries like China, Russia will use these services from abroad to mask their involvement in these activities and in this kind of influence, because they can deny everything. Thus, these countries benefit from these markets because countries like China have exploited networks from countries like Russia, Indonesia, Bangladesh. The Russian government has then benefited through its internet research agency, as well as other country operators from Nigeria and Ghana.
We know that through these networks, it creates credible denial of state actors, but on the other hand there are benefits from entrepreneurs who are involved in such activities. A centre for such activities is here in the part where I live, in Australia, and we've noticed great activity in the Asia-Peacenaire region for a lot of reasons: internet access, free market but, relatively well educated and new labour power, which can be mobilized by people who want to gain by offering objectively influential services.
Election campaign opportunities for people to take advantage of disinfectants
Radio Free Europe: You have also mentioned that malicious networks have targeted Australia's federal elections in 2019, especially from Kosovo, Albania and Northern Macedonia, publishing false news and fraud from deinformation networks. Why do you think these countries have served such activities?
Jacob Wallis: Elections, referenda and major political impact developments have now become the source of finances for people's engagement businesses for influence purposes, because in this period there is greater activity in social networks, increased interest in politics, and people are easily flexible as they are involved with emotions in political developments. Thus, these periods of campaigning during the elections have turned into great opportunity for those who take advantage of the disinformations, and some are motivated precisely by finances to create social networking activities.
Veles Again Focused on False News
We know that there is a number of average entrepreneurs who have exploited powerful political feelings in the 2016 presidential election in the United States, and all that activity has been developed by a small village called North Macedonia Veles, until 2019, during the campaign for federal elections in Australia, the Australian television broadcaster has found after a research that there have been persons from Kosovo, Albania and North Macedonia who have exploited the powerful political emotions that have emerged in social networks.
They have created large Facebook pages mixing emotions associated with the nation, or even with topics such as Islamophobia. Large groups of people were mobilised there, and then the Facebook networks were fed in links and Internet addresses with content from our environment. Every time a Facebook user clicked on that link, there were ads there and then that commercial generated revenues. This business model is designed to direct people to an environment in advertising service, because through advertising it increases income and the basis of the digital economy.
The Decade of Great Competition
Radio Free Europe: Do we know who was behind these groups that spread deceptive or false content?
Jacob Wallis: We have limited information and all we know about these groups are their locations, because technical tools allow us to identify the location, but we can't know who's involved. The goal has been clear for increased revenues. They have been politically motivated activities, because materials have been copied and distributed on the internet from other sites to create social media audiences and then run those audiences into disinformive content, which has been targeted and thus increased in profits.
The danger from the prospect of national security is that these people can turn into branches for the state. In our study, we've mentioned how pages of stimulating content operating in the Asia-Peacekeeping region have the basis in Singapore, though they are very close to Chinese state media. This does not necessarily mean that there are harmful connections between the Chinese state and pages with stimulating content.
We've highlighted the report, and the relationship is only financial. These people realize that by linking their content with those of the Chinese state media, they can expand audiences because Chinese state media have already built these audiences and if they connect the content with them, then they get to the same audience, and using the same business model through advertising, these people raise revenues.
This is really dangerous, because we've entered a decade of great competition, and if there are politically motivated actors associated with powerful authoritarian states, which have the will to use disinformation and propaganda, then this can shape the region in ways that are not favourable for open democratic countries.
Governments need to avoid hostility with social networks
Radio Free Europe: One might say that Australia is far away from Kosovo and Albania. When we talk about why these countries are involved in this activity, do you think the free market is one of the reasons for this involvement?
Jacob Wallis: Of course. These people are the basis of the digital economy. They may have limited opportunities and find that this type of business can be exploited. Social networks were enabled to reach audiences that otherwise could not have. By creating these sites that shouldn't be invested much in content, so it's not Radio Free Europe, it's a content which is stolen from other websites and through them they create small revenues. I see these ventures coming out of countries that are potentially impossible and this possibility is ideal for them, which they can exploit.
But there are no risks, especially during the election period, as financially motivated persons can create shape patterns that are not healthy and then those spaces can be used by other states to interfere with the choices of their strategic rivals.
Radio Free Europe: In your report you say governments can work in this direction, so they can focus on working on something more creative, instead of producing such content.
Jacob Willis: This is a valuable way of thinking about this challenge, because governments tend to create hostile approaches with large social networking companies. There are a lot of issues why that approach is created. We here in Australia have faced something like this because Facebook has stopped broadcasting news from Australia because of legislation that has been adopted through parliament. This creates further friction with regard to the sovereignty of government processes and major information providers worldwide and is something we cannot turn back on.
How do pages with stimulating content work?
Radio Free Europe: Can we talk a little bit about the stimulating page content? What should we know about them?
Jacob Wallis: When we talk about pages with stimulating content, then we talk about unregistered actions that tend to be forbidden, there are no journalistic facts in the production of that content, the emphasis is on the amount of content and access of as many people as possible, as well as manipulation of these financial income audiences. The content is typical of increasing human activity, having no other merit on it, is not journalism, has no objective of informing, nor is it a cause for much of its content taken from other sites, and is aimed at profit. As far as workers are concerned, they view the task as additional commitment in addition to another job. All the work is in distribution of content, sometimes through personal accounts or through an entire network of fake accounts, with the aim of spreading content.
But if we look at a higher degree, there are also services that are offered either as marketing services. We've analyzed some accounts from Indonesia that promoted online purchases, drinks and supported the government's vaccine program or government agenda. What we suspect is happening here is that these networks are funded for potential consumers and now distribute whatever content the client requires.
The danger exists in the fact that this activity is highly regulated. It's not well understood, it's not well documented, and that means that countries that come out mainly of the most authoritarian regimes, have weak civil society, few independent media, so if the government secretly goes through these paid activities intend to create public opinion then this thing is not necessarily healthy for the level of democracy. Therefore, we recommend that such activities be better adjusted, understood. Governments and political parties must pledge that they will not use false accounts, because we believe this exceeds the red line in terms of legitimate influence.
“commands must invest heavily in positive public messages”
Radio Free Europe: Should we blame just social networks for these activities, are they doing enough to fight such a thing?
Jacob Wallis: I think the guilt is sharing in some parts. Social networks have had astronomical growth, which exceeds their imagination. They operate in markets where there is great political danger for them. These companies do not necessarily understand every environment in which they work, so they must work to be able to understand the political context in which they operate. I think governments should try to create a suitable environment for working with these platforms.
Radio Free Europe: Coronervirus' pandemic has endangered everything so far. As you have said in another report, the pandemic has installed a new era of dezinformation, where we can see credital information eroded. How can we fight this thing?
Jacob Wallis: This is a big challenge because we have a population under stress. People are trying to find meaning in their situations. How do we do this? By staying online, we get involved in our credit media networks, we can look through Google or other search machines to figure out how we can get through the stress we're going through. People are also facing financial influence, which has the potential to alter societies.
Hence, governments need to invest heavily in positive public messages, which help people to understand how they should pass the pandemic, but they also need to fight negative messages from state actors who are exploiting pandemic for political points, but also from some extremist groups that view pandemic as opportunities.
This is another case when the partnership between government and industry becomes necessary because social networks in this case make decisions rather than governments. Social networking companies have to make decisions about which networks block or suspend and what kind of messages are appropriate and which should be deleted. Only through such positive cooperation between government and industry can an environment that best serves the interest of populations in democracy be created.











