Who government in Kosovo, and who does the opposition?

(Perscope observation) 

A day after the Balkan Open summit in Skopje did not provoke the political opposition in Kosovo. No voice to the LDK bosses either, PDK and AAK. Even these 5-6 lines of today's Loomi Mayor Before it's an economic project, it's a political project. Just to testify to the embarrassing attempt not to spoil public opinion through a '%no, de é, traditional LDK deé.

In short, everyone is aiming for attitudes to be enjoyed by measures that in Kosovo imply a vague combination of the townman and ʹmergiant.

The problem, however, is that political parties have neither clung to public opinion nor to policymaking. The complex situations like this with Balkan Opin testify to that. To be or against her?

A advice to party chiefs in Kosovo: as for public opinion, he will always trust the worst and simplest option. Translated, this means that ordinary Kosovar experiences Balkan Opin as the Serbian initiative to revive Yugoslavia and oppress Albanians. After that, you know, fighting, slaughter, etc.

There was also an anthological advice for Memlyn, Lumir et al: Policymaking means having vision and political attitude, whether he likes public opinion or not. Political parties exist to stand up to public opinion, not at its tail. A coward is not in this world, nor in the Hereafter. No one has said it's an easy trade, this of the party chief.

As things are, how much time and time are minimally now and two years of final political stances on serious issues are perceived during media clashes, social networks and political analysts. Analysts' concerts and Facebook comments turn into party views and, quite recently, into government positions. The two-day mortar issue for the Skopje Summit only reconfirms this. Analysts already broadcast their position as usual, half for and half against ʹ while public opinion across social networks was more unique: he sealed Balkan Open as Vuciqi's hegemony and Rama's betrayal. So simple is that, let's prefrarate here a phrase liked by the President.

The clever approach of political acts, you would say, this subtle expectation of popular media attitudes and then the conformist articulation of the party. Maybe.

However, we must note that this elaborate tradition of hiding behind the dress of TV analysts for fear of citizen opinion and exile is disturbing: it's the reactive and conformative population of CHA is the most infirm form.

Today, opposition parties have no clear stance on any of the country's key challenges. Neither are they for the dialogue, but they are not against it. In Dialog, it's neither for territorial exchange nor for Zajednica. In fact, they are not entirely opposed. In fact, they cannot stutter an attitude out of fear of cross - Facebook and television debates. On the other hand, they are neither against mini-Schengen, though unanimously they are for common regional market and free movement.

Political opposition chiefs in Kosovo are behaving like the government they want to tear down. On one side they repeat Prime Minister Kurti's popular mantra not Zajednica, not exchange, etc. On the other hand, they hope that Kurt will fall because of his refusal to stand. Nowhere, in a moment, a new Green in the international community will release a fatwa that will take it out of power.

Theoretically, the odds are not small that this really is happening, given that Kurt doesn't seem to have created many friends in international community during these four ruling months. Before such a motion is launched, however, there must be a clear reason for it. There must be a political opposition that has opposing positions of power that he also fell for. Otherwise, why replace a rejection government that flatters Facebook commentators with another who would do the same?

Is there such, opposite positions, the political opposition has faced Kurti's retaliatory stubbornness among others, against Zajednica, the Balkanpen, even in the face of reports with Tirana and Edi Rama? Clearly, no. Fear of not being liked by Facebook crowds has already turned them into the tail of public opinion. You see goods in an interview once in two months, and even when you see them, you hear nothing but flattering wording of consent.

As for the student government, there's nothing to talk about. She's also conceived by the obsession to like social media. Its real birth is Facebook, with all the status and comments of the semi-analphabe militants. So, while Government and Facebook are one, the only opposition develops a handful of shared analysts on local television.

In short, it turns out that true governance in Kosovo is thus applied by completely informal, non-party acts and, often, unpolitical. From tax policies, diplomacy, security to criticism of patriarchism, all of which are first discussed in debates, are commented bloodyly on networks and end up as government attitudes.

Even if, at times, by chance, the government dares make an unaccomplished decision with this real power, virtuel and television, it will soon be forced to withdraw from it: the case of the ticket/Vete for car registration is the most exciting example in this.

So, what government today in Kosovo? Comment below