Former American Secretary of State Albright in her book talks about Thaci's insistence on independence

In her book of Memos “Madam Secretary” former American State Secretary Madeleine Albright speaks of her meetings with the Kosovo delegation during talks in Ramboullete, where the special emphasis puts on its recognition with Hashim Thaci, the current president of Kosovo.

The following is a cut from her book:

The 16-member Albanian delegation included moderate political leader Ibrahim Rugova, respected newspaper editor Veton Surroi, schoolboy Rexhep Qosja, and representatives of other political, independent parties, as well as UCK. Suddenly, delegates chose as leader a 29-year-old UCK command, Hashim Thaci, with whom we had had little contact at all. Thaci's position seemed to reflect the continuing opposition to Rugova's stance, which responded to these objections almost silently. When one of our diplomats asked Rugova why he was so rigid, he replied so I have style.

On the fifth day, I spoke with Hashim Thaci, who was still in Kosovo. He reported that Pristina was like a dead town while listing a series of areas where security forces were killing people. He said 60 thousand Albanians had fled the northern town of Mitrovica, and that about half a million Kosovars were without a peak over their heads. Thaci appealed to us to start distributing humanitarian aid from the air, but the Pentagon said this was not appropriate because our planes, to avoid any shooting risks, had to fly very high.

On the other hand, I started one of the many meetings with the Albanian delegation in Ramboulletet. The term "laralara" could be created by this group, which depended on balem Rugova, on the pragmatic Surroi and Thaci problematic.

After the general meeting, I met separately with Thaci in a cold basement room. There and at my next meetings, I was impressed by his new age and lack of experience, which seemed to make him both stubborn and enthusiastic about pleasing others. Rugova and I had felt that I was addressing an ex - centered academic colleague. Thaci was more like a student with brilliant potential and a tendency to bring the tasks late. Under our agreement, UCK would disarm and cease any independent military role. I knew this would not be easily acceptable to Thaci, despite NATO's promise to fill the security vacuum. That first afternoon, I encouraged him to think of other military organizations that had transformed themselves into political parties. Thaci responded that he expected the Albanian delegation to sign the agreement but that it would take time for guerrillas to adapt. Trying to keep Thaci's prediction, I told him I'm happy with your commitment to sign. I believe an agreement can be reached but it's not up to me or the UCK or the delegation. It could be hard, he told me.

During the week, I called Thaci, who had said he would like more of the Albanian suggestions to be accepted. In general, however, it remained optimistic. Returning to France, on Saturday morning I met briefly with the Albanian delegation, either together or individually. Kosovars said they would support the Framework Agreement when the two sides meet with the Contact Group foreign ministers that afternoon. As Serbs had not yet addressed security issues, Kosovars had the golden opportunity to isolate Milosevic. I confidently expected them to take advantage of the occasion. Then the meeting happened. The room was small and tight. The foreign ministers sat down together as a panel of judges on a side of a long wooden table. From the start of the session, I had an inquisitive feeling. Finally done. Leaders of the Albanian delegation settled in front of us. Thaci, seemingly inconsistent, took the central seat.

They had promised to respond positively, but when the moment came, Thaci gave no direct answers. This gave way to Italian Foreign Minister Lamberto Dean, who had always been a major UCK critic. He pressured Thaci not only to accept the framework but also to withdraw support for the independence referendum. That was unfair. The proposal we had developed required Kosovars to postpone, but not to abandon, their aspirations for independence. Again Dean urged Thaci to answer yes or no to what was an unacceptable proposal for Thaci. As a result, Thaci neither supported the framework nor gave direct answers. His other delegates, Erroi, Rugova and Qosja were sitting like a stump, Surroi because he didn't think it was up to him to talk, Rugova, because he had it off and Qos because he thought Thaci was doing the right thing.

Saturday was to be the last day of negotiations, but we agreed for three extra days. The text was neither nearly carried out nor needed time to change votes. Thaci was not the only member of his delegation having reservations. Because of the time we had spent trying to convince Serbs, Albanians had started to feel uncomfortable. They were listening to people from outside who told them not to trust either Europeans or us. They were concerned that the language they were told to accept would be a permanent barrier to independence. They also had hesitations for disarming.

The result was progress. When we started Saturday evening, nine members had voted against it. On Monday, only Thaci continued to oppose. He was a particular problem because it was hard to engage in specifics. Leader of UCK had seen Jamie Ruby denouncing Milosevic on television and building a friendship between themselves. Now Thaci had told Jamie he was afraid of his life.

After Saturday's meeting, I tried a series of tactics. I told him first what a good potential leader he was. When the first one didn't work, I told her we were disappointed in her and that if she thought we were going to bomb Serbs even if Albanians refused the deal, she was wrong. We could never get NATO support like that. On the other hand, I said if you say yes and the Serbs say no, NATO will bomb until Serb forces emerge and NATO enter Kosovo. You'll have security. And you will be able to govern yourself. Thaci replied that his sole purpose U n CK had been fighting for independence, and it would hardly have given up. I told him you don't have to give up, but you have to be realistic. This deal is three-year-old. We know Milosevic is the problem. But the situation may seem different after three years. This is your chance. Get him because you may never get another chance. Though clearly confused and almost in tears, Thaci did not say yes to”.