Mountie foot: So I predicted in 2014, we have a similar situation.

Political analyst Shzen Maliqi has predicted the political situation in the country following the collapse of the Kurti government. He has published a 2014 text that, according to him, today corresponds to political reality. He had written in 2014 that if Thaci and the PDK would not want to form Government, then the second belonged to the formation [...]
He has published a 2014 text that, according to him, today corresponds to political reality.
He had written in 2014 that if Thaci and the PDK were not going to form Government, then the second belonged to its formation.
Maliqi's complete writing:
After the 2014 elections, which are rightly regarded as a key moment and overturning political developments in independent Kosovo, which have caused a six-year blockade, and the collapse of three subsequent governments (Mustafa, Haradinaj and now Kurti), I have made some notes and tests that are pre-paradition and commentary also on the crisis we face today.
The first mark, titled “Pat position” I didn't complete and publish, and the second, which is the answer to a question portal “Politto”, has been published and combined, these two fragments of alaisas filled up and prophesied further developments under the influence of Albin Kurti's popular strategies.
Pat location
The opposition has the right to establish the new government if the first prime minister, Hashim Thaci, fails to collect the necessary quota of votes in the Assembly, at a minimum 61, while Ramush Haradinaj holds hands. The agreement by LDK leaders, AAK and Initiative, in its current form, is claimed because it accounts for 48 seats in the Assembly ( The LDK 31, AAK 11, Initiative 6), but it needs 13 more secure in order to make the new government majority.
But, on the other hand, if Haradinaj, Mustafa and Limaj insist, Hashim Thaci's attempt to form the government, however, will be failed because the one with the new “ ” has only 36 seats safe in the Assembly, and there is no theoretical possibility to do 24 more seats that would make the ruling majority. If, for example. Thaci would receive the support of all minority subjects, with 20 seats guaranteed, the new mission would reach a quota of 56 seats, which is higher than that of the LDK-AAK-Nisma coalition, but not enough because it lacks the five seats that make it out in majority.
The key factor in all estimates of making the new government is actually the Vetevendosje Movement, which has 16 seats in the Assembly. These 16 votes make the difference crucial before potential mandaters Thaci and Haradinaj begin consultations on making the government. Vetevendosje with its call to unite the opposition has paved the way for Thaci to be blocked and overturned. With VV votes “Hope Coalion”, as it was called, reaches the 64-seat quota with which all dilemmas are resolved. Haradinaj may even build a more convincing majority if in government he receives any from minority parties.
But this calculation that definitely blocks Thaci and opens the way to Haradinaj is not without problems, and it is not that such a government of numbers would be stable and easy... (June 11, 2014. )
Interview for “politicalo”:
Question: Vetevendosje leader Albin Kurti has declared: We don't want the Serbian List in Government, because we don't want them in the country first either, because they are the guests of the outgoing Prime Minister. With the Constitution of Kosovo, the minority communities -- as well as Serbs -- are obliged to be part of the government, while in the country they also have guaranteed seats. Besides this inexorable fact, how do you see this Kurt statement? Is she racist? What can explain Kurt's thinking?
Sh. Maliqi: The statement indicates that Albin Kurti, in essence, is not moderate at all. I don't want to stop citing this stance that practically excludes a Serbian political subject from being represented in the Government and the Assembly of Kosovo. But it is clear that the Serbian List cannot be reduced to the fish that the prime minister has left us on the run. The Serbian list represents 90 per cent of the Serbian electorate in Kosovo. You may not like List's demands and attitudes, but it is now a political subject that has transformed Serbian politics in Kosovo by agreeing to compete in Kosovo's elections under the rules here. The Serbian list is a real force with which Kosovo must count, negotiate, make political and agreement, within that process, which is aimed at integrating Serbs into Kosovo institutions. And we have this balance from the dialogue process that is supported by the EU and the US, as well as by all political forces in Kosovo, besides the Vetevendosje Movement.
If it were asked why Kurt comes out with such a statement, I think you're behind a popular manipulation. Kurti, with the idea of excluding the Serbian List from the Government, learns Vetevendosje's promotion as the key and only factor enabling the creation of an Albanian majority government. While the alleged Haradinaj government does not have the numbers for majority, because it is stuck to 47 deputies, and Vetevendosje's conditional offer can bring the majority to 63 deputies, the expulsion of the Serbian List can also be understood as Haradinaj's impasse for the government to form by linking the coalition with minority deputies, which is a total of 20. But without the 9 deputies of the Serbian List, which Kurti does not want in Government, Haradinaj remains only 11 minority deputies, which is an insufficient number to reach the government majority (47 c. 11 = 58).
With these calculations, which I don't believe are well thought out, Kurti hosted Hashim Thaci's ambitions as well as Ramush Haradinaj's, providing for himself two favors. In other words, Ramush's covenant with Isa and Fatmir has been unable to provide a mandate of Hashim Thaci, while the obligation of these covenants to accept Kurti's terms about dialogue and privatisation, including now the expulsion of the Serbian List, would be an extraordinary empowerment of Albin Kurti himself, who even without being in government could deal with its policies as a shadow prime minister.
But I guess Kurt's calculations don't stop here. His popularisation teaches more, that the processes lead to his personal and Vetevendosje favour even if the three-thirds of the covenant did not accept the conditions that would seriously deliver Kosovo's reports with the EU and the US. That popular concept would also convention any failure to establish the Haradinaj government, whether the process would end with the repeat elections, whether the credibility would be broken and Isa Mustafa or Ramush Haradinaj would be forced to make deals with Hashim Thaci or any other PDK candidate, as a solution imposed by the international factor.
Kurti estimates that any such eventual humiliation of LDK or AAK would affect his movement becoming the opposition and the only alternative for The PDK, so that in the next elections, whenever they are held, will get the votes of the disappointed subjects by becoming, if not the most voted subject, then the second by power.










