Brussels Triangle

If with measures of organisational power and negotiating potential, a few weeks before talks begin between Pristina and Belgrade on reaching the legally binding agreement for normalising relations between Kosovo and Serbia, the situation in Kosovo, Serbia and the EU (in the Office of the High Representative, Federica Moghrin), would likely be appreciated.

If, in this analysis, we were to begin with Serbia's position, either by its president, Aleksandar Vuciqi, there is no doubt he is and will remain the only Serbian official address that has the full responsibility to bring talks to Brussels. So, actually, Serbia, or, its leadership that only recognises one single name, President Aleksandar Vuciq, has a maximum organisational power pending final dialogue with Kosovo representatives. On the other hand, however, Vuciq cannot take pride in even the negotiating potential he possesses under these circumstances. Vuciq, in reality, has suffered a double blow, within Serbia and in the major Western states, which have recently narrowed much of the maneuvering space in preparation for the dialogue chapter with Kosovo.

First, the so-called internal dialogue in Serbia, which Serbia's president himself initiated, took a largely unwanted approach to Vucinqi. He didn't produce any new ideas. Furthermore, the positions which prefer the holding of the current Quo-kuno Status in Kosovo (or, as often qualified to freeze conflict) were restored to the political and media scene, although Kosovo's north is no longer such), until the changing geopolitical situation, which would be in Serbia's favour. Currently, Vuciq, at his own fault, finds it more difficult to make an agreement with the Kosovo side than a year ago.

Second, Vuciq has found nowhere in the main Western capitals, and here privately matter Washington and Berlin, support for his preferred territory exchange option, where Serbia would take over the north of Kosovo (or, current territory of four Serb-run municipalities), and in return, it would offer Kosovo a portion of the Presevo Valley.

For this reason, Vuciq is now obliged to define his negotiating position with the sentence he is repeatedly repeating, under which one party cannot lose everything (Serbia), and another to win it all (Kosovo) all.

However, his extraordinary organisational power, as president of Serbia, is conveyed with a real negotiating power, which will likely come to the fore whether there will soon be real talks between the Pristina and Belgrade negotiating authorities.

As for the current position of Kosovo, here current values show the opposite, compared to the situation in Serbia.

Kosovo really has a serious negotiating potential, which could translate into a legally binding agreement that would benefit Kosovo. In the past two cases when Kosovo representatives have talked and negotiated with representatives of Serbia, or, at the Ramboullett Conference (1999) and Vienna Process (2006-2007), co-operation between Kosovo and the West, as well as Serbia's full lack of political will for Agreements, have resulted in political, diplomatic and military circumstances that coincided with Kosovo's liberation and with its independence. This time Serbia is more hasty than Kosovo. This time around, Serbia is still interested in making the Agreement with Kosovo, because it has the power of a pass passer-by (passion), which for Serbia, therefore, opens the doors of the European Union.

On the other hand, the reality of the state of Kosovo, and that is well aware of Serbia's current leadership, is irreversible. Of course, Serbia's President Vuciq will try to keep his state's presence in Kosovo alive, mostly through the creation of association/ The Serb majority municipality community, according to Belgrade's move and ambitions. However, the Kosovo side in every option knows what this is about, and what is the eventual negotiating space.

In Kosovo's case, however, the potential evident negotiator is currently at odds with Pristina's organisational power for future talks. Although there is in principle a common will for re-creating negotiating unity under the model of the Unity Team, created by the late President Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, and was then led by his heir, Fatmir Sejdiu, on the Kosovo political scene still this principled will is not being translated into a political agreement for the new organisation of this delegation. Of course, Kosovo politics has little time, measured by two weeks at the most, to make this will still undefinated a formal reality.

Finally, when it comes to the Office of the High Representative, Mrs. Moghrini, who plays the role of facilitator in the talks between Kosovo and Serbia, how things stand now, this Office has no organisational power nor has the negotiating potential to lead the final chapter of this dialogue. Furthermore, it seems that Mogher and her associates have no claim of better organisation or of a negotiating plan, hoping that objectively, both sides will have an interest themselves to successfully conclude the conclusion phase of these talks.

The last meeting of Quinti's representatives in Washington, held several weeks ago, was largely a reflection of these two missing features of the Mogher Office.

Of course, the further commitment of the big five will be necessary to write down these talks, or to round them with legally binding agreements.