Russia towards deployment of troops in Serbia

From: Shaban Murati

The advancement of Russian geopoliticals and geostratency in the Balkans is heading towards increasingly aggressive forms. Russian pro-government organisation “adaily.com” on December 22nd 2018 issues the new proposal for the deployment of Russian military forces to Serbia. With the title “Serbia needs the Russian military contingent” and with the subheading “Russian military presence in Serbia could prevent the military frustration of the conflict in Kosovo”, the director of the Balkan Centre for International Co-operation in Moscow, Victor Kolbankovski, submits the proposal that “the only way for Serbia is to establish a Russian military contingent in Central Serbia”.

It is the first time that a pro-government media and a leader of a specialised Russian Centre for the Balkans present the proposal that a Russian military contingent should be established in Serbia.

This should be taken as a warning signal of the expected negative developments in our region, where Moscow's ambition can take on the dangerous form of deploying Russian troops to the region. In his December 22nd article, the director of the Russian Balkan Centre for International Co-operation points out: ” The fact that the situation in the Balkans was involved in the agenda of the Russian Federation Security Council's Security Council on 17 December testifies to what the region in question enters into the focus of Russian national security interests”.

Even the Russian presidential communiqué for the above gathering of permanent members of the Federation Security Council, which was headed by President Vladimir Putin, stresses that the “collection discussed the situation in the Balkans”, and does not mention any other world region, not even Syria. Eastern diplomatic sources suggest that at this meeting of the Russian Federation Security Council, it has focused on Russian diplomatic and military movements for developments with the theme of Kosovo.

It does not seem random that at the very height of regional, European and international diplomatic debates for resolving the conflicted knot between Serbia and Kosovo, the proposal for the deployment of its military forces to Serbia comes from Russia. To be clear, this is the proposal addressed to Serbia's leadership, which according to Eastern diplomatic sources, has been presented to the Russian diplomatic channels. A prominent Russian military expert, Victor Litovkin, director of the military editorial department at the Russian State Agency TASS, wrote some time ago but at “adaily.com”, that the “possibility of Russian military presence in Serbia depends primarily on the will and initiative of the Serbian leadership”. It is open pressure and blackmail from Moscow on Belgrade, that Serbia paves the way for the deployment of Russian troops on its territory and not deviate from the role of the Russian strategy instrument in the Balkans.

Currently, Serbia is in a difficult diplomatic and political position. The US and several EU states are urging it to end its reluctance to recognise Kosovo as an independent state by signing the final agreement on normalisation of bilateral relations. Everyone understands that the realisation of a final agreement, where Serbia and Kosovo mutually recognise each other, would be contributing to the stabilisation of the region, but also an advance of the Euro-Atlantic integration space in Serbia and Kosovo. Such a Euro-Atlantic perspective means closing doors for Russian influence in Serbia and the region. This favourable geopolitical scenario Moscow seeks to prevent it in any way. So a huge activism of it is found in the region, and as a result, we have a new active role for the first time in the region after 15 years. The fact is that Russia is managing to win a new role in closed efforts of major powers to end the Serbia-Kosovo conflict.

It must be acknowledged that Russia, in one way or another, with consensus or without the consensus of the West, is managing to be an important player in the closed district of major powers for the final Serbia-Kosovo dialogue. Russian President Vladimir Putin's surprise meeting with Kosovo President Hashim Thaci, in Paris on November 11th 2018, and the care of the French protocol to sit next to each other, should be read as a sign that Russia is allowed to take on a new diplomatic role in the Balkans. But whoever knows little about Russian methodology and diplomacy strategy, knows that the Kremlin will not only be satisfied with diplomatic roles in Kosovo-Serbia and the region. It aims at something bigger, and this is the Russian military presence in the Balkans.

I have the opinion that Russia is applying its successful Syrian approach to the Balkans. In Syria she waited four years until the West was confused with the flow of interest and could not solve the Syrian crisis, and then Russia entered the dance. First diplomaticly with the US agreement on the removal of chemical weapons from Syria, and then a year later Russia established the dislocation of its military forces on Syria's territory. Russia is currently the main player in the face of the West for resolving the Syrian crisis. Its Syrian scheme is being revised in the Balkans and Russia, as it is sitting on closed tables of major powers for dialogue between Serbia and Kosovo, is expected to move to the next phase of its strategic plans -- that of deploying its military forces in Serbia.

What is impressive about the Russian Balkan Centre for International Co-operation proposal? First, it is required that Belgrade “firmly reject any particular agreement with Kosovo Albanians and address Russia with prayer for military assistance, including the deployment of the Russian military contingent” in Serbia.

Second, it threatens Belgrade's leadership that, if it does not accept Russian troop demand, Russia could raise against the domestic public and particularly the Serbian Orthodox Church. Russian specialised institutions have created experience and networks in the direction of promoting social and political unrest and protests in Balkan countries, and we have seen their hand in many Balkan states, including NATO member states.

Thirdly, the proposal for the deployment of Russian military forces in Serbia is put on the eve of the visit, which the Russian president is expected to make early next year in Belgrade. The director of the Russian Balkan Centre for International Co-operation classifies it as an inappropriate “fund for the realisation of President Putin's visit Serbia's current domestic policy circumstances”. This form of diplomatic threat means that Russian diplomacy before Putin's visit is awaiting Belgrade's response to the request for the deployment of the Russian military contingent to Serbia and for granting diplomatic status to Russian military soldiers of the Russian military base in Nis.

It is the first time a Russian institution is presenting to a Russian pro-government body the demand that Serbia not accept an agreement on final normalisation of relations with Kosovo. Despite the Kremlin's stated that Moscow will accept any bilateral agreement, which will agree to Belgrade and Pristina, the significance of the new call for rejection of the agreement is that Russia is increasing the price of its game and shopping on closed diplomatic tables of major powers. Moscow is raising the price for both Serbia and Kosovo, as well as the West, with the offer in hand for everyone.
The Russian ambition for deploying its military forces in Serbia is a major Russian geopolitical and geostrategic goal for the Balkans. It is understandable that a Serbia with Russian military forces on its territory cannot be accepted as an EU member without allowing any more NATO member. Russia is thus gaining a new weight in the Balkans, trying to dictate the principle of influence in the region and sanctioning its share of influence.

We are ahead of a negative process, which requires an articulating reflection especially from the EU, which must understand that its role in the Balkans is shifting and the weakening of the European voice goes in favour of Russia. This graph will get even worse if EU diplomacy continues to deal with the “sex of the Kosovo Army” and will not see the black clouds of the Russian military presence coming towards the Balkans. The EU's lack of diplomatic cohesion and its inability to impose Serbia's recognition of Kosovo over the seven years, which led the Serbia-Kosovo dialogue in Brussels, led to a situation where the EU is turning again into spectators and not to architects of resolving the Balkan crises. Let us hope that in Brussels and other important European capitals, as well as in Balkan capitals, they are listening to the sounds of the old Russian military march: “ja is coming the Red Army!”.