When the International Crisis Group concluded that independence is the best solution for Kosovo

The International Crisis Group, an independent organisation struggling to prevent crises on January 24th 2005, published the report “Kosovo: Toward Final Status”, where they concluded independence is the best solution for Kosovo.

The report said that unless declared independent, riots could begin again in Kosovo.

The report says that the Albanian majority of Kosovo's population expects the international community to make a decision regarding its aspirations for independence.

If in 2005, the report says, no significant progress is made towards resolving Kosovo's final status, there is the danger that the Serb minority will seek protection from the Serbian armed forces, which can turn Kosovo back into conflict.

The International Crisis Group says in its report that if the new Kosovo government wants to lead its people towards independence, it must commit to democracy and exercise” respect and full protection” for Kosovo Serbs and other minorities.

Executive summary and recommendations International Crisis Group 200405

In Kosovo time is running out. The status quo will no longer be held. As the bloody riots of March 2004 showed, Kosovo Albanians are frustrated with unresolved status, the economic situation, as well as problems in dealing with the past. The Albanian majority expects the international community this year to do something about their aspirations for independence. If that does not happen, then Kosovo Albanians can act uniformly. Under these circumstances, if the harsh attitude of Albanians towards minorities is considered, Kosovo Serbs can invite the Serb armed forces to protect them and the region can once again sink into trouble.

The year 2005 will either bring progress in resolving future status that consolidate peace and development, or there is the danger that Kosovo will return to conflict and generate regional instability. This report, aimed at saying what is not said at Security Council Resolution 1244 at the end of the 1999 conflict, instructs how this progress can be made.

As a first step, the six-nation Contact Group needs to make as soon as possible a declaration that would clearly offer a deadline for resolving the status issue and clarify four fundamental rules: that protection of minority rights in Kosovo is a matter on which, to the greatest extent, progress depends, that neither the return of Kosovo under Belgrade's rule will be allowed; nor will any possible form of Kosovo unification with Albania or with any neighbouring state or territory be supported. At the same time, a special envoy must be appointed by the UN Secretary General to start consultations on the content of the agreement and the process with which it will be implemented.

In mid-2005, The UN will assess the commitment of the Kosovo government to standards of democracy, good governance and human rights. If the assessment is positive, the special envoy should compile the preliminary text of the agreement é “Agreement on Kosovo” and the details of an international conference for its approval.

If the new Kosovo government wants to lead its people towards desired independence, there should be full respect for rights and protection for Kosovo Serbs as well as other minorities. The Kosovo Assembly, with international help, must immediately begin to compile the constitution that would fully satisfy these concerns, whose text, if accepted by the international conference, would become part of the Kosovo Agreement. The final aim of the Agreement, along with the new constitution, will be to create conditions for Kosovo's accession as a full member of the international community.

It would be appropriate, given what happened in the past and uncertainty about the future, so that the agreement and the constitution set some important boundaries between themselves ʹ to content, but few in number and with relatively limited scope in the freedom of action of independent Kosovo, in particular:

* Kosovo will effectively pledge that it will not join Albania or any neighbouring country or territory except within EU integration;

* There will be a number of international judges appointed in Kosovo's highest courts, as well as certain international parties, will have guaranteed a presence that ensures that prior to these courts the fundamental issues pertaining to minority rights and other agreed-on and adopted obligations;

* Thirdly, Kosovo would accept an international monitoring presence -- “Kosovo Monitoring Mission” -- which would report the wide international community and recommend responsibility measures if Kosovo withdraws from pledges.

An international conference must be held before the end of 2005, under UN leadership, where representatives of the Contact Group members, the EU, Belgrade, the Government of Kosovo and opposition parties in Kosovo would participate. In early 2006, the adoption of the Kosovo Constitution by Kosovo citizens with a referendum would mark the start of the Agreement for Kosovo's entry into force. It would be desirable, with the aim of giving the full legal and political effect, for the agreement to be approved by the UN Security Council as well. Kosovo's de jure sovereignty, if this is not done with an agreement with Serbia or with a Security Council resolution, would have to be recognised by the entire international community, or at least by its members (including the US and EU member states) who are willing to do so.

It should be thought that Serbia and perhaps Russia will refuse to co-operate about certain parts of the agreement or refuse to co-operate at all. But the proposed process should not be allowed to remain hostage to this possibility: the situation on the ground in Kosovo is very fragile and the status quo is unstable on many points, so that the international community will allow future status to be left unresolved indefinitely. Until Serbia's legitimate concerns should be fully taken into account, especially those for the status of the Serb minority in Kosovo, Belgrade must be cautioned that “treni is leaving, with or without you” and encouraged to participate fully in finding the best solution.

Politics around Kosovo is long run by the feeling that things are good. The potential for renewed outburst of violence is very real. The international community, in particular the Contact Group member states, must decide whether they want to take over the agenda or allow things to go out of hand until in the field an unpleasant development will start, which they will then have to deal with. The Agency given here requires political courage as well as energy. But her options are much worse.

References

1. As soon as possible:

A) Contact Group member states (would be much preferred to do so to Russia, but it is not necessary) as a measure for confidence building and promoting the process, should issue a declaration with which they would set a deadline for resolving the status issue.

B) This statement should make it clear that protection of minority rights in Kosovo is the issue on which progress will largely depend, and that neither Kosovo's return to Belgrade nor the partition nor any possible unification of Kosovo with Albania will be backed.

C) The UN secretary general, in agreement with the Contact Group, must appoint a Special Emissar to begin consultations about the structure of the final status process and the contents of the draft agreement.

d) The Kosovo Assembly, with the support of international donors, should begin drafting the draft constitution, including measures to protect minority rights and appoint a number of international judges to the Supreme and Constitutional Court.

e) Kosovo's Special Self-Government Institutions (IPVQ) should take a series of steps aimed at accommodateing the Serb minority, including the “Pristina ) campaign, an open city”.

2. Middle summer village in 2005: The SPP needs to complete a review of the IPVQ's commitment to meeting the standards for the next steps, supposed to be positive.

3. By autumn 2005:

A) The Kosovo Assembly must finalise the text of the draft constitution.

B) Special Emissar must present the sad text of the agreement é “Agreement on Kosovo” and the details of an international conference where both it and Kosovo's constitution would be accepted.

4. End of 2005: An international conference should be held, under UN leadership and with representatives of the Contact Group, EU, Belgrade and the Kosovo Assembly (or those willing to do so) and accept the negotiated text of the Agreement on Kosovo and the constitution.

5. Early in 2006:

a) Kosovo should hold referendum on the new constitution.

b) The agreement on Kosovo must be brought before the UN Security Council for approval (this approval will be very desirable, but not necessary; condition for the next steps that should be good-doers).

6. Middle of 2006 Kah:

a) UNMIK should hand over its executive functions to the Kosovo government while those monitoring the new international body in Kosovo (“Kosovo Monitoring Mission”). The continued, long-term role of KFOR, or any subsequent mission, should be confirmed with an agreement between NATO and the Kosovo government.

b) Whether this is done with an agreement with Serbia or with a Security Council resolution, Kosovo's de jure sovereignty must be recognised by the international community or by its member states (including the US and the EU) who are willing to do so.