RLI article: Kosovo on the brink of institutional collapse- Who believes a country that cannot choose its president?

The Constitutional Court issued its judgment yesterday regarding the current political situation, where it ruled that President Vjosa Osmani's decree to distribute the Parliament has no legal effect, and that MPs have yet more than a month to elect the new Kosovo chief.

For this, and in terms of the political situation, Robert Lansing Institute with headquarters in the United States has dedicated an analysis article. There, this institute estimates that the Constitutional Act marks a defining moment in the country's democratic trajectory, and that Kosovo risks entering a crisis-election cycle of new crisis.

But prior to that, the institute points out, immediate risk is the lack of the new president, who, by being the key to institutional legitimacy, adding that without president, cannot confirm high appointments, mandates are threatened to expire without replacement, and that operational continuation depends on the task manager.

Navrattivas, who present Kosovo as dysfunctional or divided, can be amplified from abroad, undermining public confidence and international credibility. At the same time, gaps in institutional legitimacy especially in the security sector create spaces for influence and intervention, the article says among other things.

Furthermore, RLI in its article estimates that Kosovo is in critical mode and that the institutional crisis is entering a more dangerous phase.

The article also raises questions about the country's functioning, saying that a country that cannot guarantee the basic functioning of the president's office is questioned about its ability to govern.

Dilma, therefore, is no longer rhetorical. Who will believe a country that cannot choose its president, and under what conditions? For Western partners, the question is asked not only on the issue of political compliance, but also on operational credibility. For rival actors, the same uncertainty presents an opportunity to exploit weakness, deepen divisions and challenge institutional stability, the newspaper Express reports.

Full article:

Constitutional Court Breaks Down Osman's Decree 34 Days for President Election

Political crisis in Kosovo: Consequences and Strategic Risks

The recent decision by the Constitutional Court of Kosovo, which wasted the presidential decree on the distribution of the Assembly, marks a determining moment in Kosovo's democratic trajectory. Listing with Prime Minister Albin Kurti and declaring President Vjosa Osmani's decision “has no legal effect”, the Court has done more than resolve a constitutional dispute ♫ it has uncovered a deepening institutional rift that now risks transforming into a broader state vulnerability. This is no longer a routine legal dispute. It is a direct confrontation between the two centers of executive legitimacy, each claiming constitutional authority, while at the same time weakening the system itself.

Constitutional Order or Political Instrument?

The presidency's effort to disperse the Parliament signalled willingness to break the political stalemate through executive action. The refusal of this move by the Court, although legally based, has consolidated the authority of the parliamentary majority led by Vetevendosje. On the procedural level, the decision is clear: The Assembly remains functional and has 34 days to elect a president; otherwise, elections must follow within 45 days. However, this structured time hides a more destabilizing reality. Constitutional mechanisms are increasingly perceived, not as neutral guarantees, but as instruments in a political clash in escalation.

The constitutional deadline aims to impose discipline on political actors. In practice, it creates a high - risk counter count. Failure to elect the president does not extend the status quo he causes institutional disruption. Kosovo risks entering a crisis cycle → new elections → crisis, where democratic procedures exist, but consensus ) the essence of democratic functioning is missing. Under these conditions, elections cease to be stabilising mechanisms and change into ongoing political confrontation.

Government Without a State Speaker

The most immediate and often underrated danger lies in the absence of the president. Within Kosovo's constitutional architecture, the president is a key node of institutional legitimacy, especially in the appointments and functioning of state bodies. Without president, the chain of authority begins to weaken. Critical appointments are blocked, mandates expire without legitimate offspring, and governance is increasingly based on temporary solutions. What appears is not an immediate collapse, but a gradual degradation of institutional cohesion.

Implication is more pronounced in the security sector. Institutions as the Kosovo Intelligence Agency depend on a clearly mandated leadership and formal legitimacy.

In the absence of a president:

High appointments cannot be confirmed

Mendates risk expire without replacement

Operational consistency depends on task manager

This creates structural vulnerability. Intelligence institutions can continue to function, but without full legal and institutional support, credibility, cohesion and independence are weakened. In time, this increases the risk of politicisation or exploitation by foreign actors.

As institutional gaps expand, power naturally consolidates within the executive branch led by Albin Kurti. This is not necessarily the result of deliberate overcoming competencies, but of a systemic imbalance.

The absence of a fully functional presidency removes a key counterweight. Institutions designed to function through joint authority begin to tilt towards unilateral governance. This gradual shift risks transforming Kosovo's political system from a balanced model to a concentrated authority.

Judicial content or institutional pressure?

The interpretation of the decision becomes more complex through the prospect of Enver Hasani, former chairman of the Court. While he praises the decision as professionally stable, he stresses a critical concern: the court's language reflects hesitation. According to Hasan, the decision is deliberately limited to reviewing the constitution of the decree, rather than directly and personally announcing President Osmani's actions as unconstitutional. This distinction is not merely technical, it signals a form of judicial restraint.

The most disturbing is the suggestion that this restraint can stem from pressure on the Court. If the highest constitutional authority calibrates his tongue under perceived pressure, it raises questions about the wider institutional environment in which it operates. The result is a paradox: The decision resolves the legal issue, but avoids establishing direct responsibility. In doing so, it leaves the political dimension of constitutional wrongdoing unresolved, strengthening rather than easing institutional tension. Kosovo's internal instability does not exist in isolation. In a region shaped by geopolitical competition, hybrid threats and deinformation campaigns, institutional fragility becomes a strategic weakness.

Narratives presenting Kosovo as dysfunctional or divided can be amplified from abroad, undermining public confidence and international credibility. At the same time, gaps in institutional legitimacy especially in the security sector create spaces for influence and intervention. Kosovo's line with Western partners remains the cornerstone of its stability. However, continuing internal crises are at risk of projecting uncertainty, especially in sensitive areas such as governance and security co-operation.

The prospect of elections within 45 days could seem like a constitutional solution. In reality, elections held under polarisation conditions and institutional distrust are unlikely to solve the underlying crisis. Rather, they risk deepening divisions and perpetuate instability. The problem isn't procedureal. It's structural. Without consensus among political actors, elections become another arena of confrontation, not solution mechanism.

A State on the brink of institutional collapse

Kosovo is now at a critical moment. The Constitutional Court's decision has offered a legal solution, but the institutional crisis it has uncovered remains unresolved and is entering a more dangerous phase. Failure to elect a president does not only cause elections he interrupts functioning state at the most sensitive points, weakening the chain of authority, delaying critical appointments and focusing power on ways that challenge constitutional balance.

But the implications no longer stop at the inner level alone. In a region shaped by geopolitical rivalry and continued security pressures, institutional credibility is a strategic currency. Allies do not invest political capital, intelligence co-operation or long-term security commitments in systems that seem unstable or unpredictable. A state that cannot ensure the basic functioning of its highest office inevitably raises questions about its ability to govern, co-ordinate and meet commitments.

Dilma, therefore, is no longer rhetorical, is strategic: who will believe a country that cannot choose its own president, and under what conditions? For Western partners, the question is asked not only on the issue of political compliance, but also on operational credibility. For rival actors, the same uncertainty presents an opportunity to exploit weakness, deepen divisions and challenge institutional stability. If this trajectory continues, Kosovo risks entering a phase where internal dysfunction begins to redefine its external position. Faith, after it erodes, does not come back easily. And in the absence of faith, even the strongest alliances begin to weaken.