Libun Aliu's Ministry's most negotiating contracts, Auditor: The ministry had not developed procurement procedures properly

In 2021 alone, the Ministry of Environment, Space Planning and Infrastructure had contracted close to sixm euros for 26 annex contracts, with negotiated procedure without publishing the contract announcement. Of them, the audience has audited 13 contracts worth over 4m euros, or close to 70% of the year-related contract value to this procedure. Procuring procedures for contracts under which the Ministry of Environment, Spatial Planning and Infrastructure established in 2018-2019

The ministry had not developed procurement procedures properly

The ministry needs to identify exactly what the jobs should be involved in the negotiated contract, and whether this contract covers all aspects of the basic project/controversial contract (the project concluded with this annex contract).

The Public Procure Law has seen that job contracts are able to be met with an annexal contract, the purpose of which is that the project finances, which may not eventually be included in the basic contract, are included in the annex. The additional jobs of each project that is next must be identified and included in the contract annex, and this should be sufficient to complete the project.

According to the ZKA, the ministry had identified the needs for each contract separately, had established commissions to assess additional jobs, following the MK's request for them.

In all cases, the commissions had endorsed each position that MK had considered should be added to the basic contract. According to an interview conducted with one of the commission heads for the adoption of additional jobs, we have found that commissions only formally examine MK's demands, because they are unable themselves to measure or calculate pre-size additional jobs (need a geodess and geodical equipment, those that lack the Ministry, as well as software to calculate exact amounts of additional jobs ) The MK based on measurements made by geodes and equipment, either by contracting OE calculations for road construction. In addition to the commission's written report, there was no other document in the commission's file proving that the additional amounts approved corresponded to the additional tasks to be performed”, the audience has found.

In addition, in two reports of the commissions for the evaluation of additional jobs, it was found that relevant projects/contradictions needed additional jobs, whose estimated value exceeded 10% of the value of the basic contract. This means that additional tasks necessary to complete the project, according to the MK and the commission, were so volumeful and were forwarded at such high cost that only an annex contract was not enough to carry out all the jobs. So on the Dragash Brod Road, the commission had only partially approved the MK's request for additional work, only as much as covered 10%, while for the rest it had recommended that the other procurement activity be held.

According to the audience, the same practice where the ministry has not identified the needs properly is in the Dolc-Gjakove Llot 3, in this case the commission report has resulted in the need for additional work as high as 25.89% of the contract value, where 10% is contracted by anal contract, while 15.89% has remained to be realised with the new procurement procedure.

The same thing had happened on Lubozhdez street. With 10%, only part of the additional jobs MK had asked for. The next case had occurred on the Decan Street black Montenegro where 10% of the annex were not nearly enough to complete the project.

And there were jobs like this that weren't even involved in the basic contract. To determine the price of these positions, the Ministry had applied a methodology consisting of selecting three previous ministry contracts containing positions in question by calculating the simple average of prices. The corresponding prices of these three contracts were collected and divided by three to release the price for position for the annex” contract.

The audience has found that a considerable number of staff that the Ministry had assigned to the Committees to assess additional tasks, often as chairman of the commissions, were from the DMR, which could potentially present conflict of interest because the staff assigned to the commissions were also contract managers on other projects. The fact that this potentially poses conflict of interest may increase the risk of unaddicted additional jobs, as projects they manage will be assessed by the staff, which in this case are additional job seekers, in the event they submit demand for additional work on their projects.

With all these required additional jobs approved in principle, but still unconventioned, it turns out that the cost of complete completion of these projects will not be limited to just 10% of the basic contracts. . In other words, figures in the budget law for projects in question, shared and designed for the following years are not even close to what is expected to result when the projects are completed. The additional cost of these projects will be known only when these projects are complete.

annex contract doesn't complete projects entirely

Once the use of the procedure has been justified, the ministry must identify exactly what the jobs should be involved in the negotiated contract, and whether this contract covers all aspects of the basic project/contact (the project concluded with this annex contract). Four annex contracts that have been connected due to the need for completion/reforming of the original project result in not enough to complete the project.

Such a case applies to the Decani Street Black Mountain project, which the ministry had changed considerably after contracting it. The largest financial effect was to change the width of the road from six metres to seven metres at the request of the President of the Decani municipality. Not only had this change increased the amount of materials needed to build the road but it had added the amount of excavations, in particular, of V category excavations I-VII, where explosives need to be used. As the supplements involved replacing 10 pipes with plow launchs so that the road could best cope with atmospheric rainfall. These changes were reflected with a reduction of the road from 14.5km to 9km. This project, expected to be completed at a cost of 3.8m euros, has already increased its cost to 4.1m euros only for the length of the 9km road, while the remaining 5.5km road will cause the Ministry additional costs, which it has not yet calculated. But if the ministry could contract the rest of the road with the same prices as in the base contract, additional costs would reach 2,642,711 euros, or 64% of the value of the base contract.

Even the Dragash Street re-building project -- Brod Llot 2, as well as the case.

Prior to the intervention of the Dragas municipality chairman, the ministry had decided to extend the road from 5 meters to 6m, with what the projected length of the 12.3km road could be accomplished only to 9km. The rest of the way will trigger the Ministry's additional costs, which the ministry has not even calculated because it has not yet identified the positions that enable the overall completion of the project. While the contract for this reformed project has not yet been completed, the ministry has not yet launched new procurement activity for the rest of the road.

The same situation where the contract doesn't completely complete the project is in the A7.1 Autoway contract, Llot 2, where the subpass, which according to the commission, is expected to trigger costs. The ministry has announced the tender for building this underpass whose projected value is onem euros, or 17% of the value of the base contract.

At “The expansion of the National Route M9.1” the Dolc-Gjakove segment, 15.89% of the additional and unforeseen jobs have remained uncontested, the Commission to review the MK's request, after consultations with the designer, has concluded that the value of the demand for additional and unforeseen work totals over a million euros. The basic contract was priced at close to fourm euros, which means that the contract could be worth no more than 400,000 euros (the contract, along with the annex, reached 4.4m) - that is, the project to complete it needs more than 600 thousand euros.

Causer for this situation where annex contracts are not enough to cover all project costs is inadequate identification of needs in the design phase.

This inadequate identification has resulted in substantial changes in the project, after contracting.

As a result, the ministry was faced, and it continues to face additional costs that exceed the limits allowed with the public procurement law and budgetary projections.

Ministry has not drawn up technical specifications in the base contract

The working of geo-mechanical reviews (internal scores 8-15m, laboratory tests and geo-technical elaborates) are needed for the work of the main road project.

The ministry had missed the geo-mechanical elaborate in three projects we've audited from a total of eight where this demand applies. These are: “Asphalming the Babush-Tern-LubocKosare-Slivowe” road construction Lubozhdez-mild Lubozhdez-Lug” and “Construction of the Dragas-Brod” road.

The designer hadn't done a geo-mechanical review on the “Asphalation of the Babush-Tern road- Luboc-Kosare-Slivowe” In the pre-size of this project, the designer had determined less quantity of land mining of the category I II-IV6 and less quantity of filling than necessary. The OE had ascertained this during the execution of the contract on the ground using the dynamic circular plaque had done the measurements and had found that the land's storage capacity was very low because it was clay land forever influenced by the waters. In addition, the contract manager (here MK) had predicted the circulation of large motor vehicles.

Construction of the soft Lubozhdez-Lug road, there were no geo-mechanic elabors, so the projected amounts of land digging and rock formations did not match the situation on the ground. Shortly after the start of the MK works, it had applied for additional amounts of several positions specified in the contract. The ministry, respectively, had approved the demand for additional jobs.

The Dragash-Brod road construction project was incomplete because it lacked geo-mechanical elaborate. The draft had been contracted by the Dragas municipality, while the ministry had taken over for construction. Once on the ground to execute the contract, the MK along with the contractors had noticed that the project needs change/fulfillment. MK and OE had ascertained, among other things, that the possession of materials under the layer of asphalt was low, which the designer had not considered when designing the project. As a result of the quantity of pre-size filler material, something had to be added that increased the cost of the project.

The ministry has accepted projects from municipalities (Ferizaj, Dragash and Istog) without making sure they have geo-mechanical elaborations. Due to the lack of geo-mechanical and geodesian elabories, the ministry has encountered problems during contract implementation because the specific positions in the contract were not compatible with the situation on the ground, in quantitative terms. As a result, the ministry had signed contracts, negotiated.

Unaccurate geo-mechanical talks

As the audience found, the ministry had encountered problems during the implementation of contracts, even in projects that were forwarded to geo-mechanical elabors. In four other projects that are the sample of this geo-mechanical auditing does not match the real situation on the ground.

For expanding National N9.1 Dolc-Gjakova, the ministry had the geomechanical elaborate, however, after the contracts were signed, during implementation, the MK and OE had found incompatible in the land categories that had to be unearthed. According to the elaborate, under which the designer had drawn up the pre-size of the project, the category V and VI of soil had to be dug, while the OE had been found in the soil of the category VII and V III, consisting mainly of rocks. So OE had to commit more to do this digging. These additional jobs were the result of noncompliance between geo-mechanical and geo-mechanical measurements conducted by the designer and those performed by the OE (building company), according to the MK and the Commission for the adoption of additional jobs.

“Project designed for “road segments Dolc-Gjakove” and “Rakovine -Dolc” had declined to adjust the project to the actual state on the ground. The reconstruction had envisioned additional amounts for land strengthening and land replacement.

On A7.1 Banu Street, at Lolot 2, OE had found a difference between the location of the projected and the one realised, with over 27,000 m3. The commission, specifically founded for considering additional tasks, had also arranged this dispute. This position, along with other escort positions, increases the cost of the project for over 100,000 euros”, writes in its report. SHAA

But according to the audience, based on projects that he ordered and accepted without sufficient review on the ground, the ministry has developed procurement activities (with open procedure) that have resulted in road construction contracts, rather than reviewing these projects in sufficient detail, leaving at least some points along the project to take samples and compare them to see if they match the draft project. Only after the project has revised and verified these points, and made sure that the draft project coincides with conditions on the ground and that pre-matures coincide with the draft/accession project would have to publish the tender

Do not include all objects on the road from the designer

Geodesic measurements and expropriation balances should be made over time, as preconditions and components of each major project designed for road construction.

The ministry, either the designer, according to the audience, had not identified and included in the project all objects affected by the road project.

This had happened on the “Country road expansion N9.1x2> Rakovin segment Drlc, where the designer had not seen the collapse of some commercial items that were located along the way, setting the stage for construction of an initial overpass on the project. Also, the cemetery that was located along the road had to be protected by a 65m-long concrete wall that was not included in the original project, as well as the construction of a solution (circ-troll) to enable key to some new location on the road was not included in the project. That's why the MK had applied for additional jobs, and the Committee for Additional Jobs assessment approved it. The value of the annex contract is $523,913, or 9.65% of the base contract.

In the project for the construction of the “Auto-path A7.1 Llot 2”, the designer had seen the road pass under the power grid, but he had not considered the vertical distance between the road and the electrical components, which was very small. Standardly, it is not allowed to have this height from the road. So the initial project has been modified to enable the air-to-air network passage, which had cost 32,000 euros for this position alone, while the total value of the annex contract is 138,558 euros, the audience has written.

The road that was built will separate two villages whose people will move from one town to the other on a daily basis. The designer had not included building a sub-pass, to enable this circulation, on the existing natural route, but had designed it at a distance about 1km away from the existing road. At the request of residents and with their insistence on the obstacles OE had made during the implementation of the contract, the ministry had been forced to terminate the work on this contract until a solution was found.

The appropriate solution was to build the second underpass at the location where residents seek it. This change in the project cannot be covered by 10% of the contract for additional jobs, as 10% has already been spent on shifting electricity and digging jobs, so the ministry has started with new procurement activity in order to complete this auto-road segment.

For the construction of the Dragash-Brod road, the designer had not included in the project the shifting of certain objects (Croatians) that were the holy “” for citizens. That's why MK had demanded that the springs move and be stored as citizens benefit from them. This change in the project had caused additional costs, which was included in the annex contract on this project. The annex contract is worth 316,528 euros, or 9.86% of the value of the base contract.

All these requests that had been submitted to the MK, the ministry had handled them by establishing screening commissions and all had been approved.

The lack of a visit to the workshop prior to the contract's connection, on the part of the Ministry, has affected the failure to engage all objects in the main project.

Because of the lack of field visits by designers, the projects had not been adapted to existing terrain circumstances. As a result, projects have had to be modified to include all objects that are necessary for road completion. These changes have been followed by annexes by contracts for additional work and unforeseen work that had reached close to 10% of the value of the base contract. The total value of annex contracts on these three projects totals 99,000 euros. In addition, the additional underpass is projected to be onem euros, meaning that the additional cost for all these projects so far is expected to be close to twom euros, without including possible costs for changes the ministry has deemed necessary but has not calculated.

Conclusions

Based on findings presented in the report, the audience has come to the conclusion that using the negotiated procedure without publishing the contract announcement for annex contracts was partly reasonable. The procurement process was documented sufficiently, but in some cases no value for money has been achieved in projects that have been contracted because the ministry had paid more than 89,000 euros for some of its projects due to post-projection rejection.

The ministry has failed to reach the value of money, at least one of the 13 road construction projects we've audited. It had happened because the ministry had not taken all actions to ensure that its projects are in line with needs on the ground. As a result, the ministry had changed the project, which had cost the ministry over 89,000 euros.

The changes in the project to respond to citizens' demands show that the ministry had shown poor performance in identifying the needs of its projects, which was reflected in annex contracts. The value of annex contracts totals over 5.7m euros in 2021 alone. In four of the 13 contracts that we've audited, annex contracts weren't enough to cover all the project costs, so the odds are that

The ministry will have to link other contracts to complete the projects it has launched. The estimated costs so far, for only three projects, in addition to the contracted costs, amount to approximately 4.3m euros. It should be noted here that not all additional tasks identified as necessary are estimated to be financial. The projected value for one of these projects (Auto-Adhe A7.1) is onem euros, which has already been tendered. For the Dolc-Gjakov project, the estimated value is over 640,000 euros, and for the Decani-Kukari project with Montenegro, the estimated value totals over 2.6m euros, given the current contract prices. Therefore, the use of the negotiated procedure in higher cases was not reasonable, since the ministry had known that four out of 13 annex contracts did not fully cover the costs of projects in question. The ministry would have to avoid using the negotiated procedure, and for these four projects it would have to implement the open procedure.

The ministry had not properly drafted technical specifications (para-size) in the basic contract, so it had not provided adequate geo-mechanical considerations and geodical measurements for its road-building projects. The lack of adequate measurements has resulted in inadequate projects, and as such, they have had to be changed. This change has resulted at additional costs (alternal contracts) worth over 4m euros for all audited projects, while four are not expected to be concluded either by annex contracts, so that additional costs, in addition to already contracted costs, are expected to be close to 4.3m euros. These changes have obliged the ministry to allocate additional funds, on the 10%-based LPP value, for new procurement procedures (open).

The lack of geo-mechanical elaborities is a major factor in additional jobs in projects we audited at the ministry. In cases where the projects had the geo-mechanic elaborate, the demand for changing the positions assigned to the contract occurred because the designers had not properly examined the country's configuration by drafting geo-mechanical elabors that did not respond exactly to the ground, while the ministry had not properly verified it before announcing the tender.

The inadequate identification of needs has caused the failure of all component elements of the road (objects on and around the road to be built) on the design, and the failure to match the situation on the ground with the positions specified in the contract, in quantitative terms, had caused disruptions of work to complete/recontact the contract. Therefore, completing/changing contracts, in addition to causing delays in their execution, had caused the Ministry additional costs to implement the projects.

The appointment of staff to commissions for additional work by the DMR could present conflict of interest because the same are contract managers in other projects. As a result, the assessment of additional demands for additional work may result in inadequate or partial or inconsistent.

As a result of the lack of proper control during the acceptment of projects and not returning to their distribution, the ministry from a total of 13 audited contracts to six of them has made a change/rejection. Project efficiency has been observed only after the execution of field works.

The ministry has not been assured that contracts are properly implemented in terms of quality and time. The ministry has failed to complete the projects within a reasonable time for various causes. Among these is the acceptance of inadequate projects directly from its contracted or indirect designers from municipalities, since it had not revised them sufficiently. The ministry had identified the shortcomings of the projects only during the execution of the projects (the contract implementation), and had modified them to connect with the situation on the ground. However, the correction of these shortcomings had been effective in the length of the contract's implementation because the shortcomings to be corrected were due to early stages of contract implementation (e.g. Replacing tube launchs with plow launchs. Without the approval of these changes in the project, which had lasted in many cases for months, the work could not continue.

The ministry has not been assured that it has appointed managers of responsible and professional contracts in implementing the manager's respective duties. This is because in two of the three road projects the Ministry has managed to complete and to make available for citizens, the Accession Commission, respectively, has found significant shortcomings in the project realised. As a result, the ministry has declined to accept the jobs OE consider done and now must face elections between options: cut the contract and keep the 10% ban on each. Situation performed or, as it is flawed, accept the path.

If the ministry continues with the same intensity of the works, this extension of the safety deadline for the execution of contracts, which is mostly by February 2024, may be insufficient and it will probably have to be continued again after these have expired, always if the ministry does not increase the intensity of the work on these roads.

References

To ensure that projects initiated by the Ministry are in line with conditions on the ground, fully and without challenges implemented and completed over time and with the quality of contract, we recommend the Ministry of Environment, Space Planning and

Infrastructure make sure that:

The projects that you accept from your designer are revised and in particular to pay attention to the accuracy of geo-mechanical and geodesian barley;

He has identified all objects that connect to the road and include them in the project in order to avoid the need for additional work;

He has included all the elements of the road to the project and contract, so that he doesn't need an annex contract eventually for new procurement activity;

He has well identified the need for additional work for each project. If the cost of additional jobs is not within the limits allowed with the LPP, then the ministry will consider initiating a new procurement activity instead of an annex contract that does not cover all additional tasks;

The staff assigned to the commissions for additional work is not from the DMR because it can present conflict of interest;

All contracts are deadlined on calendar day, along with effective working days, including a deadline for when contracts should be met;

) has created conditions for non-stop enforcement of contracts by resolving the issue of expropriation, co-ordination with companies offering public services (Energy, water pipeline, channeling, mail, etc.) );

The contract is being implemented in accordance with the terms of the contract, in terms of quantity, time and quality. Continue to conduct field inspections during and after contract enforcement in order to prevent/coordinate any deviations from contract conditions;

) contract managers report on regular grounds and make sure accepted jobs are in line with the quality of contract;

) assigning contract managers to do so in accordance with the complexity and time-term schedule of the contract, as well as in cases when managers are changed, to make sure that formal acceptance-over between managers has occurred; and

The contract managers use the electronic procurement platform to report on contract progress. /Periscopi/