Three Ways in Which Russia Can Start a War - NATO for Ukraine

By Christopher Blatman “19 Forty Five”

The Joe Biden administration has committed too much to Russia not treating America as a warring party in Ukraine. But that does not mean that NATO is not deeply involved in this conflict. The level of support for Ukraine is extraordinary and on the rise, including sanctions, exchange of intelligence data, arms shipments and money.

Add to this the increasingly severe political rhetoric: the UN “states are involved in this struggle to win it” - a U.S. Congressman wrote on social networks during his visit to Kiev. But no international law prohibits Russia from changing its mind, and treats the US as an active party in this war.

Instead of offering a clear “red”, conventions are unclear and subjectives. The fact that Vladimir Putin has not considered NATO to date as an inter-combat party comes from a mix of turbulent international norms, strategic calculations and fortune.

But things can change at some point. Perhaps a Ukrainian military unit can use a long-range system sent by NATO to attack the town of Belgorod within the Russian border, and Putin orders his army to retaliate against a Western country, reports abcnews.al.

Or as large calibre weapons shipments to Ukraine increase, Moscow may decide to strike air and rocket attacks at the supply depots in Poland. We can imagine dozens of such scenarios. But in all likelihood, none of this will happen.

War is devastating, so countries do their best to avoid open conflict, especially one that can escalate into a nuclear war. War costs also mean that even when fighting, nations have powerful incentives to avoid escalating and expanding wars.

This is one of the most powerful lessons that comes to us from history as well as Game Theory, and that's the theme of my last book “Why we fight: Roots of war and paths to peace” War is the last tool, and the more expensive it is, the more both sides will engage to avoid it.

For the most part, this logic applies to the war in Ukraine. The danger of the US and Russia getting involved in a conflict with each other is extremely low. However, this danger is not zero. With their public support for Ukraine, it is important that American politicians and their public share the risks involved.

The history and theory of the Games tell us how aggression can occur NATO or Russia for rational and calculated reasons. But before we get there, let's go back to the reason why we're unlikely to have a Russian war. - NATO. The conflict in Ukraine again shows that war is a rare phenomenon, or last resort of a nation.

A powerful example occurred two weeks after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, when India accidentally launched a rocket against Pakistan. As predicted, that accident was followed by calmness, as it has been for decades. The war between two rivals armed with nuclear weapons would have been so costly in an unimaginable way that both sides tried to avoid it.

For years Putin too avoided the invasion of Ukraine. For two decades he tried every other possible secret tool to bring this country under his control: dirty money, propaganda, bought political leaders, murders and support for separatists. He experienced everything else he could because no matter how violent and costly these methods were, neither was as dangerous or destructive as war, reports abcnews.al.

Likewise, Putin successfully subdued Russia's other neighbours, from nearly joining Belarus to sending “peacekeeping commissions” to Kazakhstan (not to talk about further robbery of the Russian people). None of these operations required long campaigns of violence.

When war broke out, both sides took steps to avoid escalation. Russia owns missiles that could level any government building in Ukraine's capital, but has not yet done so. And while it's terrible to see the latest attack on customers at a shopping mall in Kiev, the fact is that Putin has the ability to do much worse.

Ukrainian forces may also increase their attacks across the Russian border, but they have to a minimum such attacks. Each of these elections is likely strategic - a decision to focus the war on Donbas and reduce costs and risks of escalation.

A war between NATO and Russia would be more costly than all these conflicts combined. The escalation is not likely to happen, but every day the war continues, means a small chance for a new world war. Some of this danger is irrational.

An officer NATO or Russian could misunderstand the situation, or a computer system could produce one mistake, and one of the parties mistakenly launch an attack on the other. There are at least three ways in which this can happen. First, it is the logic of reputation and restraint.

NATO has incentives to be confrontational with Russia -- that is, to take into account major risks in supporting Ukraine -- to weaken future opponents. This is because each of NATO's other rivals is watching and learning lessons.

If the West treats Russia with tenderness, only because it is an armed nuclear power, this sends a clear message to any Ottoman leader in the world: Atomic weapons guarantee impunity; so equip them as soon as possible. To avoid this message, America and its allies must show that they are willing to resist a state armed with nuclear weapons, and risk several scenarios of escalation of the situation.

Second, Ukraine or NATO could unwittingly give Russia the motivation for a preemptive nuclear attack. Suppose Ukrainians concentrate their heavy forces and weapons, tempting Putin to use a tactical nuclear weapon. Or perhaps the West vows to send even stronger weapons to Ukraine, but they will not have been functional for months. This could give Moscow a push for a large-scale attack to surround Ukrainian forces, cut off Western supplies and attack NATO supply depots. In both circumstances, Russia has a window of opportunity in which it believes it is temporarily strong.

Third, the last path to war includes clever leaders who have the right incentives to provoke public opinion against certain types of compromise, only to discover that they have exceeded mass and eliminated any possibility of reaching a peaceful agreement.

Suppose that after six months, Russia may have control over large areas of Donbas, and Ukraine has little chance of taking them back by force. Imagine that in private, the Ukrainian government believes that a certain solution is necessary. From an optimistic point of view, Kiev will argue that Russia may withdraw from Donbas in exchange for the region's autonomy, Ukrainian neutrality and formal annexation of Crime.

But Western and Ukrainian public opinion will be against such an agreement. This could put Russia and Ukraine into an eternal struggle, which could escalate into a NATO-Russia war for all the reasons mentioned above. / Translate: Alket Goce-abcnews. al

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Note: Christopher Blattman, professor of Global Conflict Studies at the University of Chicago.