Krasniqi: Modern Patriotism Is Late

These are Serbia's conditions to address its structures in Kosovo. Who can guarantee that politics in Belgrade will not act differently”, Krasniqi writes.

Krasniqi's Facebook mailing:

When should 86 MPs, even being in opposition, vote and vote? They're still in the opposition. Modern Patriotism is delayed. The call that someone protested or fought yesterday no longer drank water. The genes are changing!

PREVICE KOSOVA ERB

I have been for talks, I am for full normalisation of relations with Kosovo Serbs and Serbia, but what we saw written on 15 points is not like that. These are Serbia's conditions to address its “ ” structures in Kosovo. Who can guarantee that politics in Belgrade will not act differently. These 15 points do not close our compromise or compromise, rather they pave paths for new compromises and create numerous pledges at the expense of stability and security not only in Kosovo. These demands as they are should be reciprocal with Albanian municipalities in Serbia. What should be applied to Serbs in Kosovo why not also apply to Albanians in Serbia? This agreement, as it has been conceived, is fleeing from the civic and multiethnic concept of the Republic of Kosovo and can serve as precedent for the entire region.

These talks, as stated dozens of times by the prime minister and his subordinates, have meant normalisation and relations with Serbia, and that this agreement would be concluded with a peace treaty. If it were, I don't think it would be rejected by political people in Kosovo. These talks were held in the mist that said more than button, and could not produce anything else. There is no doubt that these documents have been reported by our correspondents in Brussels and the seed of little of the reports the prime minister has made to the quiet opposition, the presidents and ultimately the Assembly, the representative institution of Kosovo citizens who has returned to the institution for the adoption of 31 votes. And in the end the document that we're ahead of and we're debating it is more than half a document and it doesn't give all its conclusions just let different issues open. What political-political-legal documents this document produces, we don't know and is deliberately designed. When it's published, we can probably figure out where the devil sleeps, but then it'll be late, too late.

Perhaps compromise could even be absorbed as if the agreement was complete and final and complete, it would be as if it were finalising the peace treaty, with mutual recognition and Kosovo membership in the UN and other European and international mechanisms, but this is not happening, but it is also strongly opposed by Thaqi's co-ordinator, Dačič. Then the deal, as it is, is not interstatement, but Kosovo's internal issues. This is not only against the Parliament Resolution but also against the basic state document. Even as it is, it is not the support of the Serb population of the northern part of Kosovo. So it doesn't turn out to be a deal, except for the name that has a deal. Why the deal is not complete!

The very word being talked about compromise means it has gone beyond the Comprehensive Status Document of Kosovo beyond the Constitution and laws that we have adopted. What's missing here is the real name of this autonomy. As deep as this autonomy is on the 15 points that we have under consideration, we have difficulty saying so.

At point two: Legal guarantees; provided through law in effect, are not said to be of Kosovo laws then continued, of constitutional law two-thirds....

What's with the opposition to the municipality Association: third point; AK has the Chairman, vice president, Assembly, Council!

Point five says: The Communists association will exercise additional responsibilities, depending on how they are delegated by the central authorities. Whose authorities are these, why aren't the central authorities of the Republic of Kosovo said?

Without prolonging even the safety and justice points are no better. While the 14th point allows for continuing Serbian aggressive policies towards Kosovo, this means that numerous opportunities for new compromises are left. This means that with this agreement not only is there no normalisation of relationships but it can also be irritated under circumstances.

I would not hesitate to contribute to the ratification of an agreement that would normalise Serbia-Kosovo relations even with this level of compromise, but not this certain agreement known as the Dačić-Thaci Agreement, which almost does not solve any interethnic or interstate problems.

Let the agreement be arranged with all details, with all the conclusions and normalisation of relations between our two countries, then our responsibility and obligation would be another.