Putin forms paramilitary forces in Republika Srpska

The main goal is not Croatia, which is a member of the European Union and NATO, is not Serbia, which already has a long history of ties with Moscow. Instead, the Kremlin returned to Bosnia, a West-oriented country but very sensitive to destabilisation, especially when the October elections are approaching.

Bosnia is administratively divided between the two decentralised entities: The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which mainly has Bosniak and Croat populations and Republika Srpska, which has a Serb majority. Russian politics uses the latter and their separatist instincts.

This implies seemingly innocent actions, such as support for the Serb Orthodox faith population in Republika Srpska. In September, a cornerstone for a new Orthodox church will be established in Banja Luka under Russia's care for Russian Emperor Nikola II, who appeared in defense of Serbia in World War I. After the church's end, Serbian and Russian priests will serve there.

However, the most intense co-operation between Serbs and Russia is directed through the security forces of Republika Srpska. Under the 1995 Dayton Agreement, Republika Srpska is not allowed to have armies, but may have police forces and it has very close relations with Moscow, writes Foreign Policy.

During the Russian delegation's official visit to Banja Luka in 2016, the talks focused on establishing a partnership between Republika Srpska and Russian police on issues involving intelligence collection, counterterrorism and the fight against cyber crime.

Republika Srpska also agreed to send members of the Serbian Special Forces to Moscow for training. Since then, Russian intelligence officers, former members of the Federal Security Service, often hold lectures and hold courses at the Republika Srpska Police Academy and Banja Luka University at the Faculty of Security Studies, which serves as a department for regional policy planning.

faculty members do not hide pro-Russian attitudes. Predrag Ceranic, dean of the faculty, is a former intelligence officer and author of the book “Qund prevents small Russians” concerning Serbs. He says developing the situation in the Middle East and competition between Russia and the West are reflected in the Balkans.

“Middle East and the Balkans are strategically important for major powers, and the Middle East War affects their rivalry in the Balkans”, Ceranic says.

The exchange of military knowledge among security personnel is running in the opposite direction, from Republika Srpska to Russia. Former RS military officers often travel and work in Russia. For example, former captain Tihomir Ivanovic from Banja Luka is currently a professor at one of the state military academies in Moscow.

His son also studies theology and diplomacy in Moscow, and participates in the activities of the Orthodox Church in Republika Srpska, Serbia and Russia.

Meanwhile, under the pretext of counterterrorism, Republika Srpska has recently strengthened its police in a way that resembles direct militarism, sometimes with Russia's help. For example, the RS Interior Ministry bought 2,500 long-tier rifles from the Zastava factory, a Serbian producer in Kragujevc, this year.

According to Rauf Bajrovic, the former economy minister in Bosnia, there are ten times as many weapons ordered by national police forces in Sarajevo. Republika Srpska authorities also open a new training centre worth $4m at the site of former barracks in Zauzhani, north of Banja Luka.

Russia has already pledged to offer Serbian forces training against terrorism, and the new centre will also serve as the headquarters of new antiterrorism units, logistical units and the fight against organised crime. These changes will strengthen Serbian police almost at the level of Bosnian national security forces.

In Republika Srpska, there is also a discussion about the creation of a <x0-humanity centre” Russian similar to that already located in the Serbian town of Nis. Officially, its goal is to help local self-government in natural disasters such as floods and fires. However, the centre in Nis is allegedly serving as a Russian intelligence centre and an informal military base, and Russia has sought diplomatic immunity for its staff stationed there.

Russia and Republika Srpska also strengthen close ties between their veterans' organisations. At the offices of the Veterans' Association in Banja Luka, St. Georgi, the defender of Russian separatists in Ukraine and their supporters, is evident. Such organisations were involved in recruiting the local population in Ukraine and Syria as foreign fighters through Russian private military companies as the Wagner group.

War veterans from Banja Luka and their association are closely linked to the Serbian paramilitary organisation “Russia still does not enjoy much support in Bosnia, even in Republika Srpska. Their main institution in Banja Luka,

“The Russkiy” Foundation of Peace does not have enough financial resources for good functioning”, said Lila Petrovic Zeciq, director of the Republika Srpska National and University Library, in which the Russian foundation is located.

However, Republika Srpska President Milorad Dodik has many reasons to play a pro-Russian card until the October elections are approaching. He has the talent to unite Bosnian Serbs for not recognising their victims during the recent war and general international marginalisation.

Serbian officials in Sarajevo bear part of the blame for the distance from colleagues from Republika Srpska. With its growing disappointment with its Bosnian Serb government, Dodik's best chance of remaining in power is if he presents himself as the guarantor of continuing the autonomy of this region in connection with the central government's alleged ambitions in Sarajevo and their Western sympathies.

Calling his opponents in Republika Srpska as Western agents, he is also publicly associated with Russia, who is represented as opposed to Western geopolitical aggression, both in the past and present, all this paves the most direct way for Dodik to achieve its immediate political goals.

Dodik thanked the Russians several times as his closest friends with Bosnian Serbs and invited them to play a larger role in the region. For its part, Russia insisted on preserving Bosnia's dysfunctional political status, just as it guarantees the autonomy of Bosnian Serbs. It is not clear whether Dodik's ultimate goal is to establish an independent Bosnian Serb state.

For now, the political and economic ties between Moscow and Banja Luka are still very symbolic. Formal co-operation between the government is taking place at meetings with unknown Russian-organised states, which concerns Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but no one takes it seriously.

Republika Srpska has discussed buying wines from Abkhazia, but has never formally managed to complete a job. But ties will continue to deepen if Dodik, as expected, wins the presidential election in October.

The Russian strategy does not include quick moves, but this could lead to the state of Sarajevo and their Western counterparts not to break Banja Luka and the rest of Bosnia, or Russian behaviour may become unpredictable, and the West may realize that it is too late for any reaction.