Even with EULEX, Kosovo is stuck with justice and corruption has been increased

Andrea Laurenzo Capusela has been working in Kosovo as chief of international control. He has spoken about EULEX's role and the results of this mission, which will from now on change the format. Interview for Deutsche Welle: DW: Mr. Capussela, EULEX's legal mission is preparing to leave Kosovo and estimates for [...]
Interview for Deutsche Welle:
DW: Mr. Capussela, the EULEX legal mission is preparing to leave Kosovo, and estimates of his work are different. Some criticize him as a failure, some appreciate that he has achieved obvious successes. What's your opinion?
Dr. Capussela: E ULEX has been a very good idea. Strengthening the judicial state has been the most important priority for Kosovo in the medium-term perspective, and the mission, its conception was very well designed. Because Kosovo lacked instruments to strengthen the rule of law. Kosovo's judicial system suffered from competencies, capacities and, especially independence. The entire public administration in Kosovo is highly politicised, corrupt, and dominated by clientlorism and nepotism. You cannot expect an administration of justice to be able to have credibility and passion, to give due justice in the medium term. It would take a lot more time for this. So the idea was to do two things with EULEX: to rely on Kosovo building capacities, training and monitoring, and most importantly to take over the delicate segment of the justice sector. Because Kosovo is tasked with creating justice itself, directly. To have the police, prosecutors and judges who can arrest, send to trial, offer lawyers in very delicate sectors as high-level corruption, organised crime and war crimes. This should also be done in the civil and economic field with difficult property and privatisation cases.
So the idea was very good but very bad application. The answer to why it was bad is over. In the book I published in 2015 I've taken a lot of time with this question. My conclusion is: The first task was very difficult. This required serious efforts by the European Union. Unfortunately, the EU foreign policy machine's efficiency did not provide good evidence. The second reason is that there was little political will to do this job well.
DW: On the Kosovo side?
Capussela: No, by the EU. Indeed from more in the West, because the US has enormous influence in Kosovo, far greater than the EU. But the problem here is that the political elite of Kosovo, and economics, is very much linked to criminal elites. There are concerns that they are circuits that overlap each other. So many of the political elites are involved in corruption and organised crime, and they have also been involved in war crimes perhaps during years of conflict.
So the passionate implementation of the rule of law also means the arrest and dispatching of important political figures and businessmen to the tribunal.
The international community and the West think short-term stability is important in Kosovo. There were two priorities setting stability on the one hand and strengthening the legal state on the other. These two priorities oppose each other. I'm not against political stability. But my criticism is that in the balance between political stability and establishing the rule of law, the greatest burden was given to political stability. That went to the point that the rule of law priority was completely forgotten.
There are many indicators that say the political elite is involved in corruption and organised crime. Even after ten years no relevant political figure has been arrested or investigated or brought to trial for any of these crimes. That's the second important reason.
The gap that exists between the political will for establishing the rule of law and the outcome achieved has nothing to do with what EULEX management did not have the motivation to do the job properly. Political masters did not exercise sufficient pressure on them, so EULEX management acted opportunisticly. It was easier to give advice about the rule of law, to train, and to develop capacities than to arrest someone for example, so they focused more on giving counsel.
The result was that if we look at indicators given by the Worldwide Governor Indicators published by the World Bank, we see two indicators that are the quality of the rule of law and control of corruption. These two indicators are synthesis for all available tests. If you see them for years before EULEX went to Kosovo and then, then you see that the rule of law has stalled in the country, efficiency does not increase, and control of corruption has deteriorated. While for the same period in other Balkan states the rule of law has improved slightly, as has control of corruption. A paradox because the EU spent 1.5 billion dollars on EULEX, the largest civilian mission ever organised by the EU. EULEX has had three times as many personnel as any other mission. E ULEX was the European foreign policy flag. So although Kosovo received assistance from a very important European foreign policy mission in the area of establishing law and control over corruption, the situation today ten years later is worse than in other Balkan states, which have not had comparable assistance.
This is a very good indication of failure.
DW: Has there been success in the work of EULEX?
Laurenzo Capusella: General vision is systematic failure. Within this picture are some positive points. The client service advised by EULEX did not deteriorate. It has good quality compared to other Kosovo institutions. Also in the area of property returns, good results have been achieved, though this is a delicate issue, because there are clashes between Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Albanians. But it is difficult to find successful examples of greater things.











