Why was the Balkans underdeveloped

The Balkans is a strange country in Europe. The income rate is much lower than the average level of Western and Central Europe income.

This is a well - known fact, but it's worth another look. On average, gross domestic production in Western Europe is around 40,000 dollars (in regular use by the World Bank) per capita. The Balkan countries' revenues range from slightly more than $10,000 to 20,000 (excluding Greece).

In other words, the gap between Western Europe and the Balkans is at least 2 to 1, and by 3 to 1, the Globalinequality script, which broadcasts the Balkanweb. Of course, comparing countries from the richest to the poorest would be much higher. If you look at the map of Europe without knowing much about history, you would be surprised by such gaps: distances are small; flight time between Vienna and Belgrade is about an hour, but the income gap between the two cities is probably about 4 to 1. This is like losing 30% of your income every 15 minutes. Why is that?

I would agree with the standard historical explanation that views the type of colonial power as the “guilty”. The areas controlled by Ottomans for about three or four centuries have lower incomes, lower educational achievements, lower levels of trust in institutions, etc. than areas that were part of the Habsburg Empire. Moreover, this is not a new phenomenon: Hendeks, in variables that are not measured monetaryly (such as the level of schooling, writing and singing) were even greater in the past, and especially at the beginning of the XIX century when most Balkan countries (as well as the dissatisfied in Habsburgs began their moves towards independence. This is the first part of the standard explanation.

The second part of standard explanation is slow economic growth due to communism. This may well be seen in the income gap between Greece and other Balkan countries, a moat that was smaller in the 1930s than in 1989. For example, according to data from the 2017 Maddison project, the GDP per capita report in Greece and Romania was 1.4 prior to World War II, but rose to 1.9 from 1989.

In my opinion, this is a standard explanation with a detail that I find strange. There is an explanation in the range of newspapers and books relating to the colonial origins of today's institutions and, as a result, the income levels, that hardly mentions the colonial Ottoman influence, which of course not only applies to the Balkans but to the Middle East and North Africa as well. I hope this is one of the gaps that future research will fill.

But my interest here is to understand why the Balkans were no longer developed in the time of the Roman Empire. Looking again at the map presents an even greater mystery. The Balkans (which at that time did not have a single name and that the appointment of the Balkans comes from the Ottomans) <x0-varience” between the two most advanced and developed parts of today's known world: Greece / Asia Minor and Italy (Rome). Why, then, were developments in the Balkans so slow?

If we look at the urbanisation data, the Balkans (with the exception of Greece) were not much urbanised. The distribution of ten larger cities around 150 was the following: 3 in North Africa (Charthage, Leptis Magna and Ptolemyis), 2 in Egypt (Aleksri, Memphis), 2 in Greece (Astine and Corinth), 2 in Italy Saracuza), 1 in Levant (Antiocynia). The smallest of them was estimated to have 80,000 inhabitants. The largest Balkan city was Ider (Today's Zadari in Croatia) with 30,000 inhabitants (shown by Andrew) Wilson, the city's “talents and urbanization in the Roman Empire”.

In terms of income, at the same time, differences were huge. Maddison's data shows the Balkans (again without Greece) that there has been a little over $400 per capita, approximately the same level as Gaul. But this is a surprise as the Balkans are closed between the two richest Euro-Mediterranean parts: Greece and Asia Minor with more than $500 per capita and Italy with nearly 700 dollars per capita. Normal expectations would be for the area's income to be an average of Italian and Greek income and perhaps 50% higher than it was (and certainly higher than the Gaul was further from a civilization aspect, not to talk about the end of the world: the British Islands).

Gibbon also investigates and mentions what is an interesting hypothesis and perhaps the answer to our question: geography. The geography of Dalmatia and Moesia (to take up provinces as they were in Trajan's time) is such that there is only one narrow Mediterranean coastline along the Adriatic, accompanied by high and impassable mountains. They produce a spectacular contrast, and it can guarantee anyone who has travelled to the Cotor Bay in Montenegro, but it also makes communication with the interior of remote areas difficult.

It is not surprising when it is read of the many voyages of poets, writers, soldiers, and emperors between Italy, Athic and the Aegean, that travel has always been made by the sea route crossing the Adriatic possibly to the narrowest point, Otranton, between modern Poulias and Albania. It would be much more dangerous and longer to take the road to the earth. So two things happened: the part that directly communicated with the most advanced world was limited in the coastal areas of the Adriatic and never expanded inland; and the difficulties of the land between Italy and Greece made remote areas undeveloped and less urbanised than we would predict.

But the worst “ ” is that after the end of several mountain verses, the terrain, as it moves more eastward and approaches the Danube, becomes smoother and more ideal for all kinds of invasions through the steppes. This is really what happened, and the number of people who took that road attacked and looted the area is untold. Rome, after expanding to the east, had to build its famous bases along the Danube (and later expand it by annexing the region of Dacia) and as the region became more important in the ages of 2, 3 and 4, its importance was translated mainly in military and strategic terms. Not only did many emperors come from the Balkans (not surprising that in the later Empire only generals could really intend to become emperors) but the cities that grew up in the “bordering” were mainly military cities of garrison. There were some luxurious buildings inhabited by high - ranking officers and emperors, but few signs of a living middle class found in the cities that cross the coastal areas of Asia Minor or Levantt. Balkan cities, if I can do this generalisation, were only military camps. Mark Aureli, who spent most of his recent years at “limit” fighting there did not seem to have left any trace. If Emperor Constantine had chosen Serdica (now sodom) instead of Byzantium, the situation might have been different - a real life the city could have been born. But that did not happen.

So if the mountains were about 400 miles [400 km] in the East, would the whole story be the story of this part of Europe, and perhaps almost all of Europe, different?