Who are the three culprits for Ivanovic's murder, according to Jakup Krasniqi?

Former head of the Kosovo Republic Parliament Jakup Krasniqi has said the wrong policies of Kosovo leadership are the cause of events taking place in the country, referring to the murder of Serbian politician Oliver Ivanovic.

According to Krasniqi, U n NMIC and later EULEX have failed to fight Serbian organised crime.

Krasniqi's complete writing:

Today's developments in northern Kosovo are the result of the wrong policies that have been led in Kosovo after June 1999, originally by the International Administration in Kosovo known as UNMIK, has been continued by EULEX with a powerful influence of Belgrade power, even after the February 17th 2008 independence. In that part of Kosovo to this day, Serbian organised crime has remained unpunished. That crime continues to produce uncertainty for both Albanians and Kosovo Serbs. Oliver Ivanociqi is the victim of unpunished Serbian crime in that part.

In today's painful event, there are several addresses and key addresses in Belgrade and then international security segments and Brussels negotiation actors from our side.

Below, readers will have the opportunity to read my scripture, published in the years of the first legislature (2001 ) 2004 Writing is published in my book, “A different war for Kosovo”, publication of “Busuk”, Pristina 2007, page 115.

THE POSSIBLE
E STATES PRELEL SERB
WRITER IN COSOVA

In Kosovo after June 1999, major changes have taken place, they are vulnerable in every realm of life. These changes were given only the liberation war, the determination and willingness of our people to sacrifice for freedom, for peace, for independent states, and for democracy. At the same time, Kosovo has also faced obstacles to an aggressive mentality of the past that cannot agree with the positive changes that are taking place and will happen around us.

A serious obstacle to new Kosovo -- for peace and freedom -- to democratic state institutions is parallel power, or, rather, the remains of the occupatory administration in Kosovo. This power in Kosovo is prohibited with all the basic documents with which administrative, public and social power is organised in Kosovo. The parallel government has no support either in Resolution 1244 or in the Constitutional Framework, nor in any other legal or legislative act of new Kosovo. There is unlegal support, in separate segments of the International Admieve in Kosovo that, with their indecisiveness, the division of Kosovo territory, the functioning of the Serbian administration, the dual representation of Serbian representatives in Kosovo institutions, as well as the exploitation of Kosovo's Consolidated Budget without committing any civic duty for public services to them. On the other hand, Kosovo institutions, being young and dependent on the international administration, package, inexperienced, somewhere inert, and elsewhere demaginative and uninitimable, other than the will and willingness to privileged Serb minority in every segment of life, have failed to gain either the trust of the UNMIK administration or the Kosovo Serb citizens. The latter, mainly (with any insignificant exception), have had a rejection and boycotting attitude towards any offer Kosovo institutions have made. Following the letter of Kosovo leaders to return to their homes and assets all displaced persons, Serb leaders at Radio Gracanica have called on Serbian citizens to boycott employment in Kosovo institutions. Those calls have also made Serbian depuytate in the Kosovo Parliament, Rada Trajkoviqi.

In any case, there has been an effort, by internationals, to place evening signs between “power” “Fiction” parallel to the Albanians in the years of dealt 90 with the post-relaunched Serb war in Kosovo. Without entering the essence of the differences of these unstable and malicious equalitys, I think a matter needs to be clarified more than discernment. The “parl” power of the Kosovo Albanians not only has been extinguishing, but also as such was imposed. That survival organisation has come after nearly 90 years of violent, invading and undemocratic administration for most Kosovo citizens. While parallel Serbian power is actually the continuation of the violent Serbian administration in Kosovo. The administration, which the UNMIK administration has been unable to integrate or distribute, for which it has been tasked with all relevant international documents. Kosovo institutions have not been given time or space to show democratic and integration values. They are often found unjustly in the black bank.
Now the question can naturally be asked: What are the consequences of this parallel power and this foreign administration in Kosovo?
I used parallel power signals and foreign administration in Kosovo, that we face both in Kosovo, somewhere together, somewhere divided and in co-operation with the UNMIK administration. In Kosovo and beyond Ibre together, while in enclaves co-exist power UNMIK with administration in question. Even in Kosovo and beyond the Ibre, Serbia's two powers co-exist, with this of UNMIK, but the fact is the first, while the second legalises and legitimises it. This administration in Kosovo provides passports to Kosovo citizens and other civil documents requiring the UNMIK administration to prove that the Filipan or Tribe is a citizen of Kosovo, even though the international administration has made a civil census of citizens in Kosovo. With the UNMIK travel document and the post-war Serbian passport becoming a political game, which a category of Kosovo Albanian citizens have not seen or wanted to see. Maybe “nevoja (carm) leads to the door of Hasmi”, says a word of the people. The poverty is the result of economic policy that is led after the war in Kosovo.

We return to the consequences of parallel power in Kosovo. The consequences of the Serbian parallel power action in Kosovo are complex and with numerous consequences for the democratic processes taking place in Kosovo and in Southeast Europe. I won't talk about all the consequences. The consequences of Serb parallel power in Kosovo will be divided into three groups:

1. The easiest result has the UNMIK administration, which, under KS Resolution 1244, has been forced to establish a new and acceptable admitrest for all in Kosovo's entire territory. That didn't happen. This has not been accomplished even for the fact that it has tolerated in Kosovo's specific areas the operation of administrative and other structures (open and secret) of the Serbian regime in Kosovo. Those structures, although they have committed crimes in Kosovo, have not been followed, rather are tolerated. Two negative effects have been achieved with this tolerance:

In Kosovo's Serb citizens, it has created false illusions, that processes could be hampered and the history of Serb violence and genocide restored. U n The NMIC has consistently seen it as foreign and hostile management.

Albanians have intensified hatred for everything related to the regime of Serb invaders in Kosovo, while for UNMIK is constantly losing confidence, it is about Albanians as a majority.

2. The consequences, very serious, have economic development processes, democracy, rule of law and security. The parallel power, by the majority of Kosovo citizens, is assessed and seen as the most serious obstacle to the positive processes and independent state of Kosovo. The worst consequences are being inflicted on most citizens in Kosovo.

3. The worst consequences are for Kosovo Serb citizens. The latter, being a hostage to Serbia's mitomanist politics and philosophy that Kosovo sees “heart” and Serbia's “djep”, cut them off from the new time and reality created not only with the numerous sacrifices of Kosovo citizens, but also with the military engagement of NATO and the entire international community. Kosovo Serb citizens need to know that the independent state of Kosovo will not build walls with Serbia, as Belgrade had built between Kosovo and Albania for nearly a century. Serbs in general, and those in Kosovo in particular, must understand that it is not even in their interest to keep positive processes hostage and that these processes cannot prevent them long.

Of course, there are other consequences causing parallel Serb power in Kosovo, since most Kosovo citizens are seen as the power of the Milosevic regime's waste and traditional Serbian expansionist policy in general. Eliminating these foreign wastes in Kosovo would create new spaces, security and free circulation for Kosovo Serb citizens and for all others. The dissolution of these wastes should therefore be aimed at requiring joint engagement between the UNMIK administration, Kosovo institutions and Kosovo Serb citizens. The common goal and commitment continue to be lacking all day in Kosovo.