Why are the armies of Arab countries so incompetent in the field of battle?

Arab countries' air defence forces became an object of praise when they helped to avoid Iran's attack on Israel in April.

Yet Arab states are not usually praised for their fighting skills; many have a bad military reputation.

They have been constantly humiliated in their wars with Israel. They proved ineffective during the 1991 Gulf War; Egypt imposed two armoured divisions against Iraq, but America quickly exceeded them when they fought to overcome the resistance of Saddam's forces.

Other Gulf countries, such as Saudi Arabia, provided only a small portion of the troops. Recently, despite considerable American military support, Saudi-led intervention in Yemen was ineffective.

The problem is not lack of money or equipment. The combined military spending on the six countries of the Gulf Co-operation Council (GÇ) plus Egypt and Jordan total little more than $120 billion annually (European members of NATO spent $380 billion in 2023). Together they can pack 94,000 troops (see map), 4,800 tanks and 1,000 combat aircraft.

Egypt and Jordan are among the largest beneficiaries of American military aid, receiving about $1.7 billion a year among them.

Much of this money is wasted. The Arab Armed Forces often spend worthless equipment like fighter planes that are not suitable for the asymmetric threats they face, argues Paul Collins, a former British defence attaché in Cairo.

Large purchases are generally used to gain influence with Western governments, suggests Andreas Krieg of King's College in London. F-15 aircraft purchases, Rafare and Typhoons from Qatar have actually bought favors in Washington, Paris and London.

The buying, arming and maintenance business of fighter aircraft is a money machine. Over the past ten years in Saudi Arabia, 54% of arms imports, according to value, were spent on aircraft. This aerial obsession generally comes at the expense of other service branches, such as the army and the navy.

Indeed countries whose prosperity depends on access to commercial transport, pay very little attention to their navy. The fleets are small and usually focused on the coast guard.

They also lack sensors and major early warning interceptors who are useful for advanced protection at sea.

They have played a limited role in protecting Houth's attacks on the Red Sea. For decades, many countries saw little reason to invest in American and British naval protection, notes David Roberts, also from the Royal Kings College in London.

Even those who have begun to invest face serious troop shortages. Qatar Navy ordered seven new ships from Italy. It will need 660 additional sailors to operate them, equivalent to a quarter of its current marine personnel.

Most importantly, however, Arab armies generally reflect the authoritarian traits of their rulers.

Military commanders are difficult to offer high-ranking soldiers independence and necessary freedom for combined weapons operations, as is common in the West.

Training often bears little resemblance to the reality of combat, notes Mr. Krieg. Arab armies are also treated as Praetorian guards.

The Saudi Arabia National Guard of 130,000 troops is the personal protection force of the ruling family. In Egypt, the military conducts a large trade empire that handles everything from vacation resorts to construction firms.

Some hope that Arab armies may provide a peacekeeping force in Gaza, but experts are sceptical that their forces have operational means to engage in high-level fighting.

These armies, however, have pockets of military perfection. The United Arab Emirates and Jordan have capable and professional armies, especially their special forces and pilots.

In 2015, the Emiraean Special Forces carried out a complex amphibious attack on the port city of Adden, which impressed Western observers. Jordan has performed regular relief flights on Gaza, a difficult mission over the dense generation. The smaller elite forces, well trained, have allowed the motivating spirit of troops to flourish. But specialised expertise is often imported: the presidential guard of the United Arab Emirates and special forces have brought some foreign advisers, most of them former Western officers, and are commanded by an Australian general.

Moreover, there seems to be partial co-operation. The prevention of Iran's attack on Israel, although controlled by America, would not be possible without a considerable degree of Arab co-ordination, Mr. Collins thinks. Since 2019, when a fearful attack, possibly from Iran, stopped nearly half of Saudi oil production, Gulf and other Arab states from integrating their air defence systems.

Some experts suggest that many Gulf air defence units are better able than their European counterparts. In 2022 a small part of Arab nations even joined Israel as part of a regional American-led air defence alliance focused on uniting different radar detection systems.

Some are still cautious: “There is nothing in the technical field that is hindering the integration of things like air defence,” notes Mr. Pollack. “It's all about politics. ”

But major political changes in the country can set the stage for military reform.

Aware of the future transition of energy, Gulf monarchs want to reform their economies and societies. They are moving their money to advanced military technology, including artificial intelligence research centres, instead of expensive conventional platforms.

Governments hope that expenses for strange military equipment will create widespread effects on the civil economy. But he may not do much to improve their military reputation.