Next week, crucial to war in Ukraine

This was not the war Moscow was expecting.

Ukrainian forces are resisting more than many military analysts had anticipated before Russia began its invasion on February 24th, as Russian forces suffered major losses and a series of logistical defeats, which have forced them to regroup and change tactics, while their progress in this state has slowed.

The Ukraine Defence Ministry has claimed it has so far killed over 12,000 Russian troops, but nature fluides and rapid conflict changes make it difficult to get a clear picture of what is happening on the ground and what may happen in the future.

Some estimates by American officials say the number of Russian soldiers killed amounts to 6,000, even though officials have stressed that it is difficult to know correctly and have estimated that among 2,0004,000 could be the number of victims. The figures from Moscow, not seen as reliable by military experts, have been published less and so far Russia has said 498 troops were killed.

But since analysts say it is clear that Ukrainian forces have thwarted the original plans of the Kremlin war, Russian forces are still in the numeric advantage and military equipment against the Ukrainian side and are continuing their offensive.

This leaves the fate of Russia's military occupation and Ukraine's resistance at a key phase that could be decided in the coming weeks, given a host of factors.

To understand more, Radio Free Europe has spoken with Gustav Gressel, former Austrian Defence Official and Russian military expert at the European Council on Foreign Relations.

Radio Free Europe: How should people understand the numbers of victims that are often contradictory with what we are seeing from US, Ukrainian and Russian officials? What is behind these different figures, and how should we view the differences that the numbers presented? And can you explain some of the challenges presented when it comes to tracking a real - time conflict, such as the present case?

Gustav GresselEven if you try to look objectively, you can't because you don't see all the victims on all sides. Ukrainians can have security for the people they capture, for the people who kill when they commit an attack, a counteroffensive, or when they regain control of a field, because they can count the bodies of the victims. Of course, Ukrainian counterattacks are a small part of this war.

So, if you're trying to evaluate this correctly, it's practically impossible, and the hardest thing is to evaluate the number of victims. Counting how many military vehicles are destroyed is easier because you see what you've done to them, and after a while, you see them on satellite images destroyed cars on the street. Therefore, Western intelligence sources have managed to verify this and give a figure.

The figures presented by the Russian side are propaganda. Russia is trying to hide the war, and practically they are offering false figures.

Of course, they cannot flatly deny that some kind of conflict is taking place because there are people who are seriously injured and are returning [to Russia]. Therefore, Russia must admit something, but the Russian side is accepting a small number [of victims] that is definitely under the real figure.

If the numbers of victims presented by Russia were real, then the ghosts are driving all those tanks. When a tank is destroyed within seconds, it is unlikely that the inside team will come out and a Russian tank has three crew members. Therefore, you may assume, at least based on the crew of these military vehicles, that there is a higher number of victims than [that Moscow is presenting].

Radio Free Europe: But there's a lot of difference between the numbers we're looking at from many sides. What else could explain that?

Gustav Gressel: These are assumptions because no one knows exactly the number of victims.

Every party in the war, no matter what war, and this is where the West is involved in the war in Afghanistan and Iraq, it blows the numbers of the victims that caused the other side. This is easy, apart when it comes to indirect fire. And also because a lot of people that we think are killed in some action are actually injured and as long as they're out of the battlefield, they're not dead. So the figures of persons killed in combat any party in any war are always higher.

According to one estimate, approximately two thirds of what Ukrainians claim has been destroyed is what has truly been destroyed. I think maybe counting military cars [from the Ukrainian side] can be more accurate than the number of people [killed] because even when you have heavily damaged cars, it can happen to save soldiers. Therefore, [the total figure of victims] may be quite high, but counting destroyed military vehicles is not far from the actual figure. But again, almost two-thirds of this is probably not far from the actual digit.

Radio Free Europe: Given that the number of victims from the Russian side may be higher, do you see any change in the strategy from Moscow?

Gustav Gressel: Putin is trying to gain more internal support [for the war], but if the situation gets hot enough [in Ukraine], he may have to use [in large scale] the recruits and the normal reserve and use formations that would generate a lot of force.

So I think that by April 1 they will play, having new recruits being sent to the battlefield and older recruits will be withdrawn from the war. [Russian Army] naturally wants many of these recruits to withdraw from the battlefield, convincing them to sign new contracts to take part in the war again.

So I think we don't have any peace solutions or serious negotiations on the Russian side. They are waiting for April 1st, [when they can take] a new round of forces and until these new units are not used on the battlefield... I don't think Russia will make any serious efforts to achieve peace.

Radio Free Europe: What is your assessment of the military tactics Russia has used so far?

Gustav Gressel: The first version of blitzkrig [fast war] has failed. That can be said. Practically this version collapsed in the first week of the war, and now they [the Jews] are regrouping.

Now [Russia] will fight more traditionally, according to Soviet combat and not fight, as we thought, quickly, to have a quick fight because many of their assumptions, which have so far, failed.

We're also seeing that they're doing a lot of things they've done in Syria or Donbas, but it's on a lower scale. They cannot repeat the actions they have done in Syria in the war in Ukraine, which is a greater struggle than the military operations they have conducted so far.

The problem is that it's hard to change tactics because they haven't brought many organisational elements that Ukraine has to restructure and reorganize their forces deeply, so I think we'll see a pause in fighting.

This disorganization and logistical problems are deep because Russia has generated most of this force through tactical groups of professional soldiers, which is a good way for a force to develop quickly and be deployed quickly. But for what requires a battle of low intensity, Russia has no logistical stability to wage a broad-scale war, and besides armoured vehicles and infantry, Moscow does not have the organisational pillar for such a war.

Radio Free Europe: Are Russian forces able to regroup and perhaps surround Kiev and achieve their main military goals regardless of whether they face major obstacles?

Gustav Gressel: If the West manages to bring the Russian economy to its knees in a way that Putin has not expected and if the West supplies Ukraine with a lot of weapons to keep up the murder number, as it is now, I think Russia can start thinking about war exit strategies and Russian society may not support the war so Putin hopes.

Of course, if Sanction regime He loses power and Putin sees that the West has touched the end [of support], he can work in this direction, and if Ukrainian resistance fades due to the reduction of citizens who fight and ammunition, it could give Russia and its Russian war machine and propaganda, space to grow and move towards a full victory.

This is hard to predict. We are at a very crucial time and our actions will now determine the course of war in the coming weeks and whether Ukraine has a chance or not to continue to resist.

Russia's intentions are still attainable. But the price for this is higher than Moscow had imagined.

On the other hand, Ukrainians are still likely to prevent that from happening. Still not set for the battle for Kiev. Other cities are also resisting. War depends greatly on local morality, local skills and initiatives by local commanders.