Polaska: If the prime minister is left with LV after the president's mandate is expired, it would have absolute power.

The recogniser of political issues in the country, Dastid Pallaska, has made an analysis of the political situation in the country, namely, the blockade created by LV and LDK, which are still failing to reach an agreement on the ruling coalition.

The Pallaska has called the non-fisic battle the insistence of both parties for the Speaker of the Parliament.

However, Pallaska has pointed to the political significance of the post of chief parliamentary, where the Kosovo Constitution defines the prime parliament as the position exercising the president's post, the periscopi conveys.

Based on this, Pallaska has analysed the possible performance of political processes in the event agreement is reached between LV and LDK for co-governance.

In this context, the analyst estimates that if Vetevendosje continues to hold the post of Parliament Speaker even after the president's mandate is expired, then Albin Kurti's party will have absolute power.

The package reasons by pointing out major challengers for electing the president.

Read the complete Dastid Pallasca analysis:

The Nonficial Battle for Chief Parliamentary Position

At first glance, the LDK and LVV dispute over the position of Chief Parliamentary may seem absurd. How is it that a coalition that has been established on high moral claims... is so much so that it's self-baptized as “the conclusion of the hope” let it not be meteraliated for such a non-fisic reason.

The dispute makes no sense even when the narrow constitutional importance of the post of Chief Parliamentary is estimated as agromatic moderator of a debate that is usually superficial and without real impact on policymaking.

This optical illusion is avoided only when assessing the position of Chief Parliamentary beyond the primary constitutional function and under the context of political events expected to occur in February 2021 if they are not provoked earlier by some external factor.

Article 90 of the Constitution defines the Chief Parliament as the position of the president in case of the latter's temporary absence for several reasons provided there.

Although it is not explicitly envisioned with the Constitution, this constitutional provision has been applied in cases where the president's position has been held due to delays in electing the president, as was the case when former Prime Minister Jakup Krasniqi exercised this position for about six months during the 2010 ' s, 2011.

As it is known, the current president's mandate will expire for a little over a year. Keeping in mind that the self-called coalition of hope even if it is made there will not be enough votes for managing the process, much less the election of the president, it is certain that the president's election will take considerable time.

If we are guided by the delays accompanying negotiations on government creation and the objectively double language of the eventual agreement for electing the president from the “co-ordination of hope, ” would mean that the president's election could drag on for months and perhaps even years.

This especially after the country goes to the polls only if the president's election fails, government no-confidence is voted or the dissolution of the Parliament is voted on, the three constitutional scenarios hard to implement under the predominant political and constitutional circumstances.

To fail the president's election is necessary to initiate the selection process. Any of the parties in the “despair coalition” that are interested in procrastinating this process is very easy to do so because of an absurd decision by the Constitutional Court that requires a 2/3 quorum in the president's election case.

The collapse of the Government by no-confidence vote or the dissolution of the Parliament is even less feasible as it calls for the co-operation of one party of “Hope coalition coalition coalition coalition coalition coalition coalition coalition coalition coalition coalition coalition coalition coalition coalition coalition.

Under this constitutional-political context, if the position of the Chief Parliamentary remains LVV, following the expiration of the current mandate of President LVV will have absolute power, effectively maintaining all three top positions of the state -- the president, the Chief Parliamentary and the prime minister.

The LVV would have full control over the process of electing the president through blocking the formation of the 2/3 quorum, which is needed for the start of the president's election process. Negotiations on potential candidates for President LVV would lead from the convenience of the time it can only be held by the incumbent president.

The situation would get worse when the fact is taken into account that to elect the president without the LVV or to bring down the LVV from power, thus disrupting the “Hope coalition” The LDK would have to co-operate “with the parties that were part of the PAN coalition. The same political trap would be activated if the LDK intended to vote on the dissolution of the Parliament requiring 2/3 of the vote.

Since the LDK's co-operation with PAN parties for any of the constitutional scenarios mentioned above would be a safe political suicide, the country would be paralyzed to a status quo indefinitely, under LVV's absolute power.

This means that the cause of the dispute over the creation of “account of hope” is not a protocol position but simply the effort to establish absolute power by a party that has only one more vote in the Assembly.

There is no noble thing in it.