Secret negotiations to betray Kosovo

If Kosovo and Serbia's president make an agreement behind closed doors to normalise relations by exchanging territories, it could further polarise Kosovo politics, exacerbate social divisions and trigger interethnic unrest.

So writes David L. Phillips, director of the programme for the construction of rights and peace near the Columbia University Institute.

Reminding that negotiations require discretion, Philipps stresses that the need for discretion should be balanced with inclusion so that interested parties can invest in the outcome and convince their voters to support the outcome of negotiations.

Kosovo President Hashim Thaci and his Serbian counterpart, Aleksandar Vuciq, have had closed-door meetings to discuss an agreement on normalising relations between the two countries.

Thaci has dismissed the controversial idea of border disorder. Besides Federica Moghrini, EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security, no one knows what Thaci and Vuciq have discussed. Even members of the Kosovo negotiating team are in the dark.

It is not easy to keep secrets, especially in a matter of such national importance. Thaci and Vuciq reportedly plan to announce an agreement to exchange territories shortly before their upcoming meeting in Paris on July 1st, Phillips writes further.

According to a prominent Kosovo personality, these are the terms of the agreement:

Serbia will agree to recognise Kosovo.

Kosovo will leave northern Mitrovica and three northern municipalities in Serbia.

Kosovo will take four to seven villages in the Presevo Valley, which are currently part of Serbia. These villages cannot form a nearby territory. Gazivoda Lake, which is crucial for Kosovo's electricity and water supply, will become a reliable territory under the supervision of an international organisation (e.g. NATO).

An association of Serb minority communities will be founded in other parts of Kosovo where Serbs live. The association will be responsible for urban and rural planning.

The deal is silent on Trepca mines, which include territories in both countries. (Falling to address Trepca's status raises the question: Who benefits?) Territorial exchange has precedent. In 1947, Serbia transferred seven villages of the Gjilan district to Presevo: Stanec, Maxhere, Peceno, Ranatovce, Depche, Caraweika and Sefer.

The other villages moved to Bujanoc: Dobros and Koncul, as well as the mountainous villages of Bujanovac, Pribovac and Zarbinca. The total of 11 villages consists of some 85 square miles [85 sq km]. In 1959, 45 settlements in the Raska region moved to Kosovo. Part of Lesak and Zubin Potok also joined Kosovo. The decision on these territorial changes was made only by Belgrade. At the time, Kosovo's political status was limited to an autonomous region within Serbia.

The Thaci-Wucciq agreement on exchange of territories is a bad deal for some reasons, Phillips points out. He explains that Vuciq does not have votes in parliament to change Serbia's Constitution and ratify the agreement, until Serbia's recognition of Kosovo is essential to the agreement.

The agreement will not address the EU and Kosovo's membership in the UN. The desired thought is not an acceptable danger.

Implementation of the agreement would institutionalise instability, isolating Albanian villages in Presevo and northern Kosovo, thus creating ghettos similar to Gaza. The Serbian association for Kosovo Serbs in the south of the country would cause turmoil and would ultimately spur their calls for withdrawal from Kosovo. Kosovo politics will become even more polarised if the details are held by the Kosovo negotiating team, the author notes.

He warns that the Kosovo Parliament will severely debate the agreement with society so deeply divided, while social divisions will deteriorate and violence can occur within and interethnic.

Bosnia could also experience a renewal of violence if Republika Srpska seeks to join Serbia.

The agreement is also bad for Kosovo's foreign relations. Chancellor Angela Merkel's stance in the dark will alienate the German leader, who has been committed to Kosovo's territorial integrity.

Reaching an agreement behind it will undermine Germany's support for visa liberalisation, economic ties and other Kosovo priorities, Phillips further states.

Washington's position is unclear. American officials show they will support what the parties will achieve. This behavior is a bitterness of American leadership in a country where American views are really important.

Any agreement between Kosovo and Serbia, without the consent of Germany and the US, will fail. Germany and the US are critical of Kosovo's Euro-Atlantic integration.

To move forward, Phillips says the negotiations require the involvement of members of the Kosovo negotiating team and information of opposition leaders, and no longer have closed-door meetings Thaci-Vuchic.

Making clear demands for ratification by parliament and a popular referendum. Kosovo's society is critical for its implementation.

The participation of US officials in all meetings is required and should not be exclusive for EU officials.

There is an alternative to division: building the state and establishing a common society in which the interests of all communities in Kosovo are protected and promoted. Instead of focusing on details of border regulation, Thaci and the international community should have a long-term view and insist on recognising Kosovo unconditionally. Anything less makes Thaci an accomplice in Belgrade's betrayal and obligation, Phillips writes.

Otherwise, David Phillips served as State Department Senior Adviser during the administrations of the Presidents Clinton, Bush and Obama. Phillips is the author of the book ʹLiberating Kosovoo: Coercive Diplomacy and US Intervention Harvard University, Kennedy School.