Final agreement for Kosovo: Compromise or Confrontation?

BIRN asked seven international experts and in Kosovo and Serbia to give their opinions on what kind of final agreement and what kind of partition of Kosovo or exchange of territories could lead to practice, if Pristina and Belgrade would reach an agreement between the self-Florian Bieber, professor of Southeast European History and Policy at the University of Graz and Balkan Co-ordinator in Europe- Policy Group, estimates that “the idea of partition continues to resurface, the EU and their key members have declared red lines against<1x> “There are many reasons why such a solution would not lead anywhere or better to further endanger tensions and conflicts. The realistic solution would have to ensure that Kosovo's independence is accepted, especially in the UN and the five EU countries, which have yet to recognise”.

According to him, if Serbia formally recognises Kosovo or finds another way that should be flexible, but it should be clear that Serbia de facto recognises Kosovo. I seriously doubt that an agreement will end tensions and disputes. Both sides are interested in a quiet country but not a new page in their relations. Both continue to present the dispute as a game of zero sums, and unlike the Macedonian and Greek governments, they do not seem ready to form a partnership to transform conflict.

Both are seeking to take advantage of future tensions. After all, the conflict is a useful entertainment for both the interior and the EU. When the Kosovo-Serbia dispute has been resolved, Serbian President Vuciq will face the EU's most critical voices about the state of democracy and the rule of law, so he has a strong push not to find a solution soon, while in Kosovo, the government suffers from a fragile coalition with weak legitimacy, thus making it impossible to compromise”. “Taking into account the scepticism of EU members also raises the question of what the EU can offer for a solution. France and the Netherlands will remain deeply skeptical about enlargement, even if both agree on a solution. That way, the decision for Macedonia and Albania served as a diversion to a compromise, as both governments require, what can we get from the EU if we compromise? And the EU response is not clear”, Biber says. While, Bojan Elek, a researcher at the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy, estimates that the final solution will probably have to be a form of compromise that will leave both sides equally dissatisfied. According to him, with a binding legal agreement, Kosovo would have to gain characteristics “de facto” of citizenship, including a country in the UN and a perspective for EU membership, while Serbia could avoid a clear “de jure” of independence, making the agreement more acceptable to citizens.

“No matter what the final agreement would be, the most important thing for Serbia would be to protect the rights of its citizens living on Kosovo territory”. An exchange of territory would be a bad solution, and not only because it would pave the way for other territorial demarcations in the region. An exchange or partition would reinforce the nationalist approach for organising territories in the principle of my <x3 people, my land “, which is impossible to implement because it would write disaster for the entire region, taking into account the history of the Balkans in the last 30 years. If a division meant that northern Kosovo would belong to Serbia, it would further weaken the Serb community south of the Iber River, because northern Mitrovica is the administrative, educational and health centre that all other municipalities are making gravity”, says Elek. Agon Maliqi, editor of S-Bunker, web site for political analysis and opinions, says it is hard to imagine that Vuciq can reconcile with something he cannot sell as victory in his country. “He wants an agreement and is in a position to sell it, but wants to be seen as taking something in exchange for the identity of Kosovo's 87x7> independence implications. “This is clear from the way he is building rhetoric in his inner opinion. The problem is that Kosovo has already given as much as it can realistically provide in the sense of protecting minority rights to remain functional inside”. According to him, “in this way, Kosovo is caught between a stone and a strong country. It risks turning its weak foreign position (contracting state) into a weak internal position by becoming a dysfunctional state (no doubt that Russia will not block the seat at the UN) or split (which would deeply polarise internal Kosovo and divide the region)”.“Passing any of these options to Kosovo, especially when there is no strong consensus or political control as Vucinq has in Serbia, will be very difficult.

So if there's going to be an agreement -- and this again remains a “if the big” -- there are three main types of imaginable results, and I think that international consensus and the ease of selling the agreement inside will determine which option will come true. The first option is to repack or restore existing rights for Serbs (which are so broad that they can do more) and that would enable Vuciqi to spin it as a victory, but would not guarantee a seat for Kosovo at the UN because of Russia, but only a vague road to the EU. The second option would be something essential such as a form of territorial autonomy for Serbs (which risks making Kosovo dysfunctional and increasing control of Belgrade) as long as it still does not guarantee seating at the UN. The third option is division or exchange of territories (which would change the game in the region)”. “Ndar has long been the preferred option in the nationalist circles (the influential Serbian writer Dorica Qosic) and liberal ones (even the late former Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Dzingjiq thought it is the best option).

So in a way this option represents the closest thing to a consensus on Serbian public opinion (except the Serbian Orthodox Church, which has recently gone out publicly against because most of its heritage objects are located south of the Iber River)”. He says the “problem is that partition has been taboo in Kosovo, and public opinion is absolutely unprepared to face the consequences and many questions this raised about nature and the future of the state. We've spent 10 hard years building trust in the current model of state. Only now has the flag (of Kosovo) started to be embraced more widely by the people (even though almost always in combination with the Albanian flag). Furthermore, the north is far from what it was in 2008, and many attempts have been made to integrate Serbs within the Kosovo system (including the recent judiciary)”. The “will have a deep polarization because partition would automatically shift the debate about when and how to join Albania and what this would mean for our ability to govern ourselves. Kosovo society is not homogenous about this but it maintains a lot of attitudes within the spectrum, so I feel that this will severely paralyses us for a long time. I cannot see what will happen without, at least, some tension or violence in Kosovo or the region, whether in response to this solution from those who are dissatisfied, or as means from its promoters to accelerate things and create new realities on the ground which would then make this option inevitable”, says Maliqi.

Edward Joseph, assistant professor and senior partner of the School of Advanced International Studies Johns Hopkins, points out that “resolving the almost difficult Balkan disputes rests on a factor above all: Western political will. So the solution for Kosovo does not occur in a vacuum; it reflects the continuation of political will not only in Europe, but also in Washington”. “As for what Vuciq can accept for Kosovo, while “resolution” concretely and directly advances Belgrade's EU accession, it can and will accept almost anything that protects the position of Serbs in Kosovo. The whole notion that Vuciq faces a “selection” between the EU and Russia is a disarray driven by Vuciq himself to remove Western pressure”. According to him, “is completely possible for Kosovo's solution to bring its almost-recognising recognition from Belgrade in exchange for asymmetric protections for Serbs in the north and south of Kosovo provided the EU seeks and is prepared to move forward on enlargement”. The “Territorial division is the Balkan disaster. The notion that the borders are flexible -- that Bosnia's [Republika Srpska] RS, dominated by Serbia, can secede from Bosnia, for example -- or that Croats can take over its entity [in Bosnia and Herzegovina], the very predecessor of the eventual division helps strengthen Bosnian political polarisation”. Joseph says that “the same mentality is one that promotes incompatibility among Serbs in northern Kosovo; why compromise and co-operate with Pristina, while Serbs in the south if you can keep them out you can be able to secede from Kosovo completely?”“Fortunately, the investigative agreement between Greece and Macedonia on the name of the latter would create no separation agreement if the agreement survives.

If the name agreement goes into effect, Macedonia's partition is removed from the table and the country leads NATO membership, almost guaranteeing that the country will not be divided, regardless of how many Albanians are convinced”. And this automatically complicates the division of Kosovo, because it makes it harder to compensate the Albanians there for losing the north. Of course, the conversation is true; if there is no agreement on the name and a movement on partitioning Kosovo gains momentum, then you can rely on calls to move majority Albanian areas to Macedonia -- a turbulent and dangerous step that only invites and promotes more claims at the site”. “Those who think that the Presevo/South Valley of Serbia represents the “exchange “for the north have not spoken with Albanians living there. Many Albanians living in Presevo do not enjoy the idea of being a eastern province of Pristina, cut off by the northern and southern highways Serbia will not give up”, he estimates. The “Ide that Kosovo should be divided is based on illusions that it would be fair, which would be possible and flooded rather than irregular, non-practice and dangerous. The more spoken, the more it will seem like a practical solution that is not. The fact that the EU has extraordinary incentives is what makes it the whole subject of Kosovo's territorial division not only non-practice and dangerous, but unnecessary “, says Joseph.

Lulzim Peci, director of the Kosovar Institute for Policy Research and Development, KIPRED, says that a possible <x0 solution to the Kosovo-Serbia dispute would be a package that would include autonomy for the Kosovo Serb community, or a form of association of Serb majority municipalities or territorial autonomy without legislative competence for Serb majority municipalities in northern Kosovo, clear or implied recognition of Kosovo by Serbia with Kosovo membership at the UN, which would be accompanied by relevant changes in the constitutions of Serbia and Kosovo under the agreement reached”. The “The division of Kosovo has a long history and the Serbian political structure has never given up on it. This option is against the values and goals of EU and NATO enlargement, which are based on the model of multiethnic states and inclusive societies rather than on changing the borders of the former Yugoslavia's federal entities on ethnic lines”.

According to him, the “possibility of partitioning Kosovo is in line with the policy Russia is pursuing with its immediate neighbours, struggling to change borders with neighbouring states along ethnic lines where the Russians are minority, simultaneously retains many ethnicity and peoples within its borders”. “This policy is not limited to Moscow's immediate neighbours, since Russia is also following a policy of destabilising the Balkans, with its efforts to transform it into an area of continuing geopolitical conflict between major powers and nationalist elites in the region. Here, Serbia is playing a mini-Russia role in the Balkans”.

In addition, the option for partitioning Kosovo seriously jeopardises its potential for economic development, jeopardising the sustainability of water supply from Gazivoda Lake for one-third of Kosovo, as well as the cooling of power plants in Obilikq”. Moreover, this option is against the basic interests of the Serb community in Kosovo, since most of its members (more than 60 percent) live south of the Iber River, and that most Serbian Orthodox churches are located in the central and western part of Kosovo”, Peci estimates.

This option has more to do with territorial hegemonistic benefits than in the interest of all Kosovo communities, including the Serb community itself. Instead of solving anything, it can pave the way for hell for all communities in Kosovo and in the wider region. Memories of this kind of hell in the region are still fresh, and we must not forget them”, he says. While Gordana Susha, a Serbian journalist and commentator, says that the closer we get to the final phase predicted for the end of the year, the more pronounced the delays, the futility of negotiations and tensions between Belgrade and Pristina”. “Signing a legally binding reciprocal agreement on normalising relations provides compromise for people in both societies to have a more normal and secure life, to travel, to trade, and to deal with daily issues”. The agreement does not force Serbia to recognise Kosovo formally, but must respect Kosovo institutions and laws ... And according to those laws the Association of Serb majority municipalities will also function:”. “If we take into account public opinion polls showing that two-thirds of Serbian citizens believe that Kosovo is lost, but also that it should not be recognised, the legally binding agreement between the two countries is the framework for both”. According to her, “if Belgrade and Pristina fail to reach an agreement and sign it, a frozen conflict could melt ... with very uncertain results, mainly for Serbia”. “If both sides fail to reach a solution after much effort, experience has taught us that a third party will decide our destiny under much worse conditions”.

I absolutely support the negotiations and the legally binding agreement, but also the responsibility of the authorities, primarily from Vuciq, to be honest and to show the public in detail and without the adornment of what is happening and how much will it cost us if we do not accept ... the bilateral agreement, and what is his B) plan in that case”, says Susha. Meanwhile, Bodo Weber, senior associate of the Democratic Policy Council, says that “Negotiations are indeed entering the final phase, which is on a final, comprehensive and legally binding agreement for full normalisation of relations, since both sides, particularly Belgrade, did not use gradual, less painful approach, original political dialogue initiated in 2012-2013x>.

The final resolution, at least on the status issue, is clear from “the original dialogue agreement”, its framework and final goals, which are more or less clearly defined in 2011-2013 and accepted by both sides, including Belgrade”. “This is a solution based on the reality that Serbia lost Kosovo, mainly because of its policy in the past three decades. This means Kosovo's territorial integrity and sovereignty, full exercise of international subjectivity, including the prospect of EU membership, and Serbian support for a UN country”. According to him, recognising Kosovo as an independent state from Serbia, through which Serbia insists that this take place in a reduced and incomplete form of law, it should explain and ensure that all the purposes of the final agreement can be secured in this way too”. “at last, forms of ethnic representation and positive discrimination, as embedded in the Association of Serb majority municipalities, must ensure the institutional functioning of the state of Kosovo and have protection against any future secession of the north of Kosovo”.

“Brend such a clear framework for a final solution, then there is much work to be done in negotiations on open bilateral issues such as missing persons, property issues, etc, where the Kosovar side should be ready to give something to Serbia, Belgrade will have to refrain from misusing bilateral issues to reopen the status issue”, he says. Any lobby for division, exchange of territories, etc. is neither in Serbia's interests nor in the interests of Kosovo Serbs, but in traditionally conformist Balkan politics and for testing a solution of the weakened West and red lines”. Weber estimates that “even in the case when Vuciq and Kosovo President Hashim Thaci agree on such a dirty deal, the Kosovo Assembly will not approve it with the necessary majority, with two-thirds of the vote. Not to talk about that any Western sanction of an ethno-territorial solution would reopen the pandora box in the region and beyond and further destabilise Ukraine, for example,”. “This would destabilise both Serbia and Vuciqiqi, even though it currently seems to be surprisingly unconscious about the possible consequences of his policy”. “S recently, it shows perfectly that Belgrade does not take care of Kosovo Serbs, as long as it has never done, most Serbs live south of Ibri, only care for the continuation of a virtual conformist policy, Kosovo's divine policy as long as possible, instead of taking care of the real problems of Kosovo and Kosovo Serbs”, Weber estimates. / BIRN/