Hasani: Serbs want to get out of dialogue with territorial autonomy

He expects clashes of parties during the latest phase of dialogue in Brussels, while according to him, the Serbian side has shown so far more timely than the Kosovo side, in which controversy continues over who should lead the team in the talks.

REL: Professor Hasani. The process of dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia is entering the final phase, while both sides have said it will not be easy. What can this phase bring about, why do parties warn difficult compromises?

Enver Hasani: They are warning, because any dialogue process aimed at resolving problems from the past, which have deep historical roots, such as the Albanian-Serbian report, Kosovo, Serbia, respectively, implies redefining those reports, and as a result, it cannot occur without mutual compromises in the economic plan, the political plan and the territorial plan.

REL: What can this phase bring about?

Enver Hasani: This phase brings, in the first place, the approach of both countries to European integrations, respectively, because Serbia, however today has a reserve and Serb roads, cannot be other than European routes of integrations, in terms of security, under the umbrella of Atlantic security.

REL: Do you expect confrontation during this process?

Enver Hasani: I expect extraordinary confrontations and difficulties, because the Kosovar side, unlike the Serbian side, even though it is seen that there will be problems -- it is not coherent. It means, in the success of any dialogue, one of the components of that success is the socio-political consistency of the dialogueers. The more co-operation is inside the dialogue body, the more successful it is. Aleksandar Vuciqi (President of Serbia) and Serbian society, I have the impression that it is better prepared in this direction because there has been an opening, a transparency to the public there, in terms of issues related to Kosovo, and has allied in compromises that could be made to the Kosovo side.

On the other hand, here from us (in Kosovo) has failed to become a division between governance and the country on the part of Kosovo institutions and institutional leadership, on the side that concerns our reports with Serbia. These two issues should be separate. But, they are not divided and with Serbia's “later”, respectively, with the report to Serbia and the neighbours as has been the issue of demarcation (with Montenegro), or as has been the issue of the report on the Brussels Accords, in relation to Serbia, governments have fallen and been established. This is wrong, because these are two issues, which if not cut off, it undermines consistency and, as a result, makes it difficult to reach the agreement.

REL: You mentioned the issue of compromises. When it comes to the party from Kosovo, does this compromise imply the Association of Serb majority municipalities?

Enver Hasani: I believe so. It means there is also the Constitutional Court (of Kosovo) ruling, but there is international agreement, which is the Brussels Agreement not the latter, because it has been the technical administrative agreement that says that association should be formed. It can only be formed if there is another nature of association that has no intelligence of the public right that we say.

It means, there's the problem and there's the key. Formation of association, in the format Serbs think, is diametrically contrary to what we think and hope for. So, in this regard, it is an extremely serious matter.

REL: Is this some kind of autonomy for Serbs?

Enver Hasani: What Serbs are looking for with association is, as it were, to create a political and territorial bed for Ahtisaari's plan in terms of community rights. It means, Ahtisaari's plan has had everything, just not what it says the Association is the territorial bed. The rights that are today in the third chapter of the Constitution, for those rights are trying to establish them in the territorial bed, within which that Association, those ingeneracy by public law, would be realized.

REL: The dialogue has been said to end with legally binding agreements for both states. What implications can such an agreement bring?

Enver Hasani: The first legally binding agreement cannot be made without the procedure guarantee of its implementation, meaning, without Europe, the US, and other similar actors. Like the Contact Group, perhaps in another format. For today I do not see a willingness to such a thing by leading international actors. As far as I can see, they've let the parties propose modalities. This is a defect, first, serious.

That agreement, when legally binding, leaves out responsibilities for each party that does not comply and still comes to its guarantors. If these basic elements of the procedure are made, then, the substance is a separate issue, and the Kosovo side must now define the mandate of how long it can go about the substance. As for the procedure for success of legally binding agreement, it is required that guarantors be strong.

REL: The European Union has said it will be facilitator of the process, but neither does it import agreements nor guarantee them. Who can guarantee such an agreement?

Enver Hasani: Me to date, judged not only in the history of Kosovo but also in the history of Europe throughout the 20th century, all of Europe's main problems have been accomplished with the powerful intervention of the United States of America. I don't see and have a problem seeing a legally binding agreement, where there are only facilitators and not guarantors of it. What is the leverage of influence for the parties, both Serbs and Albanians, for Europe, if it has the extenuating status? None. There's no leverage.

The second, when legally imposed, cannot be legally binding without guarantors. Here's a pattern and content contradiction that doesn't go. Therefore, I see no choice but a concerted action by both sides of the Atlantic, between the US and Europeans, as a way of resolving the Western Balkan issue. It's not just Kosovo. Kosovo is one of the most serious problems about Serbia's relations Kosovo, but, in general, the question of the Western Balkans, because the Western Balkans have powerful security components that dominate the soft component that is rule of law, democracy and respect for human and minority rights.

These are under the shadow of the security umbrella, because the processes that are under way, where the NATO coalition -- primarily the US and other European allies -- necessarily have direct effects on the Balkans.

REL: Can Kosovo secure its seat in the United Nations and clear EU integration prospects through the final agreement with Serbia?

Enver Hasani: Now, the question is, if an agreement is to be reached, what nature will it have? That agreement can foresee a dynamic that in this case, I believe will be a process of integration into Europe, the UN and so on, Kosovo and Serbia. There will be a process in which deadlines and political deliverys are envisioned that the parties should make against each other and a guarantor.

It means, of course, there must be a implementation council in order to prove whether the parties are holding to the agreement. Otherwise, it will happen as with these Brussels agreements, which have not had any substantial effect on the approach of the parties.

REL; Do you expect that at the end of the dialogue, for implementation of the eventual agreement, the two countries will be obliged to make constitutional changes?

Enver Hasani: It is inevitable that the legally binding agreement will force the parties to take a mutually made commitment from both the Serbian and Kosovo sides. From the Serbian side, what is now accurate, is the question of the clause that exists in the Constitution (Serbia) that defines Kosovo as part of Serbia. It means she must change. Even there, they have to change the provisions, as far as the nature of the Serbian state and its report on Serbs living outside the border, which they have that constitutional auspices for today, but many more.

On the part of Kosovo, the legally binding agreement will certainly again define the definition of the state and the sovereignty of Kosovo ʹ the section referring to territorial composition. The border issue with Serbia will also be part that will require constitutional changes. Then, Chapter 3 (of the Constitution of Kosovo) will change in line with obligations taken with that legally binding agreement.

The form of association, which is the word “cella”, as well as its integration into Kosovo's constitutional order, will necessarily re-definate Chapter 3 of the Constitution and general principles that define the nature of the state. Why chapter 3? This is because this chapter is meant for collective rights that have no territorial grounds.

It means, they are not given to ethnicities within Kosovo or to municipalities within Kosovo or to local communities, but the point of reference is the preservation and protection of Kosovo communities in the entire territory of Kosovo, on the basis of what is today called the Constitution, from the first article to the last. Now, though, this may be different.

REL: Can this defund the state of Kosovo?

Enver Hasani: Even so, it is not as if the Ahtisaari Plan has become operational. Don't think it was. It can only legitimize an existing state.

REL: Kosovo President Hashim Thaci has called on political parties and the entire political spectrum for unity and a platform for approaching dialogue. On the other hand, opposition parties, but also parties within the ruling coalition, have rejected President Thaci as the leader of the Kosovo side in the dialogue. Is this unfavourable situation for Kosovo, and if so, how to overcome?

Enver Hasani: This is certainly an unfavourable situation, because the way it is done here (in Kosovo) in recent months and weeks, clearly shows that the Kosovo side has serious problems with cohesion against the Serb side. The transition of this situation can only be made by respecting the Kosovo Constitution, respectively, not violating it. Clearly, it's a deal from Article 18. 1 of the Constitution of Kosovo. Agreements, like Article 18. 1 of the Kosovo Constitution are agreements, which are similar in all European constitutions, but also in the US Constitution.

They always require internal ratification, which is constitutional ratification with a qualified majority, but that I can't make any bodies except the body that is representative of the people, the Assembly. The president or government can make agreements by Article 18. Two, that's administrative-technical deals.

For legally binding agreements, which fall at Article 18. 1, however, should be secured consensus platforms through the Parliament, because those legally binding agreements, as it claims with Serbia, or such as peace agreements, necessarily contain territorial clauses, political clauses and economic clauses. These always require qualified majority, and in most cases constitutional changes are also required. I can't do any organ but the House.

Here is no question of who will lead the dialogue. Here is how the issue of bilateral agreements with Serbia will be resolved.

We all know that the bilateral agreement with Serbia cannot be made by one step, but is made through a peace agreement, similar to that Dayton, which has been much more structured than Rambouillea, with which agreement is provided as guarantee and guarantor, very structured provisions and implements, which it cannot perform any of the existing organs today.

It is not the constitutional authority of the government, nor the president, nor any other body, on and on, to discuss issues that have constitutional implications.

I can only do that organ that represents the voice of the people. And he is always a guardian of the people's will.

Only they (Kupon's deputies) can, with internal procedures and regulations of the Parliament, come to a decision with which terms of reference, conditions, limits and all other that go to dialogue with Serbia are defined. / REL/