Osama File: Could America prevent terrorist attacks?

In the red brick building, near the presidential palace of Cartum, agents serving the Mukhabarat, Sudan's secret service, guard their secrets. These guys know what they're doing”, says the CIA retired specialist for Africa. “They tend to be careful. Their staff is quite reliable”.

WHY SEPTEMBER 11 HE WAS DIFFECTION SEKRET INFORMAT I V AmericanKAN?

Sudanese Mukhabarati spent the beginning and mid-90s collecting data for Osama bin Laden and his timelines in the heart of al-Qaeda, the terrorist network, when he was not very well-known. Some of the files on Mukhabarat headquarters identify individuals who played the main role in the suicide bombing at the US Embassy in Tanzania and Kenny in August 1998; others list the background and movements of al-Qaeda operatives, who are said to be directly related to the atrocities of September 11th. Immediately after these attacks, President Bush and the FBI published the list of the 22 most wanted terrorists in the world. Sudan has kept records for many of them for years.

Since autumn 1996, until several weeks before the 2001 attack, the Sudanese government has made efforts to share this information with the United States. In some cases, older agents in the FBI have wanted to accept these offers, but apparently they have been detained by President Clinton's secretary (Bill Clinton), Medllulen Albright) and her assistant, Secretary for Africa Suzen Rice (Susan Rice), who do not want to comment on the matter after several requests for the interview.

September 11th was a failure of the intelligence service. As the CIA man named it, “we didn't know this was going to happen”. Some of the reasons for the failure were structural: the absence of Arabic-speaking agents, the inability of CIA officers to sneak into Afghanistan.

However, if the United States agencies had examined Mukhabarat's files when they had their first chance in 1996, the chances of preventing the subsequent al-Qaeda attacks would be greater. Tim Kern (Tim Carney), the last US ambassador to Sudan, whose post ended in 1997, says: “We can speculate if this failure had serious implications, at least for what happened at the US embassies in 1998. However, the United States lost access to intriguing materials for bin Laden and his body”.

D KA CAIN PLAIN WRITER IN SUDAN?

How could this happen? The simple answer is that the Clinton administration has accused Sudan of supporting terrorism. At the same time, perceptions in Washington were influenced by the CIA's incorrect reports, some as a result of the supposed dezinformation. The problem, Kern says, was “correction inadequate and analysis by the CIA of its own” products. This is conditional on the hostility of Clinton's administration with Sudan's Islamic regime: “against differences by the State Department's own Intelligence and Research Bureau, the US intelligence service failed because it has become politicised”.

Osama bin Laden, his four wives, his children and many supporters “Arabafga” who helped remove the Soviets from Afghanistan went to Sudan from Saudi Arabia in early 1991. They chose Sudan for two main reasons. Initially, concerned, radicalised veterans of Afghanistan's war were not welcome in many Arab states, but Sudan left its doors open. Second, bin Laden wanted Sudan policy. The government's Islamic radicalisation, then the ideological leader, philosopher Hasan al-Turabi, who came to power with fists in 1989, was in the genten. Sudanese accepted bin Laden as an investor. His family has built most of Saudi Arabia's infrastructure, and they saw his wealth and experience as an engineer, as an important source in the development of Sudan.

In Sudan much of bin Laden's energy went to business: the contract, financed by Saudis, to build the airport in Port Sudan, agricultural and al-Hijra projects, the joint project with the Sudan government to build the 185 miles north of Kartumi. Abu Ibrahimi, Iraqi engineer, who later becomes the chief executioner of al-Hijras, says Bin Laden had great interest in the technical details of the project. In Bin Laden's big house, in the rich part of Cartumi, they spent hours together to discuss which drillers, level cars and other means should buy signatures. Abraham knew bin Laden during the African War.

When we were in Afghanistan everything was jihad, jihad, jihad...”, he says. Here, in Sudan, we saw other aspects of it: construction, family life... He was stabilising...”

However, bin Laden also took time to start a vicious propaganda campaign against the Saudi government, furious because it had allowed the American Army to build bases on Saudi soil. He also cared for contact with other Muslim extremists, some of whom were very dangerous.

A IT IS MEANING INFORMED FOR TERRORISTS MUCHABARATI SE CIA?

Sitting on leather couches, Jahya Huseyin Baviker, the deputy head of Mukhabarat since 1998, reveals the elements of 1992. This year, Muhhabarat learned bin Laden played host to Ayman al-Zawahir, founder of Egypt's Islamic Jihad, the fundamentalist group that stood behind many armed attacks on the ministers and officials of Egypt's government, including the 1981 assassination of President Anvar El-Sadat.

Mukhabarat has been following Egypt's Islamic Jihad for years. If anyone in the world understands the Egyptian side of this network is Sudan”, says the CIA source.

Egyptian Islamic Jihad has melted heavily with al-Qaeda. Al-Sawahiri, now man no. 2 on the FBI's most wanted list, serves as Bin Laden's doctor and advisor in Afghanistan. Other Egyptians occupy substantial positions within the al-Qaeda network, many of them known by the Mukhabarat since 1980. “These files for Egyptians could have been of great importance to the US intelligence service”, says Baviker.

All foreigners in Sudan were subject to surveillance. Bin Laden's discovery of ties with Egypt's Islamic Jihad forced Mukhabarat to convey him and his Afghan Arab supporters. Lieutenant General Gutmi al-Mahdi, director general of the Mukhabarat in 1997-2000, says the service started to take notes for “the click of bin Laden... We had a lot of information: who were they, who were their families, what was their education. We knew what they were doing in the country, what their reports were with Osama bin Laden. And the photos for all of them...”

In the 1990s, Sudan's Islamic enthusiasm has softened by pragmatism. In 1994 she attempted to state anti-terrorism credentials, helping France in the capture of Ilq Ramirez Sanchezi, better known as “carlos jackal”, the notorious Venezuelan terrorist who allegedly killed 83 people and now suffers the life sentence in France.

HOW MANIPU REVIDENCES SEKRETE America?

The United States, however, remained convinced that Sudan was a supporter of terrorism. During the end of 1995, US Ambassador Don Peterson was instructed to hand over a secret, unwritten report card to the spiritual leader Hasan al-Turaby and Chairman Omar al-Bashire. It said the US were aware of Sudan's evolution of terrorist plots against us” and that there would be severe response. It could result in Sudan's <x2nd edition, the destruction of your economy and military measures that could cost you a high price. ”

Whatever these plots, which the CIA thought had discovered, they had nothing to do with bin Laden. Ambassador Peterson says: “When I made the presentation of terrorist organisations Osama bin Laden did not figure. We in Cartum weren't too worried about him.

Focusing on the wrong enemy was not the only wrong feature of American intelligence in Sudan. In 1993 The American Embassy sent all the staff home because the CIA claimed there was evidence that Americans were endangered by terrorist attacks. One report even claimed it was a plot to bomb the party for the children of American Embassy workers in Cartum. None of these threats were true. Peterson says: “There is no doubt that these were wrong reports”. President Clinton's National Security Adviser, Tony Lake, has left home with his family and has been held by secret service guards at Bler Haus. The cause was also a false CIA statement that Sudanese agents were planning his murder in Washington. Finally, in early 1996, after Peterson's mandate had come to an end, the embassy has been emptied by all Americans, again because of the unclear <x2) security threats”. His heir, Tim Kern, has had to do some work a thousand miles away in Nairobi, Kenny.

The veteran CIA specialist says these are the products of the disinfectant. All these reports cost the CIA. One of its members, Tunizani Ali bin Homed, has been convicted of spying in Sudan last year and has been sentenced to 14 years in prison. Jahja Baviker, Mukhabarat's deputy chief, confirms that disinformations for secret foreign services constitute one of the charges against Homed.

P SE SUCCESS CRAY TA AUCLES SUDON FOR TERRORIST STREATING?

Sudan has been affected by these developments. However, the radical wing of government, led by philosopher Dr. Al-Turab has lost its ground to pragmatist moderates who want good reports with the West (in 1998) Al-Turabi is placed under arrest, where he is still standing. In February 1996 Kern sends the demands of America for Sudan to remove bin Laden, mainly because of his campaign against Saudis. Gutbi al-Mahdi, former Mukhabarat chief who then served as senior adviser to the Sudanese chairman, says Sudan has not objected in principle. The arguments he and his colleagues used were more practical: “We said: Here he is under control and we know everything about him. Here, in Sudan, he's under our supervision. ” So, when bin Laden left, al-Mahdi adds, “ai had no choice but to be completely radical”

bin Laden was deported in May 1996. Despite the evidence of Sudan's will for cooperation, the United States had no interest in seeing what they could learn from Sudan. Mahdi Ibrahim Muhamed, now minister of information, went to Washington as Sudan's ambassador in February 1996. Amerikophilia, who has been educated in Michigan and California, says: “I like the country. I like people. I went as ambassador for three years, with views that America is free, open to dialogue. What I found was a big surprise and disappointment” Muhammad spent three years trying to meet with US Secretary of State Suzen Rice. He also failed to meet Tony Lake and his heir, Sandy Berger, because their staff continued to accuse Sudan of sheltering terrorists. Muhammad begged officials to give specific statements, but they refused. I said: Give me information on any terrorist, any camp, and we'll take this job very seriously. The answer was: Your government knows. You should know. We don't want to expose our resources”.

Ambassador Muhamed made an open offer: The CIA and the FBI can send in joint investigative teams, which can move freely across the country. I kept saying: You go anywhere.” This has not been accepted.

In February 1997 the offer was repeated with a letter from Mayor Bashir to Clinton. Al-Bashir suggested the <x0 commission to investigate claims that the Sudan government trains or protects terrorists”, with “the freedom of movement, contacts and unconditional selection of alleged terrorist terrain”. Clinton never answered.

HOW WHICH WINS SIT SUDAN IN U.S.?

The idea appeared among the Sudanese that the way to convince America that they were serious in fighting terrorists was to offer American researchers access to Mukhabarat files for bin Laden, al-Qaeda and Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Frustrated in their efforts to invite America, they decided to hire the Pakistani-American millionaire, businessman and financial manager, Mansor Ijaz.

The Democratic Party's great Donator, Ijaz, had personal relations with Clinton, Berger, and Al Gorin. But he also feared the American refusal to engage in Islamic regimes, such as Sudan.

As an investor, Ijaz was interested in Sudan oil, but he also had “sens for injustice”, with the way the country was being treated. From July 1996 to August 1997, he has undertaken six trips to Cartum, meeting Dr. Al-Turabin, chairman al-Bashiri, leader of the Mukhabarat, Gutbi al-Mahdi, and other officials. He managed to convince them that it was worth trying to convince the US in Sudan's sincerity, in part by drawing America's attention with information about al-Qaeda. His initiatives produce the most ecstatic results with the letter of April 5, 1997, by the chairman al-Bashir, directed by Lly H. (Lee H. Hamilton, the post democrat of the Foreign Affairs Committee. It said: “We invite the FBI's anti-terrorism units and other official delegations that your government can think appropriate to come to Sudan and work with our Foreign Service Department in order to assess all the notes in our moods and help us resist the forces that your and our government want to contain”.

According to Ijazi, Hamilton sent the letter to Medellen Ollbwright and Sandy Berger, none of which answered.

Ijaz also wrote memorandums for Sandy Berger, and in a series of talks, he expressed exactly what the Sudanese offer meant. He told Berger that <x0fraza to evaluate the notes in our mood was a clear reference to bin Laden's notes. References to the forces we want to contain was a clear reference to prevent the spread of al-Qaeda”. Ijaz and his family have spent Christmas dinner at the White House with Clintons. But he couldn't shake American politics in Sudan.

P SE NUCLEA EXTRADO AVERSTER DO YOU doubt NIROB BOMIN?

Sudanese did not give up. Early in the fall of 1997, they benefited from another private mediator, Janet McCellingigott, who had worked with the White House under George H. W. Bush (George H. W. Bush). She assumed that the rational state head would eventually prevail. She was wrong about it. On February 5, 1998, a direct letter from Gutbi al-Mahdi of Mukhabarati is addressed to David Williams (David Williams), chief of the FBI Department for the Middle East and Africa. It wrote: “I would like to express my sincere will to start contacts and cooperation between our ministry and the FBI. I would like to use this opportunity to invite you with pleasure to visit our country. Otherwise, we can meet anywhere else”

18 days later, on February 23, 1998, Osama bin Laden issues his thrilling fats from Afghanistan, inviting all Muslims to kill Americans and Jews, adding that civilians must now be named as targets. McCelligot brought the letter to the end with his personal request: “I told them: You understand bin Laden lived there and they had files on the main people? Oh... The guys I had a job with said: I would give anything to go there, but they don't let us, thinking about the State Department. ”

David Williams didn't answer Al-Mahdi's letter for four months. “Unfortunately”, he writes on June 24th, “I am not currently in position to accept your gentle invitation. ”

Six months after that, the bin Laden al-Qaeda network managed to detonate two trucks at the American Embassy in Nairobi and Dar Es Salaam. They have become heaps of bloody ruins in which 224 people were lying dead.

A few days after the bombing, just as he first reported NBC in 1999, Sudan arrested two suspects who arrived in Cartum from Kenya. They had Pakistani passports and used the names of Sayid Naziri Abbas and Said Iscandar Sullivan. They reserved the American Embassy's footage of the possible future attacks. The material collected between 1991 and 1996 led Mukhabarat to believe that both people were members of al-Qaeda. Mukhabarati informed the FBI in Washington, offering their extradition. Without consulting The FBI, the U.S. State Department, responded to the bombing of the al-Shifa factory in Cartum, claiming based on even worse information that it was possessed by bin Laden and produced VX nerve gas. Actually, al-Shifa had nothing to do with bin Laden. She was taking medicine vaccines and contracting with the UN.

P SE CIA AND FBI DO YOU IN SUDAN?

US-Sudan relations then reached nadir. Makhubarati sent suspects “Abase” and “Sullivan” in Pakistan, where they just lost. Ambassador Muhammad left Washington. Shortly before his departure, Janet McCelligot, arranged the meeting at her house between him and senior FBI official. McCelligot says the FBI man expressed regret over what happened and says he hopes politicians will, in the meantime, allow his agency to investigate the Sudanan secret service.

A few months later, Mukhabarat's chief, Gutby al-Mahdi, invited McCelligott to Cartum. He gave her a hand-written card that is handed over to the FBI director Louis Freih. It linked the circumstances of the arrests of the two suspects and offered surrender, adding that Mukhabarat's files on al-Qaeda still await inspection. Through McCelligott, The FBI was suggesting meeting al-Mahdi in Europe. Before the meeting was completed, the State Department placed vetoes.

“We understood it as a irrational stance”, al-Mahbi says. We have extended our hands to someone who needed mutual benefits and this has been rejected... If (FBI) accepted my offer in February 1998, they could prevent the bombing. They had very little information at that time: they were shooting in the dark...”

Osama bin Laden was not named very important by the CIA and the FBI by the end of 1995. However, Mukhabarati had all the main registered players. Apart from bin Laden and al-Zawahir, it was Muhamed Ated, suspected to be the military commander of al-Qaeda, the man who appears to have orchestrated the 1998 bombings and, according to allegations of the 11 September attacks (Athef is suspected to have been killed in November in Afghanistan). Abu Ibrahim, the former chief executive of bin Laden, recalls seeing Atif at bin Laden's home in Cartum and “with Osama in Afghanistan, when he delivered messages on TV”.

PI SUDAN'S TERRORITS HE WAS T HAPPEN?

How significant would the files be for them? Sitting at the pool in Cartum, I asked the senior Egyptian secret service official, who worked closely with Mukhabarat and who asked not to be quoted by name. He says: "They knew all about them, where they came from. They had copies of their passports, their tickets; they knew where they went. Of course, that information would be very helpful. ”

During the New York trial, the four people convicted of the 1998 bombing, the court chief has heard a lot about the man named Fazul Abdullah Muhamed, who also figures on the most wanted list. He has organized the plot by making two trips to Nairobi in the spring of 1998 by Cartumi. If FBI officials accepted the offer made by al-Mahdi that February, they would know that as well. Mukhabarat, too, has kept records of another embassy bomber, Egyptian Saif al-Adel, who also appears on the most wanted list.

If the 1998 plot were thwarted, it would probably not be September 11th. In any case, Sudan had other information. Vadih al-Haji, former private secretary of bin Laden, who now suffers the life sentence following his sentence in New York for his role in shelling the embassy in 1998, has been registered and photographed in Sudan.

The other subject of Mukhabarat's files was Sudanese, Mahmud Mahmud Salim, a veteran of the Afghan war, who worked two years with bin Laden companies in Sudan. He secured connections with New York's suicide kidnapper. From 1995 to 1998, he has made frequent visits to Germany, where the Syrian businessman Mamun Darizanly has signed authorisation on his bank accounts. Darizanly is supposed to have provided electronic equipment for al-Qaeda. Both men went to the same Hamburg mosque as Muhamed Ata and Marvan al-Shehi, who led the two planes to the World Trade Center.

The message from Sudan was not adapted to the State Department and the CIA, so it was humiliated. That was until May 2000, when the Clinton administration responded from pressure from the US Secret Service and agreed to send the joint team FBI-CIA. Even then, her mission did not investigate Mukhabarat's files, only to prove whether Sudan supports terror. There was no “Campe training” or sanctuary for murderers, at last. Gutbi al-Mahdi, former Mukhabarat chief, says that weeks before 11 September, the American team finally wants to investigate Sudanese materials for al-Qaeda. Events prove that everything was late until then. /Telegraphy/