REL: The name of the new Russian office chief in Kosovo figures in a database linking it to Russian intelligence

In an office that has been operating almost quietly in Pristina for years, Russia appointed a new chief.

In August 2025, through a brief announcement, the United Nations Mission to Kosovo (UNMIK) announced that the then special representative of the UN secretary-general had hosted the new chief of the Russian Liaison Office in Pristina, Ilia Uvarov.

The meeting was described as “General and constructive execution”.

Beyond this formal announcement, Uvarov remained a little familiar to the public in Kosovo.

Even on the Kosovo Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Diaspora website, where foreign diplomatic missions in the country are listed, he still does not figure as head of this office. It continues to be listed by his predecessor, Andrei Shugurov.

Meanwhile, Uvarov's name, as appointed for Kosovo, is mentioned on the up-to-date list of foreign missions in Serbia, a practice related to the fact that Serbia considers Kosovo part of its territory, while states that do not recognise Kosovo's independence often manage diplomatic relations through Belgrade.

What puts Uvarov's name in a broader context is a database published by Molfar Intelligence Institute a Ukrainian organization that deals with analysis of open sources and, in some cases, even documents stemming from Russia.

On this database, Ilia (Ilya) Uvarov is described as “RT department officer (intelligence from Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR)”.

According to the organisation, the database is built on materials provided by an internal source at a technological company in Moscow and contains names of diplomats and intelligence workers.

Part of the data, according to her, has been verified through comparison to state records, but the organisation itself stresses that full confirmation of specific roles remains difficult.

Molfar Institute told the REL that the RT department “is linked to intelligence operations conducted by Russian territory and that often use diplomatic or institutional covers to establish contacts with foreign officials, businessmen and others”.

REL has not been able to contact Ilia Uvarov directly to take a stand on this data.

Russia's liaison office in Pristina did not answer questions sent to its official email address, nor did the Russian Embassy in Belgrade.

Similarly, the Kosovo Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Diaspora did not answer REL questions if there is information Uvar may be linked to Russian intelligence.

Who's Uvarov?

Uvarov's diplomatic career, believed to have started since 2000, includes several positions in different countries.

In official documents, it first appears in 2011 as part of Russian diplomatic staff in the United States.

However, the most visible information on his activity is linked to the diplomatic mission in Moldova.

There he served as consul at the Russian Embassy in Moldova.

The important role was also in the structure of the Moldovan breakaway territory ʹ mainly Russian - speaking and prorus called Transnitri, which Moldova considers part of it.

There is the Joint Control Commission, which oversees the security zone in Transnistria and consists of representatives of Russia, Moldova and Transnistria.

In 2017, Uvarov was elected co-chairman of this commission as Russia's representative. He held that position until 2019.

The commission is responsible for monitoring the security zone along the Dniester (Nistru) River since the 1992 war.

According to data that Moldova's Radio Free Europe Service gathered, in November 2017, Uvarov supported reopening a bridge over Dniester, despite the opposition of the separatist Transnistria administration.

The bridge was rebuilt with funds from the European Union.

According to a former Moldova Government official, Uvarov has later returned to Moscow precisely because he supported the reopening of the bridge and keeping it open.

In addition, according to the media in the Transnistria region, Uvarov worked earlier in other former Soviet countries as well as in the United States.

What happens when an intelligence official acts under diplomatic cover?

International security experts say that using diplomatic cover for intelligence activities is a known practice, but that in Russia's case it is the most widespread and intensive “.

There are almost no embassys in the world that do not have a certain intelligence role”, says Mark Galeotti, British professor at University College London (UCL) and expert on Transnational Crime and Russian Security Affairs.

He points out that, often, it is difficult to make the distinction between a diplomat and an intelligence officer, but that a career can give indicators.

“If a diplomat has a large number of positions abroad, it can sometimes provide indicators for a role in intelligence”, he tells Radio Free Europe.

According to Galeott, a mission like the one in Kosovo “seems to be a perfect base for intelligence officers, who could then travel across the region”.

He adds that the importance of this mission relates to the wider geopolitical context.

The “matters what happens in Kosovo. Kosovo has relatively good relations with the West... it has nothing to do with Kosovo itself. It concerns the use of Kosovo as a basis, to see what can be revealed about what NATO and other Western countries are doing and thinking”, Galletti says.

It also warns of changes in the way Russian services operate after the expulsion of hundreds of diplomats from Europe after Russia's war against Ukraine began in 2022.

“They're relying more and more on mediators... people recruited to perform certain tasks, often without knowing who they're working on, he says.

In the same line, British expert for Russia Keir Giles says the practice of using intelligence officials under diplomatic coverage is widespread globally, but that Russia stands out for its scale.

Many countries place intelligence officers under diplomatic cover... but in Russia's case, a large percentage of diplomats are actually intelligence officers”, he says of Radio Free Europe.

He adds that countries face a dilemma when they identify these people: they expel or keep watch.

There are certain circumstances in which local counterintelligence agencies will be aware of the identity of an intelligence officer under diplomatic cover, but will decide not to act against him beyond monitoring his” activities, Giles says.

According to him, in cases like Kosovo, where institutional control over this diplomatic mission is limited, the situation becomes even more complex.

When a country doesn't control who enters its territory... it represents a potential vulnerability of”, he says.

Meanwhile, in Kosovo's ongoing polls, for most people, Russia continues to be seen as a risk factor for the country.

A 2024 report by the Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS), which analyses the Russian foreign policy turquoise against Kosovo, says Moscow sees Kosovo simultaneously as a symbol of Western intervention, as a security issue for Serbia and as precedent in international law.

“In essence, Russia's position on Kosovo reflects its geopolitical rivalry with the West, which under the leadership of president [Vladimir] Putin has significantly deepened, especially through efforts to strengthen the impact in the Western Balkans, standing in solidarity with Serbia”, it said in that report.

Even the “Annual Prevention of Threats 2026”, published by the U.S. National Intelligence Director's Office last week, estimated that Russia “promoted instability between Serbia, which it favours, and Kosovo”, but also “supports the division of the Serbian entity, Republika Srpka, from Bosnia and Herzegovina<5>.

What does the Russian Office in Kosovo do?

In Kosovo, Uvarov heads a mission that functions in an unusual diplomatic framework.

Russia's Liaison Office was established in 2005, at the time Kosovo was administered by the UN.

It functions under the UNMIK umbrella and does not undergo direct control of Kosovo institutions.

Its staff does not need visas, has access and access without restrictions, and enjoys immunity from criminal, civilian and administrative jurisdiction.

Even its facilities are immune to local authorities.

This makes this mission one of the least transparent in Kosovo.

For years, the activities of this office have been largely invisible to the public. The little information available is mainly related to meetings with international missions.

However, in 2021, Kosovo authorities declared “grata” and expelled two Russian diplomats associated with this office, saying they had “censed national security and constitutional order”.

According to unofficial information from Radio Free Europe, representatives of the Russia Office in Kosovo maintain ties with the Serbian Orthodox Church.

The Serbian Orthodox Church itself says its representatives in Kosovo have regular contacts with international missions, such as KFOR, the UN, the OSCE, the EU and Quint countries, but that these contacts relate to security issues, daily life and the functioning of church institutions, not politics.

As for Russia's Liaison Office in Pristina, the Church told REL that, in recent years, there have been no formal visits, but only repeated visits of its staff to religious objects, along with family members, primarily for services and religious visits.

Kosovo's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Diaspora did not answer REL questions even if there is communication with this office and its diplomats, nor with how this diplomatic mission functions.

Of the exact role of this office in Kosovo, UNMIK did not speak either.

In a response to Radio Free Europe, the UN said that “does not comment on the composition or activities of diplomatic missions of member states”. /REL