Chocolate: The court does not deny the logic used by the president, correcting him

He said the Court essentially acknowledges that the 30-day term is binding and that its disrespect has consequences. But it explains that this consequence is not directly activated through this deadline, but through Article 82, that is, through the 60-day deadline and distribution ʹex transition.

On the other hand, he said that the court permanently shuts down “ ” between 30 and 60 days, adding that they are not two deadlines used separately, but a single mechanism.

He also said that the Court does not deny the logic the president used, corrected him as he did.

Full Facebook mailing:

The Constitutional Court's judgment today reaffirmed some principles for constitutional deadlines, especially in relation to the president's election. Not why they were not understood as such before, but because, once again, we tried for constitutional provisions to be misused for political reasoning.

First, the matter of the decree. I believe that the reason why the Court did not consider it an unconstitutional act, but only as a law-free decision, is directly linked to the logic of the deadlines. The court essentially acknowledges that the 30-day term is binding and that its disrespect has consequences. But it explains that this consequence is not directly activated through this deadline, but through Article 82, that is, through the 60-day deadline and distribution ʹex framework. So we have no denial of the logic that President Osmani used, but the correction of the way it was implemented.

Second, and this is the main point, the Court finally shuts down “dilem” between 30 and 60 days. They are not two deadlines used separately, but a single mechanism. The 60-day deadline is under way on the 30-day deadline. That means the procedure should start much earlier. The last day of the 30-day deadline cannot be expected, the procedure is said to have been launched and then another 60 days required. Simply put, the total is 60 days, where the last 30 days are closed zone that cannot be exceeded.

Third, the Court sets a clear standard. The constitutional time does not begin when the Parliament decides to act, but when it is able to act. So even in this case there are not 60 new days, but only remaining time from a deadline that was earlier limited by the fact that there was no constitutional framework in a period that would enable full exploitation of the constitutional deadline.

In the end, this is a decision that also balances the situation and buys time for institutions to complete the process. Moreover, responsibility remains with the institutions and parliamentary parties to develop the constitutional processes in time, not to adapt them according to political circumstances.