Constitutional Court Gives IKD Right to Independent Media Commission

Otherwise, the Kosovo Institute for Justice (IKD), represented by executive director Ehat Miftaraj, on January 29th 2025, had exercised indictments against the Independent Media Commission (KPM) regarding the change of Labour Order and the election of the new chairman, reports the “Betim for Justice“.

Through this indictment, the IKD has called for the declaration of lawlessness and the abolition of paragraph 2 of Article 3 of the Independent Media Commission's Labour Adjust, which the paragraph was added to this regulation in the KPM meeting held on January 17th. Also, The IKD required that the decision to elect the KPM chairman, taken at that same meeting, after completing the change of regulation, be declared illegal.

Otherwise, as for changing regulations, The KPM at that meeting has added a paragraph (2) to Article 3 through which the election of the new KPM chairman was defeated, while still in the exercise of KPM chairmanship, whose mandate expired on January 21st 2025.

Through the June 10th 2025 ruling, the Supreme Court had approved the IKD's application to the KPM, declaring it illegal and abolishing the change of KPM's Labour Rule.

While, in the Pristina Constitutional Court's decision of December 17th, 2025, it is said that after the Court carefully examined the subject papers, the prosecution's claims, objections to the indicted side, the evidence administered during the main review, as well as the Supreme re-advised, assessed that the plaintiff's indictment is based and that the KPM's decision to elect KPM chairman is illegal and should be declared illegal.

Meanwhile, the KPM at the Constitutional Court has contested the June 10th 2025 act of the Supreme Court of Kosovo, where it had demanded that the KPM not act in accordance with the Constitution and confirm its organisational and functional independence as an independent constitutional institution.

Thus, the subject of the case at the Constitutional Court has been the assessment of the constitutionality of this Supreme Court act, where the KPM had claimed the same was violated of its fundamental rights and freedoms, namely, articles 31 [Rights for Justice and Freest] and 141 [Independent Media Commission] of the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo.

Among other things, the KPM had claimed that the KPM's rule of work had been changed in order for its chairman to be voted a month earlier, provided the mandate of the elected chairman starts after the end of the current chairman's term, in accordance with the practice of the Constitutional Court.

In this context, according to the KPM, the Supreme Court “, in the absence of a regular insistence on revising its decisions (because under the Law on Administrastration Conflicts for Charges Against Normless Acts decides as the first and only degree) has arbitrarily decided on a sensitive issue which essentially affects the constitutional status of the KP, praising that the KPM should ask outside subjects how and when it can choose its chairman<1>

And so, The KKP has claimed that the Supreme Court had failed to take into account the functional independence of this institution and that it had bypassed Article 6 and Article 10, paragraph 4 of the KPM Law, which according to it guarantees independence in the Commission's work and activities.

According to the KPM, these provisions forbid the Commission to request or accept instructions from abroad regarding its activities and duties.

The KPM had also stressed that reforming the work is an internal act, which regulates exclusively the mode of internal functioning of KPM members and the Executive Office.

According to her, this regulation is not the normative act that affects the rights, obligations and interests of the general public or media subjects licensed by the KPM.

The KPM had also rejected the Supreme Council's stance that this regulation should be subject to public consultation.

According to its claims, the publication of the Labour Order for Public Consultation, to receive suggestions regarding the time when the KPM could vote on the mayor, would be contrary to the nature of this act as an internal act.

The KPM had stressed that domestic regulations, with particular emphasis on regulating KPM employment, have never been made available for public consultation since the KPM law entered into force in 2012.

And so, The KPM had claimed that the Supreme Court had not justified violating public interest by this regulation, saying such a requirement was legal.

In demand, The KKPM had asked the Constitutional Court to annul the Supreme Court, establish that the KPM had acted in accordance with the Constitution and to confirm its organisational and functional independence as an independent constitutional institution.

In dealing with KPM allegations of violations of Article 31 of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court has noted that the pre-declaror of the motion had claimed that the Supreme Court's act had not argued and argued that the violation of public interest by an internal act, which, according to the KPM, was a legal requirement for the prosecution of the indictment's abolition of the norm legal act.

And so, The KPM had claimed that the Supreme Court, as the first and single-scale ruling, had arbitraryly interpreted material right when it rejected Article 2 of the KPM's work regulation.

According to the decision, the KPM had stressed that, in this case, the example of the Constitutional Court's Labour Order was followed, and that this issue, according to her, affected the constitutional status of the KPM, assessing that the KPM should ask outside subjects how and when it can elect its chairman.

The Constitutional Court ruling says that initially the court stresses that based on the ECHR judicial practice and the court's judicial practice, it allows the latter to issue unacceptable requests for reasons associated with the merits of a case.

“More precisely, based on this rule, the Court can issue an unacceptable request based on and after assessing its merits, respectively, if the same estimates that keeping the demand is clearly unsubstantiated on constitutional grounds, as specified in paragraph (2) of the 34th rule of the work rule”, it is said further on that decision.

The Constitutional Court has estimated that KPM claims in this part are essentially linked to the claim that the Supreme Court has arbitraryly interpreted material right, respectively, the Law for the KPM.

While, in terms of claims that the Supreme Court has arbitraryly interpreted material right, the Law for KPM, respectively, the ruling is said to have addressed in light of its standards of judicial practice and that of the European Court for Human Rights.

According to the Constitutional Court's ruling, the GEDNJ has consistently stressed that, looked at in general, it is not its duty to address the actual or legal errors of a local court, unless, in the extent that those mistakes are evident and constitute violations of the rights and freedoms protected with KEDNJ.

“, however, as a rule, the ECHR cannot question the findings and findings of local courts, among other things, regarding the interpretation and application of domestic law: First, local courts are obliged to solve problems related to the interpretation of local legislation...”. The Constitutional Court ruling says that mentions concrete cases of the GEDNJ.

Also, the Constitutional Court has considered that the Supreme Court has given answers to KPM claims, elaboring material rights and procedures applicable in the concrete case.

Furthermore, the Constitutional Court's ruling says that by the argument of the Supreme Court's conclusion, in light of the concrete circumstances, we are not even dealing with the “alyx1> and neither with the “arbitrary collusions” or “ex5> on the part of the Supreme Court.

It is also said that the subject's records indicate that the presurgeon had filed answers in the indictment and at different stages of procedure had given him the opportunity to present arguments and evidence that seemed relevant to him in his case.

“Consequently, the Court concludes that presumption claims for the lack of fair and impartial judgment are claims that fall in the category of the fourth “ ” and, as such, these claims are clearly unfounded on constitutional grounds, as set out in paragraph 2 of the 34 of the work rule”, further stated in the Constitutional decision.

Meanwhile, in terms of KPM claims for violations of its organisational and functional independence, the Constitutional Court has concluded that there are clearly unfounded claims on constitutional basis, due to the visible or visible <x0m euros of violations”.