Janusz Bugajski: Vuciqi warned secret Kosovo invasion by Serbian troops

According to him, this warning was given, linking the Kosovo issue with that of the Karabakh region, numerous parts of which were already taken from Azerbaijan in an agreement enabled by Russia.

However, he believes the Kosovo case is not similar to that of Nagorno-Karabakh.

Bugayski's Complete Writing, published in DIA

Regaining the Karabakh region by the Armenian army of Azerbaijan has opened the way for a storm of anger and ambition in Europe's birth.

In the Western Balkans, this could renew the Serbian government's aspirations to regain Kosovo, while in Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova this could consolidate the conviction that territories currently occupied by Russia will eventually be regained.

Despite Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic's covert warning that Kosovo can again be conquered by Serb troops, the Kosovo case is less similar to Karabakh's. Instead of merely rejecting Vucic's threats and comparisons, such statements need careful consideration if Karabac's teachings are understood.

Both Kosovo and Karabaku were autonomous regions within the republics, respectively, Serbia and Azerbaijan, which were dependent on the largest state structures of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. When these disintegrated, numerous and fundamental differences arose between the two regions, if taken for the nature of the war and the international response.

Armenian forces expelled or displaced more than 800,000 space civilians from Karabaku and neighbouring regions and formed a military alliance with Russia to maintain occupied territories. Quite the opposite has occurred in Kosovo, where, during the collapse of Yugoslavia, Serbian government forces expelled or displaced nearly a million of the Albanian majority of the population and claimed that the territory was Serbia. A government that expels and kills an ethnic group in a certain region, in which they are majority, damages its legitimacy to control that people or their territory.

Just as important is that a NATO-led international force intervened in Kosovo to prevent further mass killings and deportations and ended Belgrade's oppressive control. Kosovo's independence and citizenship were recognised by over a hundred countries, including all NATO members, except for four (states). The country has established closely monitored democratic institutions by international institutions and is taking first steps towards EU accession. In contrast with Karabakh, which no country has recognised as an independent state, not even Armenia or Russia, and no international peacekeeping force was allowed in.

The three main lessons stemming from Karabakh's war can be implemented more productively in territories learned from Moscow from Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine: the status quo is temporary, Russian peacekeepers are harmful, and agreements on final status are essential.

A quo status does not last indefinitely, especially if two protagonists insist on diametrically opposed solutions. The term <x0) Rather, these are unresolved conflicts, negotiations for which are deliberately blocked or diverted by either side, and international mediation is weak or spored. Negotiations on the Transnistria region of Moldova, Donbas, Ukraine, Abkazia, and South Ossetia of Georgia, as well as on the Karabakh of Azerbaijan, were not resolved after wars and initial occupations, thus boosting prospects for rerun.

A second fundamental lesson is that Russian peacekeepers deeply weaken the host state. They not only prevent control over territories from the weakened capital, but also are used to legitimise separatist groupings, create parallel authorities, separate state institutions, exert pressure on the central government and block the country's progress towards EU and NATO membership. Russian forces in Moldova's Transnistria region are a real example. Moscow has calculated that the deployment of its forces in Karabakh will provide a greater impact on limiting Azerbaijan's western aspirations while retaining its dominance over Armenia.

A third lesson from Karabaku is that territories divided during the wars seek international legitimacy regarding their final status in order to ensure their independence and security. Kosovo is the clearest example of a relatively fast road from territorial division to widely recognised citizenship, beyond Serbia's controversy. Although the Kremlin has tried to generate a similar outcome in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, only six countries, including Russia itself, have recognised them as independent; they are excluded from international organisations; and Georgia is determined to recover. In addition, the complete annexation of the Ukraine Crime Peninsula by Russia is not internationally recognised as legitimate.

Another lesson in the European arena is that the continued engagement of the EU and the US is more likely to resolve the conflict and provide lasting security. On the contrary, the Kremlin estimates that its mediation will advance its strategic ambitions by creating frozen “states” that cannot progress towards international institutions. Although Azerbaijan has regained its territory through war, it may become more dependent on the Kremlin. Moscow remains the main mediator between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and Russian peacekeepers will now patrol Karabakh's restored region indefinitely.