The Guardian: Watch out for the Kamameleons as Vucinac of Orban

Two weeks before receiving the last victory in the election, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban travelled to the Serbian town of Subotica to meet with his close friend, Serbian President Aleksandar Vuciq. Outside the Balkans, there are very few people who attach importance to the strong friendship between these two characters, but avoiding something like that can be dangerous. If you look at them carefully, this pair tells a lot about the link between political intrigues, nationalism, and the success of the demagogues in modern Europe.

Orban and Vuciqi like each other because they have a lot in common, even though one has made the EU an enemy by being part of it, while the other stays out, but with the goal of joining. They are more or less of the same generation; the generation that entered politics in turbulent times, after the fall of the communist bloc. Both attract nationalist feelings, but at the same time try not to sever ties with key EU actors, especially Germany. And leading strongly, without showing interest in balances, liberal democracy or free press, broadcasts TopChannel.

But the most surprising thing that also tells a lot about this newly-made phase in European politics is how Orban and Vuciqi have managed to rerun a spectacular image of themselves in recent years. Their recipe for survival and being well placed in political battles is the fact of being a chameleon. They fill state - controlled televisions full of ideology, but they themselves are not loyal to any faith. Their slogans are just costumes that are changed on occasion when they were more convenient. Their power stems from their ability to perceive where public opinion will be directed and how they can make good use of it.

Look at their careers. Orban passed by representatives of the youth of democratic transition in the late 1980s to pioneer the nationalist nightmares that Europe is experiencing today. Vuciq has been a staunch fan of the bloody Balkan butchers in the 1990s, enough to join Slobodan Milosevic's propaganda staff as minister of Information. But by the end of 2010, it suddenly turned into a pro-European that seemed reasonable. He had well understood that the dreams of Great Serbia had already fallen, that nationalist sentiment had been consumed and defeated.

Yes, like Orban, he noted that the temptation to Brussels was beginning to fall, so he decided that the time had come to direct politics elsewhere. Vuchie saw a good chance to turn. He kept the country officially linked to EU integration, while Orban chose to move to the other side. They look opposite, but motivation is the same - providing for power. Machiaveline maneuvers do not rarely occur in politics. Orban and Vucinqi know how to do well. But the impact of these changes on Europe's future is important, and if there are other possibilities, perhaps otherwise.

These two people are important. Hungary's Orban is a magnet for the far right in other parts of the continent. Serbia has the key to stability in the Balkans, a fragile but significant area for Europe's strategic security, which Winston Churchill once said “produces more stories than it can consume”.

In his book “Europe, after War”, historian Tony Judt does not value dissident intellectuals as significant to consolidate Central Europe after the 1989 revolutions. He notes that the most dangerous is something else, the fact that former senior officials of the ruling parties were being transformed, within a few months, by the servile of nomenclature to the fervent advocate of pluralism.

“The environment depends on the balance of alliances. ”, he wrote. Key words became the “market economy”, “democratisation” and “civil society” (or Europe, which included all three). Orban himself has experienced this. Things in Yugoslavia were different from those in Hungary because there were different populations, mixed ethnicity. Nationalism remained with Milosevic as the only way to retain power. And Vuchy became part of that story.

What about today? It happened in Belgrade shortly after Orban and Vuciqi had met in Subotica. Conversations between politicians and civil society activists were about intense feelings that were again being sparked for Kosovo. Speculations were many. It was discussed whether Vuciqi would choose to exploit tensions in the region, or turn himself into an ultranationalist seeking to capture territories. This could be his way to compensate for the loss of personal legitimacy if they did not materialise their goals of joining the EU.

Interestingly, there were also comments on Orban's interest in the Hungarian minority in Serbia, Vojvodina, where the town of Subotica is located. Many residents in Vojvodina have double citizenship, so they also voted in Hungary for the last elections. The most pessimistic thoughts I heard were that Orban and Vuciqi would try to change borders, pleasing Hungary for the Trianon deal in 1920; and Serbia with its obsession with Kosovo. Despite current democracy contraction talks, the future crisis for Europe could be linked to ethnic and territorial frustrations, however now seems like a distant opportunity.

The EU has only one tool to prevent these scenarios: joining and protecting principles using soft power, with further pressure and temptation. He must act now and not allow the exploiters to sink into their darkest temptations. Remember, these are chameleons, adapting to all circumstances. Just as they changed colors before, they can change them now. The question is how to push.

He wrote: Natalie Nougayrède, opinionist on “The Guardian”