ZPS file: How did the Intelligence and Police Service work in the KLA and Kosovo's Interim Government?

The prosecution claims that from the founding of The KLA had identified the need for intelligence and that during the spring of 1998, different people were actively being loaded with information collection. In addition, communiqués are said to expressly acknowledge the existence of an intelligence function, reports the “Justice Trust “.

During that year, the Intelligence Directorate was reportedly founded under the direction of Wessel, who during August 1998 claimed to oversee training for approximately 20 people in this area who would then form the core of service.

The prosecution says that Wessel's position was reconfirmed by the General Staff in November 1998 during the restructuring.

The file also mentions the intelligence services regulation allegedly distributed into operational areas, which assigned the discovery of important persons to the enemy inside or abroad, and gave powers for their arrest or murder.

For Wessel, the prosecution says he was present on the ground in several areas during 1998 with the aim of conducting investigations and handling complaints.

Speaking of the Drenica Zone, the prosecution says it was an intelligence unit composed of Sabit Geci and Ismet Haja who reported directly to Kadri Wessel.

For Gecin, the prosecution says it continued this role even in 1999 in Albania during which period, according to them, participated in other crimes.

The prosecution claims that within areas, intelligence reports were regularly accepted and compiled by the area-level intelligence chief, who was then sent to the area commander as well as to the General Staff.

The prosecution claims that under the rules, the Zone's commander had the responsibility to forward intelligence information to the Intelligence Directorate. However, it is said that in practice, direct reporting by intelligence personnel to the General Staff also occurred, especially on sensitive issues such as counterintelligence.

In addition, it is said that such parallel reporting was particularly common in the Pacific Zone, where for a certain period, the Commander of the Zone was a professional military that zone-level intelligence personnel considered a person who “prevented” their work.

While, at the level of the General Staff, the prosecution says the Intelligence Directorate reported to the Commander General (or, in case, Deputy Commander) and Chief of Staff. However, as in other levels of the reporting system, intelligence reports were repeatedly said to bypass Bislem Office as Chief of Staff and to appear exclusively to the Commander.

As for the tasks and responsibilities of this structure, according to the Prosecutor, they were to collect information on the movements of enemy forces, identify “co-workers” inside and outside the KLA and undertake concrete “actions in the service of the liberation war”.

It is emphasized that, in accordance with relevant regulations, KLA intelligence services co-operated closely and supported by military police and special units in carrying out their duties.

While, during 1998 when Wessel was abroad, the prosecution says Ferat Shala was located near the General Staff and exercised intelligence functions.

It is also said that in late January 1999, before traveling to Rambouillet, Wessel brought Mensur Kasum to the General Staff, where he was assigned to assist the Directorate of Intelligence Operations during Wessel's absence.

After his return to Kosovo, Wessel was reportedly back active on the ground, including in issues related to bans.

While, in late March 1999, the prosecution stresses that Wessel was appointed by Thaci to the Interim Government at the head of the Kosovo Intelligence Service (SHIK), which reported directly to Thaci.

At that time, an intelligence department was also established within the Ministry of Defence at the Interim Government under the direction of Abdullah Versisza.

Thus, the prosecution explains that the G2 had remained the term that formally referred to the Directorate of Intelligence within the KLA General Staff, the ZKZ was referring to Zone or KLA headquarters intelligence services, while SHIK referred to the state or civil intelligence body established under the Kosovo Interim Government.

When SHIK was formed, the prosecution claims G-2 inside U The CK continued to function parallelly under the leadership of Mensur Kasumi and then Fadil Kodra.

“Even though V ESELI has claimed that following his appointment as SHIK leader he no longer had any role in the KLA General Staff, in practice KLA and in accordance with his continued authority as a leading KLA figure/ QPK, regardless of any formal role, he continued to appear and be perceived in this quality, as well as to act as such, as other SHIK members. In fact, there was a considerable overlap or transfer of personnel between the two organizations, where the V ESEL confirmed that the initial group of KLA members who were subjected to intelligence training in 1998 then continued to form “Heart” of SHIC”, the prosecution's final file said.

By June 1999, according to the Prosecutor, SHIK consisted of nearly 30 people, and Wessel's deputy was Ilmi Recica, who was engaged as intelligence chief in the Nerodime Zone.

In addition, as director General at SHIK, the prosecution claims it was Latif Gashi, who had previously been intelligence chief in the Lappin Zone.

In addition, SHIK reportedly had four thematic directors, which Ferat Shala was one of Wessel's closest associates.

The prosecution claims that Wessel personally supervised SHIK recruiting and potential members were subjected to a careful process of verification.

“SHIK was a closely connected organisation where the V ESEL knew all the members who reported to him and with whom he had regular contact” are now said in the Prosecution file.

The prosecution claims that after his appointment as SHIK leader, Wessel, among other things, held meetings with international representatives and participated in negotiations on demilitarisation, as well as kept in touch with intelligence agencies of other states.

Furthermore, it is said that during and in the following months of the indictment period, SHIK members verified public employees, collected information and monitored the activities of RFJ forces and the security situation, and investigated, questioned, abused and otherwise targeted opponents.

The “actually, seized documents from SHIK headquarters in Pristina in 2002, when the V ESELI and Latif GASI held offices there, further confirm the degree of continuity between KLA and SHIK intelligence services, as well as the continued focus of SHI's on anti-optors”, the prosecution's file said.

On the other hand, it is stressed that even after the Kosovo Interim Government was disbanded, SHIK continued operating until 2008 when the Kosovo Intelligence Agency (AKI) was established.

The role of Military Police and the Ministry of Public Order, according to Prosecutor's claims

As for the Military Police, it was reportedly created under the supervision and direction of the General Staff.

This facility, according to the Prosecution, along with the judicial sector and the Military Court and later the Ministry of Public Order (MRP), played a role in efforts to justify kidnappings and bans before international representatives under the covering of legitimacy and procedural guarantees.

The prosecution claims KLA police and the MRP were a key tool for implementing the common criminal goal through responsible crimes.

On November 12th 1998, the General Staff reportedly appointed Fatmir Limaj as director of the Military Police Directorate, who was also an MPK member and a friend of Selimi.

According to the prosecution, the Military Police Directorate was also based in Ladrovc, while Military Police held at the same location a detention centre of the General Staff destined for soldiers and civilians charged with serious criminal acts.

The Tuja, said to have been dependent on the Directorate of Military Police, and reported directly or through the commanders of the Limaj and the Directorate of Military Police.

In its final file, the Prosecutorate points out that the Military Police Directorate was responsible for the detention centers, order and internal discipline, appointments, logistics of the Military Police -- including uniforms, distinguishing marks, weapons, masks and radio connections; as well as training, inspection and oversight of the development of the Military Police of the Zones, as well as the extraction of regulations and clarifications.

Explaining the role of Limaj and the Military Police, the prosecution cites a meeting allegedly to have taken place on March 9th 1999 with an OSCE representative, who at this meeting as representative of the General Staff, reportedly refused to release a detained and later killed in Kletchka.

As for the actions of the Military Police, the prosecution claims that on December 2nd and 3rd 1998, in documents signed by Krasniqi, the General Staff instructed the Zone Commands to issue orders that military police “arrest those who, showing loyalty to the occupants, have worn the Serbian police uniform”, stressing that the same would be done the future “for any citizen involved in any police force other than KLA <x>.

Following these orders, police and intelligence services in the Operative Zone reportedly questioned, stopped, mistreated and killed suspected members of local police, who were not part of the Serbian armed forces, under suspicion of being spies and collaborators.

While, in the file, it is said that at the end of March 1999, Thaci appointed Selimi as minister of Public Order and since April, he participated in the arrest, ban, mistreatment and release of those detained in Klechka, had military police units available and was photographed in black uniform, including in the days following the Kumanovo Agreement.

The prosecution cites a photograph allegedly fired on June 16, 1999, in which Selimi is in black uniform, accompanied by Avdi Raci, Haxhi Shala and Sabit Shala in Malisheva.

On the other hand, it is said that around this time, Kosovapress published Communications No. 1 of the Ministry of Public Order (MRP), where it was announced that the return of the population would be organised and accompanied by the KLA Military Police, considered the base of the upcoming Kosovo police. Public order forces would also be said to work on restoring order and calm.

According to the Prosecutor's File, this police force consisted mainly of current members and former members of the KLA Military Police. Following the withdrawal of Serbian forces in June 1999, KLA/MRP police soon took over police duties, often using former Serbian police stations and acting without regular legal procedures.

On the other hand, Rexhepi was said to be running a structure involving various deputy minister, commanders, directors, commissions and police commands of the districts. He reportedly held meetings for police organisation and sought financial means for its operation.

The prosecution claims that numerous documents were seized from Selimi showing the functioning of the KLA/MRP police, including police reports from Pristina, Gjilan and Prizren, financial and personnel documents, organisational schemes, registration forms, ID cards and photos of police members.

The prosecution's claim is that documents show that MRP personnel carried out various tasks on the ground, such as the preservation of facilities and security; patrols; receiving statements from different persons.

Also reportedly, documents in the secuested documents include some who, according to the indictment, relate to alleged crimes, including Ilir Krasniqi (former MUP building in Prizren), Xhevat Krasniqi (Llapushik), Selim Krasniqi (Drenoc), Hajdar Hodza (Klech), Shaqir Shaqirin (Gyqilan), Xhedin Gashi (Cahanka), Nuredin Ibisin (Lpishey), and Lahimym Branan (Claca), who appear at various MR structures.

During the summer and early autumn of 1999, police units reported directly to the Ministry of Public Order on investigations, arrests and interrogations. While, it has stressed that international representatives raised concerns before Hashim Thaci, Rexhep Selimi and other KLA leaders over the arrests and illegal detentions. Even though Selimi had pledged respect for the deilitarisation agreement in August 1999, according to the Prosecutor's Office, police units on the ground continued their activities and reported KFOR movements, including raids on detention sites.