Maliqi: Agreement in Kosovo's favour, Washington, Brussels partner

Kosovo and Serbia signed a document pledging normalisation of economic reports. Again, the next agreement was said to be mutual recognition. A good basis for a final with Serbia has been built, or is it still unrealistic to expect recognition of Kosovo by the Serbian side?

Shkelzen Maliqi: I have the impression that the issue of recognition of Kosovo by Serbia is being misunderstood. Especially when <x0) mutual recognition” is being said. Serbia does not suffer at all for recognising Kosovo, it is now a republic with international recognition, a UN member. Kosovo too needed recognition of Serbia if it were in the UN. Some say the independence declaration has been legitimised with the JND verdict. Yes, it is only that the decisions of this Court are recommendation - not binding. That's why Serbia, even though there's pressures, doesn't hurry. Her behaviour is like the owner of old taps, which I know is no longer committed to Kosovo, but she can tell Greenie “cut mutual recognition agreement” And it was removed, they threw the matter at the EU, so Brussels can take care of the political final. But can the EU be able with its ambition and neutrality towards Kosovo status? Borel and Lajcak Vucinqi again says no to recognition, as long as the EU does not speak in a voice. Before asking Serbia to recognise Kosovo, The EU must convince its five members who do not recognise Kosovo...

However... VVA warnings of knives on Kosovo maps proved incorrect and came Israel's recognition. Granted, something the Serbs won in the final agreement, blocking Kosovo for a year on the road to membership, discussing Wajan, and introducing the Balkan Schengen point, this idea of Edi Rama. Actually, who won the most at this meeting?

Maliqi: If achieved, the benefits will be largely economic, yet mutual, that to some extent could be measured by earned dollars, which are potentially proportional. But, in terms of political benefits, each step forward in normalising reports that facilitate the achievement of the final agreement leads to Kosovo's favour. It's true that we've actually accepted the certificate for membership in international organizations, but it's also likely that in the inside there's a real possibility of any membership, where we've long been blocked by the objective inability to membership, for example. Because of voting rules, where Kosovo must secure 2/3 of the vote, while opponents need 1/3.

Meanwhile, I think Balkan Schengen is an important initiative that paves an alternative way for recognition. It is not the original idea of Edi Rama, he was only the most vocal promoter among Albanians, stated that the project stemming from the Berlin Process. Interestingly, in Kosovo I was rejected as a Serbian-Great project, while in Serbia they said it led to the creation of Greater Albania! The truth is that this Balkan Schengen “combines the two nations that live, not within a state, but within an open-border economic structure and the common market, according to the EU model. The priority of this initiative is that the creation of Balkan Schengen assumes that Kosovo should be an equal state, otherwise it does not become at all.

Avdullah Hoti seemed to mark the first, great success in his political career. Does this agreement guarantee the continuation of the government mandate and the removal of any dilemmas on who the new LDK chief will be?

Maliqi: Reports on our political scene are delicate, we saw that even in Washington a little bit of coalition collapse. But the point was that it was clearly seen: There were no knives on the map in the White House. Despite Kurt's criticism that the deal is harmful, relations with the US are seen to have been repaired, and this will affect the two prime ministers who emerged from the Government of Hope to be assessed differently: Kurt will be with a minus for the unreasonable fears and even further without US support, while Hoti will have plus as Wilson's partner and Brussels. Granted, real impact and processes should be seen as well as the epilogue of American elections. But the tendency now to play in the divisions between Trump and Biden will not work, the US's ruling towards Kosovo is bipartisan,

What are the chances that even this agreement will affect the reduction of tensions on the domestic political scene, especially when the new president's voting day arrives whether Thaci completes the regular mandate or resigns because of the Special Act?

Maliqi: In Kosovo since 2014, we have behind us various crises and tensions, even a time of even violent LVV actions and protests and militants of several other parties, but that did not bring about violations of order and security. Even the initial process of investigating and interviewing the Special Court, however traumatic, has no impact on what they thought. Humans are disappointed but not to the critical extent that it would cause even greater divisions. I think that the schematic division in which the LVV insisted is failing, for the opposition and old policy as an absolutely corrupt and failed casssist, from the hopeful new policy.

I think even the election of the new president, whenever it happens, won't be trouble, except the usual. There will be a candidate from the current legislature, or go to the polls. And in the election, I believe there will be new lines and surprises. The general trend in parties is to penetrate the new generation of politicians that bring new minds and approaches, and this trend may have to all, including LVV, that in the upcoming elections, you see yourself as the absolute favorite for victory.