Alternatives to resolving Kosovo issue in the last decade of the 20th century

The last decade of the 20th century represents a turning point in the history of the Albanian people in Kosovo. The fall of the Berlin Wall, which was associated with the fall of the communist system and the breakup of Yugoslavia, put the Kosovo Albanian people ahead of a historic crossroads. The revocation of Kosovo autonomy in 1989, and the usurpation of institutions and legislative and executive competencies associated with police violence, put Kosovo Albanians ahead of a dilemma how to proceed further? Initially, Albanians were organised around a peaceful movement, viewing it as a single alternative, while changing circumstances set up a new movement which, through armed resistance, became the basis for the Albanian people's subliative efforts for freedom and independence. Thus, in the course of such efforts, we discern two options: peaceful and armed warfare.

Peaceful Alternatives

With the collapse of the communist regimes of Southeast Europe and the moment of the break-up of Yugoslavia's Federative Socialist Republic, which was accompanied by the mass abandoning of the Yugoslav Communist League of other legal political organisations, the political scene in Kosovo reflected on political pluralism by undergoing rapid and dramatic change with the emergence of future political organisations aimed at protecting the legitimate democratic rights of the people of Kosovo and resolving its political status.^[1]One of the options that gained ground in Kosovo, for protecting the country's rights and direction, was the peaceful alternative run by the Democratic League of Kosovo (back): LDK). At the top of this alternative, which simultaneously represented the numerically greater unique union among Albanians under the former Yugoslavia and after World War II, the intelligence with which the masses of the people were solidified, despite the serious conditions of the Serbian state's depression. The peaceful alternative to the initials, yet90, brought to power a new governing team, attributed to the July 2, 1990, Constitutional Declaration for “the Republic within the framework of Yugoslavia”^[2], the Constitution of the Kachanic proclaimed, September 7, 1990, as a referendum on Kosovo as Independent and Sovereign States^[3]September 1991, marking a breakthrough in Kosovo Albanians' demands from the possibility of co-existence with the remaining nations in Yugoslavia in the independence option.

The Democratic League of Kosovo, with strategic alternatives to the peaceful road, will organise widespread resistance to cope with extremely difficult situations that were created by Serbian violence measures and terror, as well as with such orientation to address the country's political status. LDK leader Ibrahim Rugova, in an interview given in August 1990, also explained his strategy: “Should be clear that the path of peaceful policy is longer, but a prudent and well-thought solution of this kind is more stable... It is important for us to protect the people from those who want to provoke him because we all know that in other previous situations we suffered a lot and we had a lot killed because of provocations..., confrontation in current conditions would not be in our favor. We will teach this lesson because we have lost many victims in our history and have gained little. Any success would be similar to the victory of Pirros”.^[4] With this strategy, the LDK will work on the national democratic plan and on affirmation and sensibility of the Kosovo issue.

In the internal plan, the period of peaceful governance following the revocation of autonomy was characterised with building parallel institutions both at the municipal and central level. Work on education, science, culture, sports, health and so on, despite the challenge from the Serbian conqueror. Despite the achievements in these areas, discrimination, violence and Serb state pressure continued to exacerbate the situation of the Kosovo Albanian people. Albanians were subjected to fierce oppression in all segments, and Kosovo will become a classic colony of Serbia. As a result of such a policy followed by Serbian power, the situation of the Kosovo Albanians deteriorated greatly (1990-1997). Kosovo's economy was robbed and everything valuable was transferred to Serbia. As a result of the violence and economic-political depression, Albanians took Europe's path, by 1997 the number of exiles in the world reached about 700 thousand.^[5] In this way, through violence and terror in Kosovo, the policy of ethnic cleansing applied and on the other hand came Serb settlers, gaining attributes and material favors, and the Albanians here were turned into second-hand citizens as they were denied all fundamental individual and collective rights and freedoms. In this situation, the LDK was at the highest stage of its resistance with calls “Patience, patience”Victory is ours. In this situation of the existing situation, the people were kept in a calm and under the violence of Serbian pressure and terror.

In the international plan, the LDK in a move managed to perceive Kosovo's issue by establishing ties with political parties and various European and American associations, simultaneously working on the creation of Kosovo's friends, such as in Europe, the United States of America (more: The U.S. and other countries.

No doubt, in internationalising the Kosovo issue, a special contribution did Tirana. At the 44th session of the United Nations General Assembly, Albania's Foreign Minister Reis Malile, except that he had noted the events of the spring of 1989 in Kosovo, citing the hope of Albanians, their national rights that were at odds with any freedom, democracy, and social emancipation ratings, condemning Albanian killings and imprisonment, had also called for normalisation of the situation in Kosovo.^[6] In the course of these efforts, the minister in question, in February 1990, sent to the Secretary - General of the United Nations Organization (more: The UN, Javier Perez De Cullar, a telegram announcing that after the speech at the 44th Kosovo session, the situation had unfortunately been exacerbated further and that such a situation posed a danger to peace and security not only for Kosovo and Yugoslavia, but also for the entire region. Furthermore, he demanded that the UN raise its voice and seek an end to violence, police terror and murder.^[7]Meanwhile, the Pitarka Union, Albania's permanent ambassador and representative to the UN, conveyed the Albanian Foreign Minister General's message to the secretary, demanding that its letter and annex, in line with the practice in force, be distributed as a document by the General Assembly of the Economic and Social Council and the Commission for Human Rights.^[8]For the difficult situation created in Kosovo, the Democratic League of Kosovo, on 3 July 1991, had sent a call to the Albanian state, in which it said among other things: “Kosovo is filled with military and police forces, as well as mobilised civilians from Serbia, who brought in buses and military vehicles and parading through Kosovo, openly threatening Albanians for massacre. At the same time, the forced mobilization of Albanians sent out to Kosovo is carried out. Exploiting the state of war in Slovenia and Croatia, the Serbian regime and the military want to destroy Albanians, accounting that all action will remain in the shadows of events in Slovenia. Since the Albanian people in Kosovo are completely vulnerable and without any kind of institution of the system, we are rightly afraid of the massacres warned and appeal to you that the more urgently you arbitrate. We seek your protection until it's too late”.^[9]

As a result of sensationalisation, where a particular role in this direction has undoubtedly given the Albanian diaspora, many delegations from Kosovo were admitted to different international institutions in Europe and the US, and a series of roundtables were organised, clarifying to foreign delegations the status of Kosovo Albanians, as well as presenting different ideas for resolving its issue. Also, government and human delegations sent to Kosovo by European Union parties and governments (more: The US EU, which was interested in fundamental human violations and freedoms and the possibilities for resolving the Kosovo issue. So, in the early 1990s with Kosovo began to deal, like: The EU, the US, etc.

In addition to working on sensationalising the international factor on the issue of Albanians in Kosovo, one of the priorities of the Albanian political class of time was the commitment to resolving Kosovo's political status. The declaration of the Republic of Kosovo had not taken the right place to address the objective for a real and just solution. In the first place, no state subject in Yugoslavia recognised the Republic of Kosovo. Only the Parliament of the Republic of Albania through a Declaration, on 21 October 1991, recognised the Republic of Kosovo, as sovereign and independent, on the basis of freedom and full equality with all other peoples.^[10]

The declaration of Kosovo's independence had been made under complicated international circumstances, not adequate for Kosovo Albanians. The breakup of Yugoslavia, as a diverse country in an ethnic, religious and cultural context, and with a strategic geopolitical position, presented a very specific challenge for the international community, especially for the EU and the US, as this process took place right at the time of the end of the Cold War and the creation of a new international system. In this period, the US and EU continued to determine their priorities in foreign policy, while the latter had internal problems such as the non-states around foreign policy orientation. The German Union was not seen favourable by France and Great Britain, as such unification endangered their dominant positions in Europe. Their conflicts of interests were reflected in the case of Yugoslavia, where Germany supported Slovenia's secession of Croatia, while France and Britain did not favour the creation of new states.^[11]

On the other hand, the US had had had excellent reports with communist Yugoslavia, supporting the economy and the overall unity of this state. But, with the fall of the Berlin Wall, the gradual change in US stance on Yugoslavia began, as Yugoslavia had no further strategic significance that it played during the Cold War as balance between East and West. Now the US began to express disappointments accumulated by the past, which it had then silented over human rights violations in Yugoslavia. Another factor in shaping American foreign policy in relation to Yugoslavia was also a report by the US Intelligence Agency The CIA, November 1990, which predicted unrest, ethnic and civil violence. Based on these circumstances, in February 1990, the U.S. published its American foreign policy towards Yugoslavia, which was based on: <x0-democracy, dialogue, human rights, market economy and unity”.^[12]

Under such international circumstances, resolving Kosovo's political status not only did it not receive the international community's attention, but it remained at the level of human rights protection. Such an attitude is attested to by the European Parliament resolution, adopted on February 15th 1990, of the situation in Kosovo and respect for human rights^[13]as well as the Joint Resolution^* of the Senate and the U.S. Congress containing several points of which the most important were (1) The expression of deep concern over the violation of human rights by the Government of Yugoslavia and the Government of the Republic of Serbia; (2) the encouragement of the government of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia to halt the use of force in the province of Kosovo and to protect fundamental human rights; (3) the encouragement of the Government of Yugoslavia and of the Republic of Serbia to restore full autonomous status of the Socialist province of Kosovo; (4) the procurement of the Republic of Serbia's government to start a real dialogue with the Democratic movement and with other democratic forces in the province of Kosovo in political interest and economic solutions....^[14]

The international community's leadership to bypass the resolution of Kosovo's political status and address this issue in human rights areas was accompanied by several acts of political and judicial character that would further make the right solution to the Kosovo issue difficult. In the course of efforts to resolve problems in Yugoslavia, the EU formed in 1991 an arbitration commission, known as the Badinter Commission, under the name of committee leader Robert Badinter, chairman of France's Constitutional Court. The commission was tasked with facilitating differences that could be presented in peaceful talks between Yugoslav subjects that would soon begin at The Hague, but also issued a number of judicial opinions regarding Yugoslavia's status and its constitutional entities. Although they had no binding character, these opinions were of particular importance to Kosovo, especially those dealing with borders at the moment of independence. Opinion No. 2 and No. 3, commemorates that, despite circumstances “self-determination should not include changing existing borders”.^[15]

But Kosovo was not recognised as a republic, and was not treated as Slovenia and Croatia, while its autonomy with elements of the republic, such as the constitution, the government, the bank, the right to the Yugoslav presidency, and so on, had been revoted by Serbia in March 1989. Therefore, by trying to prevent any crisis that could jeopardise the security situation in the region, the international community drafted various proposals that were developed at The Hague Conference during 1991, like the “special status” or some kind of broad autonomy for minority residents that formed a majority in the space they lived in. These minorities had to enjoy rights such as a special educational system, special legislative organs, administrative and judicial structure, and so on.^[16]

It was clear that the international community wanted to advance certain rights for Albanians in exchange for calming the situation, but that on the other hand meant recognising Serbia's jurisdiction over Kosovo. This is evidenced by Lord Owen's statements, representative of this conference, in the press address given in Pristina, where he addressed Albanians and Serbs: “Serbs must reconcile with Kosovo autonomy, and Albanians ) Keep him going. ) must accept Serbia”.^[17] Even Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Great Britain Douglas Hog, on the occasion of opening the British Embassy in Skopje in December 1993, stated: “Brengo for Kosovo is in the order of the day and is often talked about”. The attitude is this: It is part of Serbia's current state. We do not aim to destroy Serbia's integrity, the problem will be resolved within it, Serbia will be obliged to grant Kosovo broader political rights to autonomy”.^[18] Italy's chairman, Louis Scalfaro, also in the speech given at the Albanian Parliament, said Kosovo should be granted autonomy as broad as possible. Meanwhile, Germany and France's foreign affairs ministers, Zype and Kinkel, also predicted extensive autonomy. Similar stance on the Kosovo issue continued to hold the administration of Bill Clinton, which for Kosovo envisioned broad autonomy under Serbia's sovereignty.^[19] So the international community was unilateral and therefore insisted on preserving the Yugoslav Federation.

To accomplish this, the international community acted in two ways. First, he warned Serbia to give up violence. On December 24, 1992, President Bush sent a letter to Slobodan Milosevic, which became known as <x0)”, stressing that: “In the event of conflict in Kosovo caused by Serbian actions, the US will prepare to use the military force against Serbs in Kosovo and in Serbia”.^[20] Second, the international community tried to persuade Kosovo Albanian leaders to reintegration into Serbia's political system, hoping they would influence the change of power and thereby win their rights. In the course of this goal, Serbian opposition leader Milan Pannaq had met in London with Ibrahim Rugova and had offered the latter the restoration of human rights and autonomy for Kosovo if Albanians were to come to the polls.^[21] But Kosovo Albanians had not participated in Serbian elections, as they considered the Republic of Kosovo is not an integral part of Yugoslavia. In his memories, the US ambassador to Belgrade highlighted the insistence of the Kosovo Albanian leadership not to recognise Serbia's authority.^[22] The Kosovo leadership's such stance revealed to the international community that Albanians were firm on the road towards freedom and independence, and that there would be no turning back to national aspirations. This stance laid the basis for the demand for independence that will be realized under all other circumstances a few years later.

During the 1992-1995 years, the Kosovo issue did not have the priority of discussing the international arena because the international community was oriented into halting armed conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. But, as long as the international community had turned its attention to the above-mentioned states, Serbian police authorities in Kosovo had increased the degree of depression towards Albanians. According to human rights activists, prisoners were being beaten and tortured. The Council for Human Rights in Kosovo warned of the possibility of an outbreak of a broad conflict if Serb refugees from Croatia in Kosovo continue to deploy.^[23]

The Vanity of Peaceful Resistance

The policy of peaceful resistance was followed with conviction by the majority of Albanians in Kosovo by the end of 1995. The end of 1995, respectively, of the Dayton Conference and events in Albania in 1997, are two factors that marked a turning point in political developments in Kosovo and around it. Unlike Bush, the Democrat administration Bill Clinton had warned a pro-active approach to commitment to halt terrible fighting in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The American engagement on this issue had two goals: through reaching a peaceful agreement to prevent the spread of war in the region and the involvement of Turkey, Greece, Albania and Macedonia, thus preventing the history of the Balkan wars of 1912-1913, and demonstrating the American superiority over Europe, which had been unable to resolve such a conflict.^[24]

The international community's focus on ending the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina prompted Kosovo not to get involved in the Dayton talks, as such involvement or discussing broader problems would significantly reduce the likelihood of achieving peace. Another argument was Milosevic's influence on Bosnian Serbs, viewed as a key figure in reaching the agreement, so the internationals did not want to provoke his readiness to achieve peace.^[25]

The international community's devotion to Milosevic's figure and role for a peaceful agreement can be testified to through the rewards the international community awarded to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (more: RFJ), Serbia-Montenegro, respectively. First, most sanctions against this state were canceled, but then the European Union officially recognised the RFJ, founded in 1992, as the successor of the old Yugoslavia with the six republics.^[26]

The refusal of the international factor to address the Kosovo issue in Dayton caused a general disappointment and frustration in Kosovo. The West had not rewarded Ibrahim Rugova's work and the people's patience, despite positive assessments of peaceful resistance. The EU continued to think that improved reports between the EU and RFJ could lead to a “construction approach” The RFJ in granting some kind of autonomy to Kosovo.^[27]This suggests that the international community again expressed itself to the remnant of Kosovo in Serbia's Souza. Another argument proving this conclusion is that the international community now began to engage in resolving the issue of education in Kosovo, in the hope that this would calm the situation and pave the way for further dialogue between Serbia and Albanians in Kosovo.^[28] With the mediation of the Catholic community, St. Exhidio reached agreement between Ibrahim Rugova and Slobodan Milosevic on returning students and students to their facilities starting in September 1996.^[29]Of course, such an agreement was not implemented because it had only been a Milosevic's game to remove from itself the pressure of the international community and also to crack down on the active Albanian resistance that had begun to give the first signs in Kosovo. On the other hand, such an agreement was needed for Ibrahim Rugova, whose political positions had begun to fade in Kosovo. The agreement was perceived by the LDK as a step towards resolving the Kosovo issue. But that is not what others thought. Besides criticising this agreement, Rexhep Qosja declared:“cannot go to independence with selection step-by-step of problems”.^[30]

The international community's attitude towards Kosovo prompted various political circles in Kosovo to think about finding other forms of national resistance. To such a point, the analysis of Dayton's decisions took place. Despite the cost of international isolation, penalties for ethnic cleansing and genocide, Bosnian Serbs had gained more than they had asked for.^[31]

In other words, the Dayton Accords revealed that territorial agreements on ethnic grounds in the Balkans enjoyed legitimacy in the eyes of the West and that only the use of force in efforts to achieve self-rule can ensure the attention of the West.^[32]In this context, most Albanians in Kosovo now became convinced that political and diplomatic means for resolving the problem were exhausted, as the international community did not consider Kosovo a serious problem. On the other hand, during 1997-1998, Serbian oppression continued to continue at the oldest pace, deprived Albanians of their most basic rights, in all segments of economic, social, educational, cultural and political life.

The LDK road, viewed as an alternative with a long-term strategy that would solve the Kosovo issue, many local and foreign politicians, began to call it gangism. Perhaps it is not too much to mention here that peaceful alternative in Kosovo was not the model of the Ghanaian form of fact: being “emorial on the Gandi platform, organising broad masses of the people in the “civil disobedience”) campaigns or to “Passive resistance”, as their means Gandhi proclaimed objections and peaceful demonstrations of widespread popular measures against British rule expressed in: boycotting official institutions and British schools; not buying foreign goods; refusing to pay taxes, etc. ”^[33] In Kosovo, even though Serb institutions were challenged, they were still not only working and acting, but Albanians, although not deliberately close to those institutions were equipped with various documentations, such as those of the civil situation, judiciary, etc. As far as goods are concerned, they were revenues from Serbia and Albanians bought them. Likewise, taxes were not only paid but even double. On the other hand, rulers in these two countries, Kosovo-andi were different. Britain as ruler had a higher cultural-democratic stage, and in India the popular manifestations were chain-symbled, and in Kosovo the “strategy was preserved, not a war, nor a peace”^[34]Since between the 1992-1996, manifestations were also largely lacking.

The peaceful alternative first in prism of its strategy, “to gain freedom without spilling blood” It would be good, but history proved otherwise. “freedom not donated, but won”. However, based on a document by Albania's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in the early 1990s, there was a group of young boys from Kosovo and other Albanian parts, made up of 43 people who had gone to military training at an Albanian Army base in Labinos in Elbasan. Of them only 11 had had the recommendation to the representation of Kosovo Government in Tirana, and 3 of these recommendations from the LDK branches in Kosovo,^[35] While the rest consider that they were all members of the People's Movement for the Republic of Kosovo, which is later known as the People's Movement of Kosovo.

But, in 1993-1997, the military training of groups on Albania's territory was significantly limited, and liberation war conflicted with philosophy and the politics of time, this way and the border. Later things changed, the KLA public appearance, and its battle share increase breaks down status quo- In.^[36] Thus, this alternative was destined to fail on the road to our liberation, despite some results it had both national and international. Given its achievements, I think that, at the moment and the time of those changes in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, it was an extremely hit option, but over time it was spent and away from the aspirations of our people for liberation, given the harsh Serbian regime.

Gradually, Albanian national efforts began to undergo a partial transformation, as part remained with Rugova's ideology and another part began to join new currents. An active movement that was manifested with street demonstrations also marked the decline of the peaceful movement that had worked until then. Another factor that accelerated the organisation of active resistance was the spring events of 1997 in Albania. The pyramid financial schemes the Albanian government had allowed had reached their natural end. Albania fell into anarchy. Sali Berisha's government lost control, while weapons abandoned by security forces were stolen. Hundreds of thousands of weapons were available to citizens, especially automatic rifles.^[37] This event facilitated the organisation of armed resistance. Another factor that intensified the transformation of passive resistance to that active was the Student Movement, respectively, the student demonstrations of October 1997.^[38] The rampant Serb violence against peaceful demonstrators convinced the international community of the difficulties in democratising Serbia, and there was a turning point, because it turned Western attention back from Kosovo. The rise in the interest of diplomacy of European and US countries confirmed once again that international involvement occurs only after the transition of the situation.^[39] In an internal aspect, the protest also convinced the Albanian population in Kosovo that agreement under peaceful conditions is impossible with Serbia, especially when after peace in Bosnia, Serbia had free hands to deal with Kosovo and thus increase violence and depression. So, in terms of intensifying the violence and oppression of Serbian police against innocent civilians, domestic politics and the indifference of the international factor in Kosovo came to an end status quo- of.^[40]

Alternative to Liberation War

I, Kosovo Liberation Army soldier, swear I will fight for the liberation of conquered Albanian lands and their union. I will always be a loyal soldier, a worthy warrior of freedom, a watchful, courageous, and disciplined, willing that at all times, I will not spare my life to fight to defend the sacred interests of the homeland. If you violate this oath, let me be punished by the strictest of laws and if I betray, if I lose my blood, I swear, I swear, I swear to you, ”.^[41] The above text was submitted to every soldier of the Kosovo Liberation Army, so it is clear that the KLA option consisted of the release of conquered lands, as perceived by Albanian lands outside London and their union with the mother state.

Although the first cells of the KLA military organisation have been confronted since the first part of the 1990s, with time they were structured until November 1998 we have a clearer structure consisting of an operational zone structure structure structured into seven operating subzones (more than NZO): Drenica's NZO, NZO of the Pacific, NZO Dukagjini, NZO of Shala, NZO of Llap, NZO of Nerodima and Karadaku's NZO. But, due to operational, establishment and command needs, General Staff The KLA, at the meeting held in 12,11,1998, decided on the establishment of these subzones in operational zones.^[42]

Kosovo's Liberation Army opposed Serbian aggression by relying on the right peoples have to defend themselves against violence and aggression, as well as bringing it national liberation. The path of armed war in the form of organisation was seen as the only alternative to Kosovo's liberation and resolving its issue, since the Serbian regime of Milosevic continued to be the main cause of deterioration and radicalisation of the situation in the country. In the situation of terror and violence, Albanians were forced to organise themselves for armed struggle, in order to protect their hearths, land, existence and release Kosovo by bringing its people freedom. The KLA entered the scene at the right time, as the patience of the Albanians had ceased and trust in the politics of time was wavering to bring the country freedom. As it is known, she took the stage on November 28, 1997, in the village of Lausa, in the county of Scikyright. Initially, Drenica continued to be the KLA's home, at the helm with the Jashari family, to then expand across the country.

The alternative to armed war touched on the feelings of all those Albanians who had suffered historically from Serbian rule, both inside and abroad. Also, this alternative will exercise a positive influence on the Albanian political spectrum as well. Political parties began to move and reflect on policies followed so far in order to better adjust them to the created situation. On the other hand, many Albanians who had been engaged in non-violent Kosovo politics or various peaceful movements and associations are set to join the KLA because they saw armed warfare as the only means of protection which one day would smile at freedom.

On the other hand, despite armed conflicts between the KLA and Serbian police/military forces, especially when the latter were causing unprecedented violence against unarmed civilians, the international community still considered Kosovo an internal issue of Serbia and at the level of human rights protection and of securing some kind of autonomy. Robert Gelbard, special emissary to President Clinton, had declared in March 1998 that “Rugova must know that independence is not option”A stance supported by European officials. The same diplomat had claimed that No doubt, KLA is a terrorist organisation” and that The United States strongly condemns terrorist activities in Kosovo”.^[43] Such a statement gave Milosevic a clear pretext to begin the first series of wide-scale attacks on the civilian population, killing a number of unarmed civilians in what was described as a campaign against terrorism.^[44]

Despite the pronouncements of Gelbard and his fellowmen, The KLA was a typical liberation army, for the fact that: the KLA attacks were not directed against the innocent Albanian population; The KLA has hit Serbian forces, which implemented violence in Kosovo, who pursued, arrested, imprisoned, beaten, tortured and killed the Albanian population; The KLA has hit the military forces, which strongly controlled occupied territory, which belonged not to them, but to the Albanian autochthon people.^[45] So, the KLA had nothing to do with any of the variants of terrorism, because it recently convinced the international community that it is really a serious party with clear missions, the release of the country occupied by Serbian invasion and bringing freedom to a very lowly people in its history.

However, it is likely that behind such a statement lies the responsibility or overcoming the competencies of Gelbardi, as it is not believed that the US has given the green light for such an act. Also, it may have been confused with different ideas within the international community that could go up to that degree to the point of thinking about eliminating the KLA, the submission of Albanians, and the achievement of what the international community required of not changing borders.

But the KLA's determination and the unreasonable degree of ethnic violence by Serbian state authorities towards Albanians prompted the international community in the first part of 1998 to change its stance about Kosovo. The EU representative had declared that the EU refuses to acknowledge that Kosovo is an internal issue of Yugoslavia.^[46]

It was now clear that the KLA's resistance and armed struggle prompted Euro-American diplomacy in drafting various projects aimed at reaching a peaceful agreement in Kosovo. On March 5, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (back): The OSCE) called for co-operation with the EU and NATO, meanwhile, British and American diplomats visited Kosovo, and many other diplomatic representatives were declared about the situation in Kosovo. Thus, at the beginning of March 1998, it marked the heroic and subliance battle of the Jasharaites in Prekaz^[47], Kosovo's case only during March 7th-14th 1998, dominated all the top European forums as in: The European Union, the Contact Group, the Council of Ministers of the European Union, etc., in which forums were defined several solutions for Kosovo. Among those most important meetings was that of the Contact Group on 9 March 1998. The essence of this meeting stood in the fact that the Contact Group was being taken exclusively for the first time with Kosovo.^[48] But, on the other hand, this meeting was a small step for Kosovo after the Contact Group participating countries came up with a project under which they were able to work out. Kosovo should gain an important autonomy, which is expressed with its corporate self-government, functioning as separate entity within SerbiaBut not in the context of Yugoslavia”. There is no doubt that such a paradoxical offer was unacceptable for Albanians.

As the international community continued talks moved to another level of its proposals. Unlike earlier autonomy approach, the international community now began to calculate projects that envisioned an advantage of the Kosovo issue. After the autonomy option had expired, a Kosovo republic card within the Yugoslav Federation was now dropped on the international table. Through this agreement Kosovo would have its constitution, manage internal affairs and have the right to veto on important issues at the federation level. The federal level would have competencies in the field of defence, financial policy and foreign policy. Attention to this idea consisted of the fact that there was no need for changing Yugoslavia's international borders, even though, according to the Badinter Commission's logic, the Republic of Kosovo would be a candidate for recognition as a new state.^[49]

Although against such a proposal Montenegro emerged, as a third republic would dim its influence in the federation, the republic's option was not acceptable either to Serbs or Albanians. How could Serbs accept Kosovo's secession when so many myths were woven for it, so much effort and propaganda had been spent on it, and not talk about the wars that were fought in the name of Serbism that the gene was in the myth about Kosovo. Also, would it be possible for Albanians to live under the security of an army that committed massacres, murders, deportations, much more when the cause of the liberation war was based on the right to independence.

As compromise solutions were being calculated, more and more of the Serbs were supporting the radical option: partitioning Kosovo. Most Serbs had realised that time was working for Albanians in a demographic way. Serbs estimated they would become minorities in the middle of the next century. To that conclusion had Serbian academic Alexander Despiq come, then chairman of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts. The same idea had been expressed by academic Dobrica Qosic, former chairman of Yugoslavia, who had proposed dividing on ethnic grounds. Taking example from the Dayton model for Bosnia, Qosic had proposed the creation of two autonomous subjects and each of these two subjects had special reports with the mother state.^[50]

The international community's efforts continued further, though not at an intense pace, as in the first part of March. On March 21st and April 29, 1998, Contact Group meetings are held in Bonn and Rome. On May 10th, the American delegation, led by Richard Holbrok, arrived in Pristina. As a result of this American engagement, on May 15th and May 22, 1998, there were meetings between Albanian and Serbian negotiators, which ended without any results.^[51]On June 8th, the European Union's Council of Ministers met on June 12th, meeting was held at the highest level of Pact member states. NATO, and the same day again, the Contact Group was gathered. Such diplomatic institutions continued, on the other hand, terror, violence, and humanitarian disaster grew and multiplied.

As a summary, it could be said that the Euro-American political and diplomatic institutions in all meetings and forums held as a solution to the Kosovo issue predicted: “to protect the red line” in Kosovo in accordance with the promise of the US administration, which has been understood also as the possibility of creating a two-part Conventional” framework according to the scheme in Bosnia; enhanced political and regional autonomy, at the level envisioned constitution of 1974; autonomy; plus republic; between the republic, not as long as Montenegro's, but not slightly like Montenegro <4> Republika Srpska” in Bosnian confederation; Republic minus; The republic under the former Yugoslavia after a transitional test of its own successful self-government for 3 years, etc.^[52] Thus, it is evident that none of these solutions for Kosovo were satisfactory, as far as confronting the principled goals of Kosovo's liberation war for national liberation. While the international community was discussing the above options, the number of volunteers in the Liberation Army was multiplying in all regions of Kosovo. The KLA will be factored to the highest degree. So no solution to the Kosovo issue could be taken into account without the KLA.

On the other hand, parallel to diplomatic efforts continued on the ground military confrontations between the KLA and Serb police/military forces. KLA active resistance further raised the interest of international diplomacy, which was beginning to calculate the W factor option CK. But, in turn, the KLA was also interested in promoting local and international factors and taking responsibility in resolving the Kosovo issue. In the course of this KLA, a political statement published in the local press, April 29, 1998, featuring its political programme^[53], also seeking support in its fight against Serb installed power in Kosovo.

In the latter part of June 1998, US Special Emissar Richard Holbrok held a meeting with KLA representatives in Junik. Although Holbrooke's statement that “... was an informal meeting between American and KLA representatives with the aim of identifying the real situation on the ground...”,^[54]However, such an act could also be seen as the silent recognition of the US KLA.

Certainly, the appearance and acceptance of the international arena made the KLA an important factor in Kosovo-related political and military processes, placing it in the international agenda. After the previously mentioned moment, the international factor will increasingly be directed to the General Staff. The KLA, since the KLA was a real force on the ground, which could not be overlooked by the international factor or Yugoslavia in efforts to stop fighting and establish peace. Such a conclusion was made by Holbrooke himself in Crans Montana after his return from Kosovo.^[55]With Holbrok's findings, diplomats like Wolfgang Petrisch and Christopher Hill agreed. Petrich expressed: Until the outbreak of armed counterwords between the Albanian Albanian army KLA and the Serbian Interior Ministry units, on the part of the international community ( The EU and US) issue of Kosovo was addressed as an internal issue of Yugoslavia, Serbia” respectively.^[56]And Hill said: “... I thought Kosovo had essential significance in the Balkans, but this issue did not become urgent, as people did not start firing weapons against each other”.^[57]

Contact between international diplomats and KLA representatives was established on the continuation of the above heels of Holbrooke. These contacts intensified during November 1998. It should be mentioned with the NLA representatives' meetings with Wolfgang Petrich, and in particular the meeting held in Dragobil on November 6, 1998, in which the KLA, represented by Hashim Thaci, Jakup Krasniqi and Rame Buya, outlined the American diplomat Hill's project.^[58]These meetings were a clear indicator that the address of the talks with Albanians had already been moved from Pristina to the headquarters of the General Staff, and that the KLA had already been officially accepted as the crucial factor in the Kosovo issue.

During the summer of 1998, especially during the June-July 1998 months, there is an intensifying of field fighting. The KLA had scored successes on the ground and had managed to control about 40% of Kosovo's territory, including the town of Rahovec. Such success had caused international complications. First, different international circles would think that a NATO military campaign against Belgrade would actually be support for the KLA. Americans also began to lean more and more from the KLA. An American emissary declared in early July that “... At this moment the Albanian side cannot speak in a single voice”. Moreover, such success had raised the alarm in Belgrade. By this moment, Serbian police forces had been responsible for confronting the KLA, while the Yugoslav Army was responsible for the borders. Co-ordination of police forces with those Yugoslav military forces was accompanied by the carrying of operational competencies to the Yugoslav Army, an act declared on July 25th 1998.^[59]This act, forced the Yugoslav Army to establish order and order in Kosovo, respectively, to confront the KLA. During August, the Yugoslav Army offensive began, which was manifested by the burning and destroying of Albanian villages and settlements, as well as the murder and expulsion of the civilian population from their settlements. The extent of the violence implemented by Serbian police/military forces had been so severe that it sparked the international community's strong response, which called for stopping the attacks and withdrawing Serb forces from Kosovo. On September 23, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution No. 1199, which called on Belgrade to ensure an unlimited approach of international observers in Kosovo and make rapid progress towards finding a solution, enable the return of displaced persons to their properties, as well as averting humanitarian disaster.^[60]

In the course of these efforts in early October, US Special Minister Richard Holbrok held a series of intensive talks with Slobodan Milosevic, who ended with the so-called October Agreement, dated October 13, 1998, under which the Serbian army and police would return to the pre-war levels. The same agreement came forward: (1) the deployment of a verifiable mission (Sypqering Mission in Kosovo) from 2000 observers, under OSCE supervision at which US diplomat William Walker was placed, and (2) NATO's monitoring flights over Yugoslavia to verify the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces. This agreement was supported by the Council NATO through the adoption of the Activisation Order, under which if the agreement was not implemented, the bombing against Yugoslavia would begin within 96 hours.^[61] Although KLA was not part of this agreement it declared self-restraint^[62]While possible fighting disruptions were used to consolidate the ranks and structure the command organs. Although international observers were deployed in Kosovo, however, the agreement was not implemented and fighting resumed after a short time. Yugoslav Army began with implementation of military plan, coded as “Patkoi”, which was based on changing the ethnic structure in Kosovo^[63], and the destabilisation of the region by provoking conflicts with Albania so that the conflict can be shifted to the waters of conflict between two sovereign states.

During the January-March 1999 period, the brutal violence of Serb forces against civilians continued. Over 200,000 people were expelled from their shelters, while more and more military reinforcements came from Serbia. The culmination of Serb violence was the massacre of Recak, January 15, 1999, where over 45 civilians were massacred. On March 20th, the Investigative Mission withdrew from Kosovo.^[64]Recak's massacre and other massacres against the Albanian civilian population,^[65]They put the international community before a very difficult position, especially when their efforts repeatedly met in Milosevic's refusal and diplomatic maneuvering. Therefore, based on International Humanitarian Law, the international factor was forced to end the war before Milosevic's actions lead the Albanian people to its physical end. Thus, on January 28, 1998, the General Council NATO issues declaration through which crisis considers Global peace and security “”, condemning Serb acts and promising support for the Contact Group in efforts to halt violence.^[66]

The situation was further complicated when the Yugoslav government decided on William Walker's expulsion from Yugoslavia and the proclamation of two NATO generals, Klaus Nouman, chairman of the NATO Military Committee and Wesley Clark, supreme commander of NATO forces for Europe, as unwanted persons for Belgrade. These acts facilitated the building of consensus among the international community that access to Belgrade should be based on threat and strength.^[67]Under these circumstances a new series of diplomatic efforts combined with the threat of using force began. The Contact Group drafted, on January 22, 1999, a plan to impose a political solution, including the use of force if any of the warring parties, Serbs or KLA refused the agreement.^[68]

Meanwhile, 1999's Rambouillet Conference, which was in charge, began finding a peaceful solution for Kosovo. The talks on the basis had draft proposals for Kosovo's future, drafted by Hill and Petrisch. In the composition of the Kosovo Albanian delegation were KLA representatives: Hashim Thaci, Jakup Krasniqi, Azem Syla, Xhavit Haliti and Rame Buja; LBD representatives: Rexhep Qosja, Hyseni Hidajet, Bajram Kosumi and Mehmet Hajrizi; representatives of the LDK: Ibrahim Rugova, Bujar Bukoshi, Idriz Ajeti, Fehmi Agani and Edita Tahira, while Veton Surroi and Blerim Shala as independent personalities. After arriving in Rambouille, the Kosovo delegation joins a team of legal advisers, such as: Morton Abramowitz, a former US State Department official, Paul Williams, Washington-based international justice lawyer, Mark Weller, German international law specialist, and Shinasi Rama, doctorate student at Columbia University in New York.^[69]The delegations were led by the leadership made up of Hashim Thaci, Ibrahim Rugova and Rexhep Qosja. Head of the leadership was appointed Hashim Thaci, and spokesman Veton Surroi.

Interestingly, the composition of the Yugoslav delegation, in which other than top Yugoslav and Serbian officials had a representative of minorities living in Kosovo, such as Bosniak, Turkish, Egyptian, Muslim, Goran, Roma, etc.^[70]The composition of such a delegation is not random or the literal will of Serbs to respect minorities. This was actually a tactic for relating the demands of Albanians and showing the international community as if minorities wanted to live in Yugoslavia.

The first text of the draft agreement presented to Albanians and Serbs had five points: the immediate interruption of violence; the immediate withdrawal of Yugoslav police and military forces from Kosovo; the Kosovo station of a NATO-led military force; the safe return of refugees and displaced persons; and a political solution consisting of an expanded autonomy for Kosovo.^[71]But the proposal had not been acceptable to both sides. Yugoslavia refused the presence of international forces, while Albanians refused the option of broad autonomy, which they had had with the 1974 Constitution. The demand of the Albanian political spectrum was independence, as the decade-long brutal Serb violence had left no room for Albanians to live under the umbrella of the Serbian state.

Meanwhile, at the provisional closure of the works, Kosovo's delegation in Rambouillet, after consultations of political and military groupings decided, on 23 February 1999, on the formation of the Kosovo Interim Government, at the helm of which Hashim Thaci was appointed.^[72]

Talks resumed on March 15, 1999, after being interrupted due to disagreements. The new text of negotiations offered extensive autonomy that contained a self-government on all domestic issues, such as education, health and the economy. Kosovo would have the president and assembly, the Supreme Court, the government, etc. Foreign troops and officials would guarantee implementation of the agreement. The expanded autonomy would be offered for a period of three years. After three years an international conference was to be held to decide on Kosovo's final status. However, in essence Serbia's integrity and sovereignty would be preserved. RFJ components in Kosovo would be: (a) territorial integrity; (b) preserving the common market within RFJ; (c) monetary policy; (d) defence; (d) foreign policy; (f) customs; (g) federal tax system; etc. Furthermore, in Kosovo there would be three levels of law enforcement authorities -- Kosovar, Republican and federal -- while international borders would be controlled by Yugoslav authorities (about 1500 soldiers). A NATO force would also land in Kosovo as guarantor of the agreement.^[73]In fact, the international offer was nothing more than the autonomy Kosovo had with the 1974 Constitution. In closing the draft text, however, stood the provision for organising an international conference to set mechanisms for resolving Kosovo's final status based on the will of the people, efforts of parties to respect Helsinki's final agreement and Act.^[74]

Despite promised a Kosovo status conference, such a formulation, stressing the preservation of RFJ's territorial integrity and common policies in the most important spheres, was hardly acceptable to the Albanian delegation. US Secretary of State Madeline Albright gave clear guarantees to the Albanian delegation in Rambouillet that the expression “people's will” implies the will of the population in Kosovo, not that of Serbia-Montenegro, which will be expressed through the referendum.^[75]

The Albanian delegation signed the agreement, while Serbs rejected it. Although the agreement provided for Yugoslavia's integrity preservation of Yugoslavia's refusal could be linked to two factors: the deployment of NATO forces in Kosovo, not those of GDP, as well as the free movement of NATO troops throughout Serbia.^[76]

However, this act was considered Casus belli to promote military intervention after the talks end. NATO was committed to the bombing of Yugoslavia, and therefore failed to operate Yugoslav maneuvers to avoid bombings like Serbia's Parliament proposal for broad autonomy for Kosovo and talks on the extent of an international foreign presence in Kosovo.^[77]

On 24 March 1999, the NATO air strikes campaign against Yugoslav police and military targets began. The campaign lasted 78 days. In June 1999 Milosevic's generals were forced to sign the surrender of the Yugoslav Army, and within a short time Serb forces were forced to withdraw from Kosovo, while the UN Interim Administration (UNMIK) was established in Kosovo, KFOR as well as the Kosovo Liberation Army.

Throughout Kosovo, the period before and during the NATO bombings was accompanied by fierce battles between Serbian military, police and paramilitary forces and KLA forces. But Serbs retaliated against the civilian population. According to post-war initial reports, 11 840 civilians were killed, out of them 1 392 children by 18 years of age, 296 children by the age of 5 -- 1739 women and 1182 elderly over the age of 65 -- and still about 1 600 residents are found and raped 20 400 Albanian women.^[78]

It is often discussed and speculated who actually freed Kosovo. In this regard, however, we can rightly find out: from all the tests, it turns out, the crucial factor for all achieved in Kosovo was the Kosovo Liberation War, the KLA with dynamism, maturity, operation, flexibility, foresight, stability, unity, complexity and interoperability. All other factors have been helpful and supportive factors...^[79] So, it is clear that without the Kosovo Liberation Army and without its war, there would be no NATO intervention or support for international opinion and European and global bodies.

[1] Ana Lalaj, “Anti-unconstitutional Dhuna and the so-called judicial state in Kosovo”, Kosovo, Histo-Politic magazine7/1999, Pristina: “History Institute-Pristina & Institute of History-Tirana”, 2001, pp. 64.

[2] Archived Funds and Collection Guide, Volume I, National Archives of Kosovo, Pristina, 2002, p. 113.

[3] History of Albania and Albanians, Syrrant, Pristina, 2001, p. 3806 The Truth on Kosovo, The Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Albania, the Institute of History, Tirana, 1993, p. 345.

[4] Elez Biberaj, Kosovo Barott Power of the Balkans, Tirana, 1994, pp. 29.

[5] Marengle Verley, Kosovo on focus of historyThe second volume, Botimpex, Tirana, 2003, p. 98.

[6]Minister's ArchiveW for Europe and Foreign Affairs (backward: AMEPJ), 1990, file 968, from Reis Malile's speech at the 44th UN AP session in 1989, pp. 1-4.

[7]AMEPJ, In 1990, Project ʹthe letter of Reis Malile, addressed to the UN Secretary General, on the situation in Kosovo, pp. 14-15; According to a Human Rights Watch report for Yugoslavia: “ ... Ethnic Albanians are being arrested en masse, beaten and tortured in prisons, being expelled from their jobs only because of national affiliation. Serbian police are using excessive violence against Albanian demonstrators, killing more than 50 Albanians during 1990 alone,”. Human Rights Watch World Report 1990 HINA Yugoslavia1 January 1991, https://www.refworld.org/docide/467fca3a1d.htmlAccess December 23, 2019.

[8]AMEPJ, 1990, Ambassador and Permanent Representative Albania's RPS near the UN, the Pirarca Union, p. 33.

[9]AMEPJ, In 1991, File 1598, Call, Democratic League of Kosovo, Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, chairman, Pristina, in 02.07,1991.

[10]AMEPJ, In 1991, The File 1598, the Declaration of the People's Assembly of the Republic of Albania, pp. 141-1242.

[11] Dejan Maralov, “The Policy of the U SA and EU Towards the Desyntengration of Yugoslavia”, International Journal of Social Science Tomorrow, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2012, pp. 1-3.

[12]Right there., f. 9.

[13]AMEPJ, 1990, File 1098, Resolution on the situation in Kosovo,f. 5-7; 12-14.

* Concurrent Resoletion ) Joint Resolution is a resolution adopted by the two chambers of the legislature and the signing of the executive chief is not required and does not contain the power of the law.

[14]AMEPJ, 1990, File 957/1, US Senate Resolution for Kosovo, sent the Foreign Ministry to Tirana by the permanent representative. Albania's RPS near the UN, the Pirateka Union, New York, on 4. 1990, p. 11-16.

[15]Allain Pellett,“The Opinions of the Badinter Referee Committee: A Second Breath for the Self-Determination of Peoples”. European Journal of International Law. 3 (1), 1992, pp. 180.

[16] Richard Caplane, “International Diplomacy and the Crisis in Kosovo”, International Affairs, Volume 74, Isue 4, October 1998, pp. 748-749; Rexhep Qosja, “International Factors and handling of the Albanian issue”, Nation, Ways of the National UnionOnufri, New York, 1997, p. 400.

[17] Rexhep Qosja, Albanian issue, history and politics, Toena, Tirana, 1998, pp. 260.

[18]Right there., f. 261.

[19]Right there..

[20] Tim Judah, Kosovo What ever needs to know, Oxford University Press, 2008, f. 71.

[21]B'lent Sarper A Tractir, “Transformation of K-Albanians '% Struggle from Parallelism to Armed Conflict: Why is Violet Necessary? The Turkish Eyebook of International Relations, Vol. 43, 2012, p. 112.

[22] Warren Zimmermann, Origins of a catastrophe, with an updated Preface and Epilogue on Bosnia and Kosovo, 1999, p. 81.

[23] Minorities at Risk Project, Chronology for Kosovo Albanians in Yugoslavia, 2004, https://www.refworld.org/docide/469f38f51e.htmlAccess December 22, 2019.

[24] D. Maralov, “The Policy of the U SA and EU Towards the Desyntengration...”, pp. Thirteen-14.

[25]Peter Russell, the version of Kosovo, Journal of Genocide Research, Vol. 11, Issue 4 (2009), pp. 12-15.

[26] T. Judah, Kosovo What ever needs... , f. 79.

[27] R.

[28] Ukshini Eye, Kosovo in EU foreign policy 1991-1997, Logos A, Pristina, 2000, f. 150.

[29] Bajram Shatri, Albanian Education in Kosovo 1990-1999, Book School, Pristina, 2010, p. 97.

[30] Journal The farmer, Pristina, September 6, 1996, pp. 10.

[31]P. Russell, the Exclusion of Kosovo from the Dayton...”, p. 22.

[32]B. S. A satisfied one, “Transformation of K-Albanians) Struggle...”,f. 132.

[33] Lambro Philo & Ilira Chaushi, The history of the world. XX (Asia, Africa, Latin America), Albin, Tirana, 1995, pp. 7.

[34] Mahmut Bakalli, “The Albanians' Union requires new strategy and political approach”, Nation, Ways of the National UnionOnufri, New York, 1997, p. 306.

[35]AMEPJ, The year 1992, file 1102, Information concerning the dislocation of some Kosovars to a Elbasan Division department, Directorate of Diaspora, Information, pp.

[36] Sabit Syla, Word chance at the Memorial Academy for the Fall of martyrs Zahir Pajaziti, Edmond Hoxha and Hakif Zamenu, Pristina, 31.01.2019.

[37] T. Judah, Kosovo What ever needs..., f. 81.

[38] Journal The farmer, Pristina, October 2, 1997, p. 1.

[39] S. Ukhshini, Kosovo in EU foreign policy ... , f. 152.

[40] In the early 1990s, the organisations of the first groups and cells of the Kosovo Liberation War had begun, which preceded and led up to the formation of the Kosovo Liberation Army.

[41] The oath of Kosovo Liberation Army soldiers, date 28.11.1998, Prekaz. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1tRjHIH5UsMinn 2:45-04:00, approaching January 2, 2020.

[42] Kosovo Liberation Army, General Staff, No. 442-07661, Military Secret, Pristina, in 19,11.1998, Jakup Krasniqi, the Institute of History-Pristina, 2017.

[43] R. Cav, “International Diplomacy...”, p. 751-753.

[44]Right there., f. 753.

[45] Gafurr Elshani, Kosovo Liberation ArmyWS, Documents and Articles (second edition), “Kosovo Voice”, 1998, p. 248-249.

[46]Minorities at Risk Project...

[47]Sabit Syla, Word of the Memorial Academy on the 20th anniversary of Bekir Meha's fall, Ilir Lushtaku, Mustaf Qorri and Avdullah Kodra, Skender, March 26, 2019.

[48] Blerim Shala, Kosovo's years 1998-1999, Time, Pristina, 2001, pp. 33.

[49] R.

[50]Right there., f. 759.

[51] B. Shala, Kosovo's years..., f. 34-56.

[52] Shaban Sinan, Kosovo's Cyclone Eye, Lullo, Tirana, 1999, p. 10.

[53] J. Krasniqi: The great turning of the Kosovo Liberation Army, Pristina, “Gjon Buzuku”, 2006, p. 83.

[54] Kosovo: US envoy Richard Holbrook met the KLA, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n-mb4vX2gUk2nd of January 2020.

[55] Surprise as US opens contact with Albanian Guerrica Force, https://www.independent.ie/world-news/surses-as-us-opens-Contacts-with-albanian-guerrilla-force-26185338.html2nd of January 2020.

[56] Wolfgang Petrisch and Robert Puhler, The long road to war Kosovo and the international community 1989-1999, Pristina, “Koha”, 2002, p. 250.

[57] B. Shala, The diplomatic fight for Kosovo. Dialogue with Ambassador Christopher Hill, Pristina, “Voice”, 2003, p. 43.

[58] J. Krasniqi: The big turn..., f. 147.

[59] Tim Youngs, Kosovo: The Diplomat and Military Options, Research Paper, No. 98/93, International Affairs and Defense Action, House of Commons Library, London, 1998, pp. 7-11.

[60] United Nations Security Council Revolution No. 1199, 23 Septemmber 1998, pp. 2, http://unscr.com/en/resultions?y=1998Access January 2, 2020.

[61] T. Judah, Kosovo war and revenge, Pristina, “Koha” and Tirana “Shlk”, 2002, f. 231; W. Petrisch and R. Pihler, Long way to war..., f. 129-130.

[62] J. Krasniqi: The big turn..., f. 157.

[63] Enika Abazi, “The Role of International Community in Conflict Soluation. Which way forwards?”, Balkanologist V III (1), June 2004, pp. 27.

[64] P. Russell, “Heumanian Intervention in Kosovo: Fact or Fiction”, Dublin Eurepean Institute, 2004 p. 30.

[65] Serb massacres in Kosovo, https://rkrespondent.com/op-ed/maskrat-Serb-ne-Kosve-Viste-1998-1999/2nd of January 2020.

[66]Statement by North Atlantic Council on Kosovo, https://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-012e.htm2nd of January 2020.

[67] T. Judah, Kosovo war and revenge... f. 241.

[68] E. Ahaz, “The Role of International Community...”, p. 27.

[69] T. Judah, Kosovo war and revenge...,f.252.

[70] Ko su pregovorači, https://www.vreme.com/arhiva html/434/3.html Access to January 2, 2020.

[71] E. Ahaz, “The Role of International Community...”, p. 28.

[72] Hashim Thaci's biography, http://www.mfa-x.net/subdomain/oldwebsite/?page=1,1842nd of January 2020.

[73]Ramboulette Accords, Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo, Security of United Nations, 7 June 1999, https://peacemaker.un.org/sits/peacemaker.un.org/files/990123 RamboiletteAccord.pdfJanuary 2, 2020, pp. 9-62.

[74]Right there., f. 85.

[75] Eric Herring, “From Ramboulet to Kosovo councils: NATO War against Serbia and its follows”, The International Journal of Human Rights, No. 4:3-4, 2007, p. 226.

[76] P. Russell, “Heumaniarian Intervention...”, p. 44.

[77] E. Herring, “From Ramboullet to Kosovo accords...”, p. 227.

[78]UN International Peoples Fund Report (FNUAP), Geneva, May 25, 1999.

[79] dosi Lama, Kosovo, Kosovo Liberation Army, Tirana, 2005, pp. 361-362.