Washington Post: Peace comes if Kosovo, Serbia reach agreement

Some species of division work better than others

My earlier research, on division, as a solution to ethnic civil war, suggests that the division of territories and ethnic groups significantly increases the possibility of peace compared with the divisions that focus solely on territories. Using a World Bank data set, I saw 17 divisions that coincide with the end of ethnic civil wars between 1945 and 2004.

I created an index to determine the degree at which divisions and ethnic groups are involved in the conflict. This occurred in only eight of the 17 territorial divisions. Of these eight divisions, none experienced considerable violence during the first five years. A critical number because most civil war results experience the repetition of conflicts and the danger is higher in early years. This is an unpleasant result for most of us, who are devoted to the concept of multiethnic states because it suggests that, at least for ethnic wars, one of the best ways to achieve peace first can be done through division.

Ethnic groups after division of Kosovo

How did the partition of Kosovo work? The 1999 division of Kosovo from Serbia (before Yugoslavia) took into account a result of the average index, where important minorities remained on both sides of the border. As predicted in research, deadly armed violence returned, and in those areas where ethnic minorities were located, mostly in 2000-2001 in the Presevo Valley in Serbia and, in 2004 in Kosovo Mitrovica.

The latest blast spread rapidly throughout the country into Serb areas and other minority groups. These clashes led to dozens of deaths and tens of thousands of displaced people, with campaigns renovated by ethnic cleansing. My research suggests that, if the separation of Serbia and Kosovo for 1999 were to be done to more accurately reflect the country's demographic, instead of blindly following the limits set in 1947, this could have obviously had less violence during the war.

Not necessarily. Research into random research in question, conducted by micro-mechanisms of violence after the division in Georgia and Moldova, suggests that the causes of conflict in Kosovo are less driven by ethnic hatred and more by the weak capacity of the state, which is widespread in post-civil wars countries. When states manage to maintain their state infrastructure or rebuild that capacity after the conflicts, violence is most frequently repeated even when displaced minorities return to their homes before the war.

This suggests that members of ethnic groups who fought each other during a civil war can live together peacefully as long as the state is strong enough (if the state has the political will to allow minority returns is a critical but different issue). Ethnic hatred may be present, but violence can be reduced to a minimum an encouraging result for the peaceful construction of post-war multiethnicity.

How can Serbia and Kosovo achieve peace?

While the Presevo Valley has a majority Albanian-speaking population, Serbia has heavily controlled this territory since the 2001 Conchuli Agreement and the inhabitants of the valley, they cannot rebel in the future, without considerable foreign support from Kosovo, an event that is unlikely to occur, due to Kosovo's foreign policy goals, which concerns integration in the European Union and NATO.

While the Albanian minority may prefer to live under Kosovo rule, most will likely continue to work peacefully with Serbia, as long as Serbia's state institutions remain strong. This suggests that it is logical, for the Presevo Valley to remain within Serbia. The handover of this peaceful region's control over Kosovo now could lead to destabilising violence, as Serbian security forces withdrew and the minority Presevo groups, including more than 15,000 Serbs, probably fled. Kosovo's northern Mitrovica from the “Iber” River, up to the border with Serbia, is a different story. This territory has been almost exclusively Serb and has been effectively independent of Kosovo since 1999.

Although the 2013 Brussels Agreement has taken steps to integrate the region into Kosovo, including the establishment of northern security forces formally within a single Kosovo police force, the region is ethnically divided and functions autonomously. Ethnic Serbs still control the region's security. Reintegration of that area in Kosovo today can only be done by force, and that would probably lead to massive violence if the Kosovo government tries to control or mix with Serbian security forces, quasi-state. Serbia will almost certainly support its enclave in northern Kosovo in such a conflict, whether openly or informally, a scenario perhaps similar to Russia's support in eastern Ukraine today.

One way to preserve peace would be for Kosovo to give up the formal control of Serb areas in the north, accepting the division that has taken place at all. If this could end in exchange for recognising Kosovo from Belgrade, the possibility of long-term peace would be even higher. Critics of border changes argue that, doing so, there are risks for “opening a box of Pandora's new challenges for the entire region”. But this position fails to assess the international community's ability to accept non-convincing positions without causing instability.

The same risks, for example, were noted when dozens of countries lined up to recognise Kosovo's independence in 2008, denying the same right in Republika Srpska, a region with separatist ambitions within Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, there was no instability. Change of Kosovo border- Serbia may bring much debate, but does not need to open the door for further changes in other countries (Shekulli).