Border change reveals Kosovo's true value

Proposals for exchange of territories between Kosovo and Serbia have been rejected earlier by the European Union and the United States as naive and inappropriate, outdated simplification of ethnicity, incompatible with the contemporary international rate in the worst case. Yet, while not having general approval, this idea is now clearly gaining Western support.

Of course, this is about the Kosovo Albanian population, which since 1999 have seen the West as a steadfast friend. But these close plans highlight the reality of relations between Kosovo and foreign masters; The West has always been interested in Kosovo, not because of love for its people, but rather because of its instrumental value.

Instrumental value comes up to some extent for geopolitical reasons, but it has more to do with Kosovo's propagandistic value. “Salvation” Kosovo, and then building a Kosovo <x2-peace>” are expressions that have been used by the West since 1999 for them created an image of powerHis ability and his loving kindness, to show him to the rest of the world. Like many other foreign powers, the West cares for Kosovo, only not necessarily for people living there.

The instrument appearance of the West towards Kosovo can be seen through its recent history: when Kosovo's Parliament declared independence in 1990, it was simply ignored by the West; when Kosovo President-elect but unofficial Ibrahim Rugova applied to participate in the “Conference for Yugoslavia” of the European Union in August 1992, he was advised to stay away.

After all, Rugova's policy was the peaceful resistance in Kosovo that strongly recognized the other violent tactics used across the former Yugoslavia, but won only empty applause, climaxing with Kosovo's full disregard for the 1995 Dayton Accord.

Of course, NATO did a military intervention in 1999 and not surprisingly was welcomed by the Kosovo Albanians, even though Western support was limited. To avoid casualties, NATO's intervention dropped missiles of 4,500 meters; while this guaranteed NATO security, it still significantly limited their ability to protect civilians on earth.

Actually, the intervention of NATO accelerated even a massive round of ethnic cleansing conducted by Serbian forces, which NATO could not stop. But protecting the victims from Serbian aggression was not at all the main goal of intervention; General Wesley Clark, supreme commander of NATO, at the time it had said, “this was not a conflict only for Kosovo. It was not even the ultimate conflict with ethnic cleansing. It was a battle for NATO's future, for the credibility of the United States as power for world affairs”.

The fact that NATO was not fully motivated by a desire to help Albanians in Kosovo was, of course, little concern for hundreds of thousands of refugees who returned to Kosovo after Milosevic's surrender and shouted for their deliverers; so, UNMIK and KFOR were welcomed by the overwhelming majority of Kosovo Albanians who believed these organisations were committed to helping build a new free and prosperous Kosovo.

However, when NATO intervention ended, a mafia group inside U The CK began to capture Kosovo institutions, often through force use. Instead of facing this group, the internationals closed their eyes to their activities in exchange for guarantees to preserve a fabric of <x0ndrendite”, closely understood as a lack of large-scale conflict and ensuring that Albanian separatism found would not be supported.

Of course, Kosovo's simple citizens suffered as a result: when the elite robbed Kosovo's poor resources, people ended up with poor education, inadequate health care, environmental pollution and an increasingly corrupt political system, although it is self-aware that these sufferings were more tolerant compared to what they suffered during Milosevic's time.

After all, the lives of the people of Kosovo were less important than the image of Kosovo, which was presented by the West. In their determination to create a “Kosovo” that could be used in public relations, international actors made micro-managime extreme. It has been proven that the Kosovo flag, anthem, even the constitution and state are designed by internationals. While each aimed to create an image of Kosovo as “interethnic”, free “” and prosperous “”, reality was quite different. Kosovo continues to suffer from high unemployment rates, widespread corruption and ethnic divisions. The latter testimony to the thorny divisions that continue in Mitrovica and in majority Serbian cities such as Gracanica are evidence of the contrast between international rhetoric and the reality of policies they have imposed.

Ethnic quotas in parliament and other government institutions, as well as the establishment of ethnic municipalities, are policies introduced in Kosovo by internationals. Far from creating a functional multiethnic republic, however, these policies have legitimised ethnic differences as an acceptable political fragmentation. Thus, despite claims that are whispered by foreigners when they complain about Kosovo's lack of progress, Kosovo is not so concerned by “ancient ethnic hatreds”, as it is the victim of external mismanagement.

Although it appears independent since 2008, in recent years Kosovo has been forced to accept a series of requests from the international community despite the gross lack of public support; this includes the creation of Kosovo Specialised Chambers and the border agreement with Montenegro. Away from the project to improve people's lives in Kosovo, these agreements have largely aimed at facilitating the integration of Kosovo's neighbours into NATO and the EU.

Ironically, however, Kosovo's prospects for joining these organisations remain insignificant. Thus, in many ways, internationals love the people of Kosovo when they are “grateful foreign victims”; they are not thirsty, however, treating them as real and equal Europeans with the ability to make independent decisions that can be accepted in their ranks. Perhaps the most obvious evidence is the fact that Kosovo and Belarus remain the only countries west of Russia that do not qualify for Schengen visas. “

The distribution of power at the international level has shifted and Kosovo owners are reevaluating their priorities and alliances. As has been the case many times throughout its history, Kosovo is now the target of divisions of great powers. As the US and the EU clash to lead a new course, the depth of their commitment to visible, visible liberal norms, such as plurality and territorial integrity, is observed, so is their real commitment to Kosovo and its people.

Proposed border changes or any particular eufemism expose Kosovo's status as hostage from which many levels may be carved to serve foreign interests.