Kosovo and Serbia, a dangerous scheme

Bilateral distrust still separates the Kosovo Albanian dominant majority from its small Serb minority. Its authorities have almost won no control over the northern part of the territory, next door to Serbia, which is inhabited mainly by Serbs who have rejected its independence and live in complete division from the rest of the country. Since 2008, EU foreign policy has cost most of its energy to solve these problems through negotiations between Kosovo and Serbia.

Particularly difficult is the “issue of the north”, which repeatedly considers the Kosovo issue as it was before its independence. The two heads of state are now considering a comprehensive agreement. All or part of northern Kosovo will be “jepet” Serbia, in exchange for all or part of Serbia's remaining lands, which are close to Kosovo. In parallel, Serbia would accept Kosovo's independence and pave the way for full international recognition. The idea was changed a few weeks ago. Both parliamentary opposition, the Serbian Orthodox Church and most of Kosovo's public opinion speak strongly against him, as did most analysts. Berlin said border changes are unacceptable, even Kosovo's ruling majority seemed divided. However, Brussels remained conspicuously silent, and on August 24th, Washington offered to accept the exchange of territories. During a public debate, the two presidents suggested the agreement was imminent tomorrow.

Most of the objections raised against him are convincing. Border changes are usually dangerous, especially if motivation is ethnic, and this is especially true in the Balkans, where some states remain fragile. But both sides of the debate seem to forget that changing borders on ethnic basis has a clear precedent in that region, which the major Western powers built and many analysts firmly supported. I refer to Kosovo, of course, who left Serbia for a motivation that is the rejection of the fierce depression of Kosovo Albanians from the Milosevic regime that can be described safely as an ethnic cleansing. This, in addition to their broader political objectives, explains why in 2008 the main Western powers chose to extract an exception from their loyalty to the principle of territorial integrity of states, the authority of the UN and the citizen concept of citizenship, and allowed Kosovo to terminate the UN protectorate and secede from Serbia without the approval of Belgrade or the Security Council.

Indeed, a double division of Kosovo immediately separating Kosovo from Serbia and the north from Kosovo would probably have been a more appropriate solution. In 2007, however, informal talks on such a solution failed, and since then the discussion of the West and the biggest analysts on Kosovo is entirely in the language of border invisibility. But if a unilateral change of border on ethnic grounds was acceptable in 2008, why is it unacceptable in 2018? This opposition challenges both arguments by principle and by consequences, for the Balkans regularly adapted to the disputed secession of Kosovo: why would changing borders, less sensitive and consensual, have worse consequences? Of course, although supporters of Kosovo's independence cannot attract it very reliablely, argument by principle remains valid.

But its importance is not clear, because Kosovo never gained solid control in the north. According to the principle of effectiveness, which is probably the only basis for Kosovo citizenship, this could mean that the north never became part of the new state: so generally “the north” division would simply be giving up Kosovo's request for it. As for the effects of land swaps, critics mainly point to the dangerous consequences in Bosnia and Macedonia. However, they focus on the potential dynamics in those countries and seem to neglect the fact that this would be a consensual change of the border. This is a valid response, but what does “consensual” mean? Both Kosovo and Serbia are headed by very irresponsible governments, which seem to fear public debate on their political elections. Without popular support, an agreement between the two capitals is likely to leave a legacy of mutual doubts and territorial claims that can overcome the very purpose of the agreement. That would be enough reason to oppose him,

Even before we consider regional consequences. On the other hand, if the agreement was to be put to a referendum in both countries and if open and rational debate were allowed, its consequences would probably be much less dangerous, domestic, bilateral, regional and wider. However, this may be a controversial point, since no country is likely to meet that standard. A third opposition, and perhaps the biggest, concerns the fate of remaining minorities. Change of border is a way to resolve the minority issue, in fact: by leaving them more than by including them. The EU and the West have invested a lot in the recent solution: land swap rejection would be a reliable way to insist on it. (/Revista “European Polytics and Policy”, received from the Century)

*Andrea Lorenzo Capusela has been the director of the Kosovo Economic and Political Affairs office near the International Civilisation Institute in Kosovo. He is the author of the “State-Building Process in Kosovo: Democracy, Corruption and the European Union in the Balkans”)