Kosovo's “split” linked to the fragmentation of the Presevo Valley as next disaster

It is already known that among the largest and longest-term tragedies of Albanians both on the national and political plains and in economic, social and family terms, are the imposed and violent fragmentations of their ethnogeographic territory. In addition to the divisions of Kosovo's geoethnic trunk of Albanians and Kosovo that did not last from the Ottoman period to the liberation of Kosovo (1999), even the last two decades were unfortunately tested several versions of Kosovo's territorial-political recoponation, which are the enclaves, cantonisation, definition of two entities under the Cyprus model, territorial re-defining, decentralisation and the formation of new municipalities, revision and territory re-regulation, etc.

The idea for partitioning Kosovo just 50 years ago has emerged from “the Serbian nation's”, Dobrica Qosiqi. When he became chairman of the zablak (Serbia and Montenegro) Yugoslavia in January 1993 the 60:40% proportional project in Serbia presented him at UN headquarters in New York, but was rejected by co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference, S. Vens and R. Owen, fearing the division of BiH and Macedonia. In 2004 Qosqi became even clearer when it stresses that “Serbia has no biological force to preserve its territory”, so it needs to be divided and such definitions present “compromit between historical right and ethnic right and rational resolution of centuries-old interethnic antagonism”. The part that Albanians would get could be joined by Albania and the two peoples and the two states could live together, and for that purpose, the Belgrade authorities should talk directly to official Tirana, crossing Pristina. Some statements of the most responsible people of official Tirana recently go in this direction (Road Nis Merdare) Kukes to build without asking Kosovo; or Albanians must have a president!). All relevant international institutions, including the UN's KS, oppose partitioning of Kosovo, as they refuse to return to the pre-1999 situation or join any other state. We also find this in the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo of 2008 (entine 1 and 3).

1. It is clear that Kosovo's Serb majority north and the predominantly Albanian Presevo Valley are two geopolitical and geostrategic joints in the Balkans for which an acceptable, quality and long-term solution is required. The Presevo Valley, which extends to the central part of the Balkans, represents a territory-corridor linking the Morava Valley in the north with the Vardar Valley in the south, enabling easier and faster communication of Middle Europe to the South and beyond. It parallels the road (austrada) and international - important railways, which make up the so - called X Corridor, as one of the most important communication and transport lines in Europe, JL. These recently re-actualized ideas “new” and older “for resolving the crisis in the region under an agreement between Kosovo and Serbia, with the international community mediating. One of the ideas caught in the mouth is often the “exchange of territories” between the Presevo Valley and the northern Kosovo Valley. The Serbian side, being a nurse for the long-term inability to maintain relations between Albanians and Serbs at the level of “conflict frozen” and under the circumstances of institutional travel, even the goal of fast-forward EU accession, recently through media routes, but also prodoncings, largely from the low levels of political leadership, and more and more, are breaking the idea of exchanging territories. To benefit the most from dialogue so far unproductive with Kosovo, but also to reduce possible negative effects on domestic political, intellectual and religious opinion, he is openly reluctant to call it “the exchange of territories”, because Kosovo does not accept the independent state and as a whole considers it part of Serbia, so it is using “rural” or “correction <12>13> of the territory. These are unfortunately encountered by some Kosovo Albanian politicians, not without political and institutional weight!
2. Both regions have geostrategic and geopolitical importance for Kosovo and Serbia, but even wider. Kosovo's northern part has 1,002km surface²  (Leposaviq 539.05 km)² Zubin Potok 334.38 km²Zvecan 123.01 km² and North Mitrovica 5,46km²), 174 settlements. It's rich in lead-zing mining sources (Belloberda, Kodoric and Zhuta Perlin, Crnac, with estimated reserves of about 6.4 million tonnes in 1986, as well as the Zvecan Lead Writer, the Concentration in Leposaviq). Other resources include construction geological substances (56 million tons of melons in Paul Vodenica and Dren de Leposaviqi and building stones that are used mainly mamatic rocks). On the other hand, in the territory between Kosovo and Serbia, the Iber River has built the largest accumulate in the country -- Gazivoda's (Wyman) with a capacity of 390 million cubic metres of water and which is vital not only for the population of the northern part of Kosovo, but for the energy and industrial system in general. The accumulate was built in 1979, and its goal was to supply water to the population and to water about 20,000 hectares of land in the fields of Kosovo and Drenica. The thermocentrics cannot be imagined without safe water sources. T C Kosova A has a monthly water loss of 8 million cubic metres, while T C Kosova B about 9 million cubic metres. Only for the production of an MWh of energy is around 6 cubic metres needed ( TC Kosova A) and 3 cubic metres of water ( TC Kosova B. According to data, T C Kosova B, which is the key to energy production, is supplied only by the Iber-Lepenc hydrosystem, whose water comes from the Uyman accumulate.
3. With its continental position by no means Serbia agrees to lose Belgrade international railway Skopje Selahalic, which runs through Presevo and Bujanoc, the Belgrade highway, the newly built military base at Cepotin south of Bujanovac, as well as the territory of the Medvedja municipality. For those who do not know the context and the geospace specification of the Presevo Valley, its geopolitical and economic position, unless railways and highways are taken, what it means to negotiate for exchange territories between Kosovo and Serbia. The question is, Can the railway built in 1889 be taken? According to us, the answer is negative, because for the railway Serbia and its allies would wage a war, not Balkan, but European. In parallel with the railway goes the modern highway and Corridor X as major advantages for Serbia and its transport to Europe, JL. On the other hand, Serbia's idea of going out to the Aegean Sea dates back to the second half of the century. XIX through construction of the Morave-Wardar Canal, what some known time companies (two French, one German, one English and one American) expressed interest about. Due to complicated terrain (for the floating route) a whole cascad and canal system had to be established to eliminate hyposometric differences of 491.6m), the high financial cost and Russian intervention to be as present in the Balkans, the project failed. But in the heads of Serbs of then-Serbs, it was deeply embedded in the aspirations for going out to sea, as well as in today's Serbia, these aspirations (for the Morave-War channel just a few years ago) were insisted and Serbia's President Tomislav Nikollic, some ministers of the Government of Serbia, analysts etc.).
4. “Correct” or “rhear” of the territory between Kosovo and Serbia turns Kosovo back in the late years of BAR40, when with the R Constitution. P. Serbia's January 17th 1947 and in support of the laws for administrative-territorial division of 1947-1950, Serbia 7 villages of Presevo's Karadaku (Stanec, Maxhere, Depca, Pec, Ranatoc, Caraweika and Sefer), which until then belonged to the Gjilan County. He did the same for the villages of Dobros and Concul, who before joining the Bujanoc municipality had met Ranillug in Kosovo, as well as the two villages of Bunanoc Mountain, Zarbinca and Priboci. There have been many years since Lutfi Haziri, today the mayor of the Gjilan municipality and high-ranking LDK (former and official of Kosovo Central Power), reiterated the demand that these 11 villages return Kosovo and thus return the border to the 1956 (sic) line, which is incorrect because in this year there has been no shaking of Kosovo's internal borders, but only in 1959 and only north of Kosovo, as well as, as we noted, until 1950 at its birth! As the most powerful voice for “respecting” or “rigation <xx7> of the Kosovo-Lugin border, Haziri either has no clear concept of the Valley's spatial concept, like the many others, or behind his insistence lies another interest (within the interparty and in-party race for the vote of the municipality Albanians left in the Gjilan municipality by the 2000 armed conflict). We've heard how many times being so confused that the extent of Albanian settlements around the railway confuses it with those around the railway.
5. At the end of the years, Serbia took the next step in terms of more stable and efficient territorial and administrative organisation, but aimed at creating a more ethnic-demographic entity. So on November 26, 1959, Serbia gave “to” Kosovo 197km² of Raska's district, with 45 settlements, which went to the Zvecan district and in the whole small municipality, now existing in Kosovo of Leposaviqi, with 26 villages on April 3, 1952, with what the national composition of Kosovo was slightly changed. Leposaviqi as a settlement and small municipality so always has been in Kosovo and there has never been any exchange between Presevo and Leposaviqi, as the uninformed say. Presevo's round of LNC was linked to Macedonian party cells (Abdula Krasnica from Presevo was the delegate of ASMOM, held in the Prohor Pchinjski Monastery), while after this war, depending on political interests and the report of forces between Serbia and Macedonia, the Valley remained under Serbia and belonged to the Leskovci Vranje circle at once; a time when it was unveiled around the Presevo province's competency took over the Bunanoc.
6. The seven villages of Karadaku of Presevo municipality have a total of 31.2km², while the four villages of Bujanoc have 53.8km². A 50 - mile [85 km] territory² Unless it has any special significance to the surface, it's already on the edge of total dispopulation. While according to 2002 census data in the seven Karadaku settlements that are being coveted under a possible “exchange” have lived 656 residents, their numbers are now being brought in only a few dozen. In the village of Sefer, there are only 2 houses inhabited, in Stanec 5, in Pecchen none, in Ranatoc 3, in Caraweka 4, in Depca 5 and Maxhere 7. Economic and infrastructure development and increasing open military pressure in the border area with Kosovo, where these settlements lie, has forced residents to move towards Kosovo and the Valley's settlements. Shepherds and forests that are not known for wood mass, which would increase their use and processing opportunities, have caused the population to become an extensive beekeeper and the sale of trees as fuel for heating. “Erosion” demographic in the late 1980s and early 1990s of the last century had taken off. Along with communicative isolation, lack of elementary services and basic infrastructure equipment forced entire families to move to Kosovo, Presevo and elsewhere. Even the border villages of the Bujanoc municipality (Dobrosini and Konculi) have faced exiles towards Kosovo. Kosovo's border line with Serbia is waiting in the middle of the village of Dobros, while the great distance with the other settlements in the municipality of Bujanoc and the urban centre itself have oriented village residents to meet their needs in the town of Gjilan. Over the past 15 years, the devastating part of Dobrosin's inhabitants has been embedded in Gjilan, while Zarbinca and Pribovci are already on the verge of extinction.
7. Another “Exchange scenario” of the territory would have the railway's split line, reaching a area of 398km² (Albanian Presevo stake has 207.6km²Serbian section 56.4km² , while the Albanian part of Bujanoc has 227km² and Serbian part 234km² ). According to this scenario, Kosovo would join a whole generation of villages that lie at the foot of Karadaku's eastern slopes, from the village of Miratoc to the village of Lluukani, as well as the villages of the Bunanoc Mountain, including the Turrnocin of Turin. Out of the mapographic estimates of the valley's western surface of the railway, which date back to 398 km.² 48 settlements. Given that several ethnically clean Serb villages, such as Llapdinca, Raccoci, Red Srpska and Levosova, then the border line would be diverted westward to include these villages within the Serbian “section. Even from this Albanian scenario, losses would be found since more than half of the territory would be left out of the new political-territorial reality, even worse, because there would be a whole generation of villages lying at the foot of the western slopes of Ruyan: from Somolica to Strzoc (Although 9 sosh), as well as the villages of Moravica field (Buroca, Zunica and Chukarca).
8. Now how long Serbia is looking into all possibilities of fragmentation of Valley territory, whether through the formation of new small municipalities or through other forms, which would destroy territorial integrity as the only form of its long-term sustainability. Even if Kosovo and Serbia under pressure of international factor agree that a part of northern Kosovo, under the umbrella of demarcation or revision of borders (197km returns² of 1959) to join Serbia should not be affected by Valley territory. The destruction of its entirety is indeed the end of it. On the other hand, the Valley is preserved as a whole only if Kosovo functions as a state on its entire territory of 10,905,25km.². Remember Sandzak's fragmentation after the war World II, which led to its failure to exist, although it was a party-political entity during LNC (Oblasni committee KPJ za Sandak) and should have a status of territorial-political autonomy, if not Kosovo (Oblast), then at least cultural autonomy! Sandzak had 8,600 miles [8,600 km]² and split between Serbia (4,600 km)²) and Montenegro (4,000 km)²⁾, while for BiH there was not even “cure”! Although what Haziri offers remains for various speculations, however, Serbia can accept its “pherate” from not giving away “anything”, while taking “all”! But Haziri must strictly show what Kosovo should get from Serbia, which settlements, how many areas Kosovo will then have, and where the border line remains and what should be given to Serbia, which settlements, how much of Serbia will have and where the border will be. Political opinions on sensitive issues, without scientific arguments, are counterproductive and dangerous.
9. Serbia would also be ready to give up the town of Presevo because it is underdeveloped and there are no more than a hundred Serbs in the city, and a small colony, concentrated at the railway station. However, Presevo is not the whole Valley. The valley is much larger surface and population territory. Whatever the population-territorial size of the rest, that in biological-demographic view and intense migration will be “alleged” for a few years. Only as a whole can the Valley stand, as Kosovo has endured as a whole these last 100 years despite power pressure, violent deportations and economic pressure. Only as a large population have Macedonia's Albanians resisted the last 7-8 decades. The Albanian element in Prespa settlements and the suburbs of the monastery has already been elaborate so much that for a few years it may not exist! Even if the Valley is exchanged, including railway and highway, with Kosovo's north, seen as the maximum benefit for Albanians, it should be well estimated that even in this version Serbia again wins, because Kosovo's north possesses huge mineral and water wealth and this should be the red line. Even in terms of territorial size, Kosovo is a loser since the space above Ibran has an area of 1,002km.² , while Albanian belted Valley has an area of 434.6km². Even if railways, highways and Corridor X were taken over, could Kosovo manage these large infrastructure systems in relation to the vital interests Serbia has with Macedonia and Greece, and especially with the emotional connection to the railway?
10. The greatest achievement this last century is the liberation and independence of Kosovo and preservation of territorial integrity at the existing borders, at the territorial size of 10,905,25km.²As the expert Commission for measuring the territory of the Republic of Kosovo confirmed in January-February 2017. Any other adventure, for example. for “relating” of the territory, which is keeping Lutfi Haziri and others open, and most of which benefits Serbia, is the next tragedy for both Kosovo and Valley. Political and Kosovo valley and material producers are pretending to be uniting the Valley with Kosovo, noting that they are hurting both; this behavior leads to direct disadvantages in advancing the political-territorial status of the Valley Albanians. All of Kosovo's internal territorial recomponsations (Ahtisaari's Plan as a complete international document in the Constitution of Kosovo) and other processes stem from Vienna meetings in 2005-2007, where Valley and Albanians there are not even mentioned in the context of the amortisation of Kosovo Serbs' maximum privileges. Lutfi Haziri also attended those meetings. Even at the Brussels meetings (2015) the Presevo Valley and Albanians have not been mentioned. Now what do Hazirat want from around the border? Reviewing maps in the Balkans is over, while attempting to open the theme of changing borders at any cost in any part of the Balkans undoubtedly leads to bloody conflicts, transfer of the population, ethnic cleansing, etc. At least today it needs Albanians wherever they are. Tomorrow is something else.

* The text is not edited by Periscope.