Periscop analysis: What does Vetevendosje need to take power?

Instead of using the word “sociation”, the word “Zyednica” was used instead of “corruption” the word “was used “Hajni” and if there was any bad synonymous for “Demarkation” would also be used. In the assembly Vetevendosje used tear gas paralysing institutional life on the issue, which was raised by Ramush Haradinaj just to become prime minister, and was thus ratified. Daily, the activists of this party had overcrowded Facebook and occupied it completely through violent attacks and links to its critics. You could swear as much as you wanted Hashim Thaci, but if you revile him [or criticize him] Albin Kurti, or anyone of importance in Vetevendosje, suffered badly.

In 2017 we had positive developments within it. First, the discurs on the eve of the elections somewhat softened, and its word shifted from the nationalist programme to the economic one. Albin Kurti did not become prime minister, but turned out to be the most voted leader, but Vetevendosje became the largest party in the country.

That Vetevendosje thinks of itself as a pre- elite move, we could see it not only in the over-species of the extent it did not know otherwise, but also in the local election campaign where its leader composed poetry.

If we talk to the terms of Fryde, the Vetevendosje Movement had become the Superego of this society whose Idi was the PDK. But this Superego, this seemingly fixed tower, was half [not as much but as representation] as if it were paper when the word "mult" came to light. This word was not addressed to power, it was to the leader Albin Kurti. The party that was disciplining society through a series of psychological tactics brought to the ground its disinformation, its unnecessary privacy, and its internal struggle for power.

Now, it must be acknowledged that the Vetevendosje Movement has lost some of its most voted people and has lost its unsurpassed image. It was clearly confirmed that the party, which criticised the power that it dealt very much with Kosovo's approach in practice, was overly impressed with its party image.

Its economic programme has been marginalised for a long time by the nationalist programme. And that is likely to continue. Identifiable self - determination finds itself in a position above society that thinks of it as a priority, but it is clear that it too has been made of social values and expectations. It fed society's need for simple things, for direct political stakes, for violence even, but it seems to have been vulnerable to patriarchism and misoginism, and what is worse than even class and provincial prejudices.

Shpend Ahmeti as chairman The PSD told its membership that “was not necessary to look poor on.” No matter how problematic this statement itself is, it actually reveals that such a thing was wanted in the party headed by Albin Kurti. Why can it be believed that Vetevendosje did such a manipulation in education, in aesthetic terms, to lure the mass? Because he needed to speak as a measure, as did the poor to provoke resentment and reaction as he has done so far.

That the Vetevendosje Movement is disinterested in the practice of defending the interests of the poor class also shows its concentration in the capital. Its branches/points in other municipalities of the country are very weak, and it is clear that stronger ties [of why corrupt] to the poor class hold The LDK's PDK rather than this party who thinks of itself as left.

However, it must be acknowledged that the Vetevendosje Movement is the greatest hope of people seeking change in the country. But this hope has already wrinkled the cause of the failure to absorb the election result of last June. Vetevendosje seemed unwilling to assume the responsibilities of governing the country and failed to give up its perfection and form a coalition government with the LDK. Even today, she is unable to think of herself beyond perfection and admit her mistakes.

Mr. Chairman's own platform. Kurti proves that Vetevendosje does not plan the government with the country in the next three to four years. Kurt's project is to transform within society through a scheme in which its activists spend more time with citizens than with each other and to organize cultural and sports events in different localities. This non-initiative power scheme is organised by the PDK, the AAK's LDK, which has only reinforced their corrupt methods. Kosovo is not a country of twenty million people, and strengthening ties with poor classes should not distort in other forms of corruption that would simply look better.

Another suspicion may arise here: will the same aggressive, lynching mind shift from Facebook to reality? Possibly.

The Vetevendosje movement should not think of itself as being from a superior point of view and definitely give up on procrastination. She should not be afraid of the responsibilities that she offers power, or of possible contempt, and engage with pragmatism for a better social and political order.

Vetevendosje must probe through its nationalist discurs, including Ramboullet, and the Ahtisaari Pack, then Kosovo independence and rigid stance against negotiations. She should even rethink the referendum for joining Albania, which she has put at the expense of her economic programme. If Kosovo citizens have any major problems currently is economic inconsequential, the lack of adequate qualifications is the cause of quality in education, alarming unemployment and persistent corruption. A opposition platform that would solve these problems would again lure the country's citizens to vote and place them in position to take power. But, red lines for parties who are constantly elected from large parts of this society in the first place amnestimate the country's economic-political system [even, deglore it by assuming that corruption is generated by a certain power class], and promotes provincialism and civic conflict.